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Foreword 
 
The Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy consisted of numerous organizations. They all had 
longish names that wreak havoc on a dissertation with a 100,000 word limit. Luckily, the Soviet 
organizations excelled in the use of abbreviations. For pragmatic reasons I have expanded this use 
of abbreviations to include both international and Danish organizations and a full list of the many 
abbreviations utilized in the dissertation is found in appendix 1.Also due to the word limit the 
footnotes are full of abbreviations. They are listed in appendix 2. Finally, it should be noted that 
with the same pragmatic reason in mind the various parts of archival references in the footnotes are 
separated by “/”, as this approach saves me a lot of words. The bibliography includes a note on 
sources. 
Transliterations of names and place follow the Library of Congress style except in a few cases 
where another form is more commonly used (e.g. Moscow for Moskva or Trotsky for Trotskii). All 
place names correspond with the names in use at the time (eg. Leningrad and not Saint Petersburg). 
All quotes originally not in English have been translated into English by the author. 
This dissertation is primarily based on unpublished as well as published sources. I would therefore 
like to thank the archivists and librarians at  TORS library, Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og 
Arkiv, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Rigsarkivet, Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier , Lamont 
Library, Wiedener Library, and Harvard Law School Library. Especially Jesper Jørgesen at ABA.  
I am very grateful to the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies for housing me for one 
semester as a visiting scholar. My stay was made possible thanks to a EliteForsk rejsestipendium 
(‘EliteResearch Travel Grant’) awarded by Uddannelses- og Forskningsministeriet (‘The Ministry 
of Higher Education’). 
I would like to thank all those I have met along the way who had to suffer the long talks concerning 
Soviet cultural diplomacy. The dissertation has benefited from all your discussions and input. You 
all know who you are.  
I would like to thank associated professor Rosa Magnusdottir for her constructive criticism at my 
pre-defense without a doubt it made this finished version of the dissertation much better. 
Naturally, I am solely responsible for the way all the utilized materials are presented in this 
dissertation, and the conclusion drawn on that basis. 
I am very grateful to Tine Roesen, who stepped in as my new supervisor at a very difficult point in 
time, for your patience, comments, and technical know-how. 
5 
 
Finally thanks to Marianne and Sophia for patiently surviving my years as a PhD candidate and for 
traveling with me to Boston, arriving during the coldest winter ever recorded, so I could spend half 
a year in a library basement reading microfilms. 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my mother, paternal grandmother, mother-in-law, 
and my first supervisor, Professor Jens Nørgård-Sørensen, who all held a living interest in my 
dissertation, but did not live to see it finished. 
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Introduction 
 
“More than four centuries ago, Nicola Machiavelli advised princes in Italy 
that it is more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today’s world, 
it is best to be both. Winning the hearts and minds has always been important”. 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
1 
 
On April 3
rd
 1954 at a concert in The Smaller Hall at Odd Fellow Palæet (‘the Odd Fellow Palace’) 
in Copenhagen the Soviet violinist Mikhail Vaiman and the pianist Maria Karandasiova played a 
selection of – among others – Bach and Beethoven. A few days earlier the baritone Pavel Listsian 
had guest performed in the opera Bajadser at The Royal Danish Theater.
2
 
Although ordinary spectators most likely did not consider the reason, the performances of the 
Soviet artists did not take place by chance. They were in Denmark as part of a Soviet cultural 
delegation to commemorate the 30
th
 anniversary of the Danish-Soviet Friendship Association.
3
 
Such delegations visited Denmark and other countries annually. Each year the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved a drawn up plan for the cultural activities to 
take place.
4
 
 
SOVIET CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN DENMARK AS THE CASE STUDY 
 
Cold War studies have traditionally placed emphasis on the study of grand politics or diplomatic 
history – that is, super power politics, security politics, bloc politics and the balance of terror – 
whereas the struggle over hearts and minds has been largely neglected, and earlier research has 
almost exclusively focused on the Anglo-American actors. It is very peculiar that the high level of 
activity by practitioners of Soviet cultural diplomacy during the Cold War is almost inversely 
proportional with the research interest after the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, research on the 
American apparatus for state cultural diplomacy has turned into something of a research industry,
5
 
although this apparatus did not function as widely or for as long as the Soviet equivalent. This led to 
a problematic tendency of turning the cultural Cold War into an almost one-sided affair of shadow 
                                                 
1
 Joseph S. Nye, Jr: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York 2004), 1. 
2
 Politiken 3.29.1954; 4.4.1954. 
3
 KB/JJ/24 /General report  draft DKSU congress 1954. 
4
 E.g. RA/Danica/105/О мероприятиях по культурным связям со скандинавскими странами 4.18.1956. 
5
 Klaus Petersen and Nils Arne Sørensen: ”Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten. En indledning”, in Klaus Petersen og Nils 
Arne Sørensen (ed.): Den kolde krig på hjemmefronten (Odense, 2004), 23. 
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boxing of the USA vs. the USA where the Soviet Union with affiliations seemed to have 
mysteriously disappeared.
6
 
By turning the searchlight towards the cultural diplomatic activities of the USSR and including new 
archival sources with Denmark as the case study it is the aim of this dissertation to analyze a 
neglected field within Cold War studies concerning Soviet cultural diplomacy. 
The utilized archival documentation as well as other studies gives the impression that the attempted 
Soviet cultural diplomatic activities did not differ much whether from one side of the Iron Curtain 
to the other or from one continent to the next. It could be argued that the greatest difference from 
one country to the next is the quantity of activities. 
The level of activity in Denmark, the number of organizations and actors involved, and full access 
to numerous archival sources give us the perfect opportunity to present this first full analysis of the 
many corners of the Soviet apparatus for foreign cultural diplomacy 1945-1991, its products, and 
their possible impact. Regarding the title of this dissertation the emphasis will therefore be placed 
on the words “in Denmark”. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
When investigating the research interests wothin the cultural diplomatic activities of the USSR with 
affiliations in Denmark during the Cold War three key groups of research questions can be 
organized. We consider them equally important. 
  
1: How was the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy with international affiliations organized, 
planed and financed? 
2: What kind of activities took place? 
3: How were the activities perceived and received, and can they be said to have had any effect? 
 
With Denmark as our case study we can base our answers to these questions on examples and 
themes that may also be considered representative on a wider scale insofar as it is possible to find 
similar organizations and manifestations in most other countries. 
                                                 
6
 David Caute: “Foreword”, in Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (ed.); The Cultural Cold War in Western 
Europe 1945-1960 (London, 2003), viii. 
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Examples of  are the journal Fakta om Sovjetunionen [“Facts on the Soviet Union”] published in 
Danish, the Danish Language broadcasts by Radio Moscow, and other publications in Danish as 
well as activities within different forms of bilateral cultural agreements were concluded between the 
two countries. 
Alongside the state-sponsored Soviet activities, attempts were made to carry out activities with a 
postulated Danish point of origin in the form of front organizations such as Fredens Tilhængere 
(“Partisans of Peace”, the Danish affiliate of the World Peace Council). These organizations 
claimed to work independently of the interests of any political party, but in reality had an objective 
of furthering foreign policy aims of the USSR. This dissertation includes an analysis of these 
organizations. 
The most important Danish practitioner of Soviet cultural diplomacy was Landsforeningen til 
samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen (“The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and 
The Soviet Union”), the oldest organization of its kind in Denmark during the period 1945-1991.  
We label these forms of activities mass activities or mass propaganda, understood as activities 
aimed at as abroad an audience as possible that is, a quantitative criterion of measuring success. 
It is also possible to identify forms of individual propaganda understood both as activities aimed at 
individuals (such as trips by delegations or tourists and the participation of individuals in the 
activities of peace movements) or the publication of materials favorable to Soviet state’s points of 
view. 
We will attempt to measure whether the mass or individual activities affected the Danish publics’ 
view of the Soviet Union. 
  
THE CULTURAL COLD WAR 
 
This dissertation falls within a relative new research trend in international Cold War studies of the 
last 15-20 years, the cultural Cold War. 
This tradition perceives the Cold War as driven by an ideological contradiction between the liberal-
democratic NATO countries and the Marxist-Leninist Warsaw Pact bloc.
7
 
                                                 
7
 Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS): Danmark under Den Kolde Krig: Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 
1945-1999 I (2005), 57-85; Kim Frederichsen: ”Kulturens Kolde Krig: Om behovet for nye veje i forskningen”, 
Historisk Tidsskrift 2010(110):2, 525f; Torsten Boring Olesen: ”Den Kolde Krigs historie”, in John T. Lauridsen et. al. 
(ed.): Den Kolde Krig og Danmark (2011), 15. 
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Following this approach, the Cold War becomes a conflict between two Weltanschauungen both of 
which attempted to organize cultural life, especially high culture, as a political and ideological 
weapon utilized in the competition between two narratives of modernization.
8
  
Therefore, cultural issues not only add a third pillar to traditional security or economic studies of 
international relations, they also influence and broaden our definition and understanding of power, 
security, and economic relations in an international system. This does not mean that a cultural 
approach aims at establishing a new general paradigm for international history – rather it aims to 
add a new dimension of international relations within the more traditional studies of diplomatic 
history.
9
 
The international cultural competitions have not received the same level of interest in mainstream 
historiography on the Cold War as the above mentioned themes as they have been perceived not as 
decisive “high politics” but as “low politics”. Nigel Gould-Davies warns against this mistake 
showing how at the end of World War II three factors influenced the fast creation of a new pattern 
of global conflict:  
Firstly, the victors held a strong mutual distrust against the model of society chosen by the other 
side.  
Secondly, the invention of nuclear weapons created an incentive to avoid a direct military 
confrontation.  
Thirdly, since neither of the first two factors can explain the proportions or intensity of the 
confrontation between the super powers, a third and more important factor has to be included, 
namely the ideological clash of interests. The super powers had crucially disparate conceptions of 
how politics, economics and societies should develop. Hence, on its own, military strength did not 
play the decisive role in defining the Cold War. This is seen most clearly by studying the end of the 
Cold War. A possible victory in the Cold War could only be defined as a complete reorientation of 
the ideological system of the other side. When the ideological conflict ended, so did the Cold War.
10
 
It is important to note that the USSR folded with its nuclear arsenals intact. This goes to show that 
military strength does not always determine the course of power struggles. The economic, 
ideological, cultural, and moral elements of the erosion of capabilities have to factor in as well.
11
 
                                                 
8
 Jessica C.E.  Gienow-Hecht: “Culture and the Cold War in Europe”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (ed.): 
The Cambridge History of the Cold War vol. 1 Origins (Cambridge, 2010), 399-409. 
9
 Eckart Conze: ”States, International Systems, and Intercultural Transfer: A Commentary”, in Jessica Gienow-Hecht 
and Frank Schumacher (ed.): Culture and International History (New York, 2003), 198, 200. 
10
 Nigel Gould-Davies: “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy”, Diplomatic History 2003(27):2, 193-96. 
11
 John Lewis Gaddis: We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford, 1997), 284. 
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This makes way for a new analytical approach to the study of the Cold War, with a focus on the 
ideological and cultural aspects instead of solely on the traditional view of a political and military 
conflict between super powers. Culture was utilized as an instrument to make the European 
populations support the policies of one super power or the other. Making a good impression in the 
cultural sphere was meant to cement political sympathies and anti-sympathies.
12
 The cultural Cold 
War is an example of the utilization of comprehensive state strategies in peace time incorporating 
culture into a campaign directly aimed at defeating the adversary.
13
 
In this regard it is important to bear in mind how people obtained the knowledge that formed their 
sympathies or antipathies. Traditional research on the Cold War places emphasis on the minutes of 
parliamentary proceedings, what one civil servant said to the other, what was stated in defense 
analyses, or in the international framework such as the arms race or ideological divisions. However, 
it is not necessarily politicians and their decisions that form the opinions of ordinary citizens. 
Instead, emphasis should be placed on the knowledge obtained from printed or other cultural 
sources, both high and popular.
14
 
It would be fair to argue that the Cold War, as it was fought in Europe, was not marred by wars by 
proxy unlike most other parts of the world between 1945 and 1991 and cannot be understood 
simply as a political and military confrontation between the leading powers, but as a confrontation 
between Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica (understood not only as peace, but peace on the terms of 
either one of the super powers). It is not only the rapid growth of the American and Soviet nuclear 
arsenals that must be taken into account, since they would make a direct military confrontation 
suicidal, but also the ideological and cultural competition that was without historical precedent. The 
parties placed emphasis on demonstrating a cultural supremacy understood as broadly as possible, 
including everything from sports and ballet to comics and space travel, in order to win the hearts 
and minds of the targeted foreign publics. The cultural Cold War was a constant struggle to win this 
battle, utilizing the printed word, radio, movies, TV, and concert halls. Propaganda became the 
main weapon used by both sides in what was primarily a clash between cultures and ideologies.
15
 
 
                                                 
12
 Iben Vyff: Øst, Vest – hvilken fremtid er bedst? Danskere på rejse i USA og Sovjetunionen i 1950’erne (unpublished 
PhD dissertation, Roskilde Universitetscenter, 2007), 3, 61-62. 
13
 Scott Lucas: “’Total Culture’ and the State-Private Network: A Commentary”, in Gienow-Hecht/ Schumacher, 207. 
14
 Kim Salomon: En femtiotalsberättelse: Populärkulturens kalla krig i Folkhemssverige (Stockholm, 2007), 21-23. 
15
Simon Adams: Propaganda in War and Peace: Manipulating the Truth (Chicago, 2006); David Caute: The Dancer 
Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford, 2003), 1-6; Scott Lucas: Freedom’s War: 
The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-56 (Manchester, 1999), 2; Tony Shaw: ”The Politics of Cold War 
Culture”, Journal of Cold War Studies 2001(3):3, 59. 
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Soviet cultural diplomacy. To wage cultural Cold War it was necessary to have access to both the 
domestic front and the front of the opponent. The USSR had an advantage; At least until the 
emergence of new communication technologies that could penetrate deeply behind the Iron Curtain, 
it was possible to maintain a just about hermetically sealed information environment where the 
Soviet world-view could prevail and through state controlled media outlets have a high level of 
capacity to provide the information and shape the opinions of its citizens on the intentions of the 
outside world.
16
 Furthermore, the USSR had free and complete access to the territories and the 
populations of the other bloc countries both through official channels such as embassies, consulates, 
and press agencies, and through loyal affiliations such as communist parties, friendship societies 
and other similar organizations in a free market for cultural manifestations – even if the aim was to 
struggle against the governments and democratic societies.
17
 At the end of World War II the USSR 
immediately launched a propaganda offensive through every available channel to seize the initiative 
in formulating the terms of the struggle or debate over the international discourse on international 
affairs. As my previous research has shown, America in this respect became the reactive part. 
Firstly, they had to answer to an already functioning and well-oiled Soviet machine. Secondly, in 
April 1967 the Californian journal Ramparts exposed the American financing through the CIA of an 
international network of organizations for cultural diplomacy leaving the field undisputedly in the 
hands of the Soviet run and financed counterparts.
18
 
The Soviets pursued a strategy of presenting themselves as the bearers, protectors, and promoters of 
European Bildung and Kultur against (according to the Soviet stance) the threat of American 
degenerating low (popular) cultural and political influence.
19
 
As exemplified by the Danish case, the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy functioned in a 
number of forms, manifestations and products.  
Firstly, there were the official news agencies with their newsletters, journals, and book publications.  
Secondly, the USSR displayed high or folkloristic culture primarily through the friendship societies 
with the Soviet Union in foreign countries and promoted causes such as “peace” or the interests of 
particular groups whether it was “women”, “youth”, “students”, “workers” or some other party. 
This system contained a network of international organizations with national branches. 
                                                 
 
16
 Philip M. Taylor: Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day New 
Editon (Manchester, 1995), 253. 
17
 Bent Jensen: Ulve, får og vogtere: Den kolde krig i Danmark 1945-1991 I (Copenhagen, 2014), 369. 
18
 Frederichsen (2010a), 535; Taylor (1995), 255. 
19
 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht: “How Good Are We? Culture and the Cold War”, Scott-Smith/ Krabbendam, 274-275. 
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Thirdly, the KGB used active measures or agents of influence through disinformation campaigns. 
KGB functioned not only as an internal security policy and external intelligence service, but also as 
an active actor in the Soviet disinformation onslaught on the West.
20
 
According to Clive Rose, we can identify a number of main objectives of Soviet cultural diplomacy. 
The key element was to project an image of the Soviet Union as the guiding force in the struggle for 
peace in the entire world and to present all of its plans and actions within the framework of this 
struggle. Following this, they attempted to project an image of the USA as the opponent of world 
peace and in this manner undercut the international influence of the other super power. Similarly, 
the USSR worked to further criticism of the USA and NATO in public discourse in Western 
countries and at the same time to present itself as the foremost supporter of movements struggling 
against imperialism and capitalism in third world countries. As part of the peace struggle, the USSR 
attempted to negotiate and enter into practical contracts with western countries in areas such as 
weapons control, promoting actions to further the establishment of relationships based on trust. In 
Soviet “newspeak” this meant the downscaling of western defense capabilities without noteworthy 
limitations on the Soviet Union’s possibilities to uphold its own capabilities. Such negotiations 
were entered into especially if they were to the economical or technological advantages of the 
USSR or to avoid the tensions that would limit the Soviet Union’s opportunities to pursue its own 
ideological goals or threaten their conquests in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world.
21
 
To pursue these aims, the USSR operated a foreign policy apparatus consisting of three dimensions: 
Regular diplomacy executed through the Peoples’ Commissariat/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Revolutionary diplomacy executed through the Comintern/The International Department (ID) of the 
Secretariat of the CPSU CC. 
Cultural diplomacy executed through a network of organizations run by VOKS/SSOD.
22
 
Although we acknowledge that several conceptual models for the cooperation or competition over 
the allocation of resources or influence on the decision making process between various actors or 
organizations in the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy could be presented
23
 it would lead us 
too far astray from the theme of the dissertation. To some degree these questions concerning the 
                                                 
20
 Ole Hasselbalch: Den stille krig: Sovjetiske påvirkningsoperationer mod Danmark under den kolde krig – 
forudsætninger, teknik og resultater (Copenhagen, 2001), 28-30. 
21
 Clive Rose: The Soviet Propaganda Network: A Directory of Organizations Serving Soviet Foreign Policy (London, 
1988), 23-24. 
22
 Jean-Francois Fayet: ”VOKS: The Third Dimension of Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. 
Donfried (ed.): Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (New York, 2010), 34. 
23
 Graham T. Allison: “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Paul R. Vitotti and Mark V. Kauppi (ed.): 
International Relations Theory (New York, 1993), 342-374. 
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various actors’ attempts at influencing the decision making process within the various layers of the 
Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus will be discussed in further chapters. Therefore it is sufficient 
to state here that although competition
24
 as well as cooperation
25
 between interest groups of the 
Soviet apparatus can be identified, one should not forget that despite these possible competitions the 
archival evidence indicates that, due to the ideological consensus, the end goals as identified above 
were commonly accepted by all possible groups. 
 
CULTURE, A DEFINITION 
 
A central term has been mentioned repeatedly: Culture. 
For the purpose of this dissertation we will proceed from the definition of culture in a theme issue 
of the Journal for Cold War Studies on the cultural Cold War. Here, culture is very broadly defined 
as a system of meanings that enables humans to translate their instincts, urges, needs, and other 
propensities into representative  and communicative structures including language, visual symbols, 
gestures, codes, art, and texts that a social group creates and uses to carry out its daily life and 
routines.
26
 
By such a definition culture could be seen as a controversial or disputed object that could mean 
different things to different people at different times and thereby lead to a situation where the 
concept of culture becomes so broad and all-encompassing that it is no longer analytically 
meaningful. A concept that includes more or less every human phenomenon runs the risk of losing 
its value as an analytical tool.
27
 
To avoid these dangers of non-definition we shall identify the central manifestations of Soviet 
cultural diplomacy (that is culture utilized for an ideological purpose) that we are going to analyze 
in the following chapters:
28
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 H. Gordon Skilling: “Interest Groups and Communist Politics: An Introduction”, in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn 
Griffiths (ed.): Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, 1971), 3-45. 
25
 Mark Kramer: “The Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and National Security 
Policy”, Soviet Studies 1990(42):3, 431-433. 
26
 Muysa Glants and Pamela Kachurin: “Special Issue: Culture, The Soviet Union and the Cold War: General 
Introduction”, Journal of Cold War Studies 2002(4):1, 3. 
27
 Conze: 199; Volker Depkat: “Cultural approaches to International Relations”, in Gienow-Hecht/ Schumacher, 178, 
181. 
28
 The following is developed and expanded based on Caute (2003b), 15; Gould-Davis, 196-212. 
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• Performing arts (theatre, cinema, ballet). 
• Musical arts (classical, jazz, popular) 
• Visual arts (painting, sculpture, poster art) 
• Tourism and exchanges (travel, delegations, tourism, congress/conference/festival 
participation, and education). 
• Print media (brochures, journals, magazines) 
• Mass media (Radio and TV broadcasts) 
• The spoken word (lectures, conferences, seminars, speeches) 
• Sport (bilateral friendship matches, international championships, the Olympic Games) 
 
The above categories are not chosen by chance. The chairman of the Council of Ministers’ State 
Committee on Cultural Contacts Abroad (GKKS), Sergei Romanovskii, in his 1966 book on Soviet 
international cultural and scientific contacts highlighted exactly these elements as the key elements 
of Soviet cultural connections.
29
 Similarly, as early as 1917 Lenin pointed to the possibility of 
utilizing scientists, artists, writers, painters, musicians and the new forms of mass communication 
for propaganda on an ideological front.
30
 Throughout his book Romanovskii gives numerous 
examples of how the Soviets followed the Leninist line of thought considering the utilization of the 
various manifestations for the popular promotion of the USSR abroad.
31
 
In addition to the aforementioned concert, we shall use ballet as an example. High arts such as 
ballet and ballet troupes such as the Bolshoi or Kirov ballets in czarist Russia, were awarded a 
special highbrow imperial status and protection. Interestingly, following the Bolshevik takeover 
they became part of a Soviet cultural project aimed at a complete cultural transformation of society 
and the utilization of high culture to create political and ideological allegiance. As a form of high 
culture ballet was transformed from elite culture to popular culture and an art form of national pride 
that also showcased the level of kulturnost (general cultural education) of the Soviet population. 
Ballet was one of the fine arts forms utilized internationally to provide the USSR with a sheen of 
cultural legitimacy, and the dancers functioned as cultural ambassadors abroad by showcasing that 
                                                 
29
 С.К. Романовский: Международные культурные и научные связи СССР (Москва, 1966), 3. 
30
 Shaw, 60. 
31
 Романовский. 12-114. 
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the performance and forms of Soviet culture and thereby the society that promoted them were 
superior to those of the West.
32
  
Romanovskii states that for the Soviets, tourism was considered to be one of the most important 
ways to promote mutual understanding between the peoples of the USSR and foreign countries. 
Tourism was actively used to promote the building of socialism and present the richness and 
diversity of the cultural level and heritage in the USSR. As such, it was a field in constant 
development with new routes, cities and resorts opening for foreign tourists every year. 
International tourism was considered an instrument in the struggle for mutual understanding, peace 
(in the special Soviet definition of that term), and friendship.
33
 As such, The Soviet government 
viewed tourism and travel not merely as vacation travel, but as a means in the international 
ideological struggle. Incoming tourists were treated according to the framework of “polittourism”. 
Visitors should forget their false images of USSR created by western press by meeting Soviet 
citizens, touring model factories and collective farms, and spread the word of their impressions 
upon arriving home. In accordance with the techniques of hospitality,
34
 specific plans for working 
with each tourist group were developed. The Soviets acknowledged that it might not immediately 
change a person’s political views, but it could limit the leeway for anti-communist propaganda, and 
give a foundation to build on. Guides were instructed in how to propagandize economic and social 
developments under socialism, how to answer critical questions, and how to identify foreign agents 
in an international tourist group. In the case of delegations the Soviets wished for a high a profile of 
its members as possible especially key figures such as politicians, popular public figures, opinion 
makers, unionists, scientists, teachers, and journalists, or members of peace, youth or women’s 
organizations. It was hoped that they would have something positive to say about their trip both 
upon arriving home and in the Soviet press, as both could be used to legitimize the Soviet 
government abroad and at home.
35
 
Another example is sports. Sport played an important role in the Soviet project of projecting a form 
of society superior to the capitalist both in the form of exchanges and friendly matches, and 
eventually in participation in the Olympic Games. The games and other international 
championships came to be viewed as venues for playing out the conflict of the cultural Cold War as 
competitions to prove the superiority of one political system over the other. As with other Soviet 
                                                 
32
 Christina Ezrahi: Swans of the Kremlin: Ballet and Power in Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh, 2012), 3-4, 68, 91, 137-139, 
149. 
33
 Романовский, 127-134.  
34
 See Chapter 1. 
35
 DIIS II, 366-370. 
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citizens travelling abroad Soviet athletes were expected not only to perform well but also to 
promote the Soviet ideology.
36
 
Our research interest is not the cultural objects in themselves, nor their possible aesthetic value, but 
the value of their political utilization by Soviet and Soviet aligned government and non-government 
organizations. 
 
ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
 
The historian David Caute warns against the charms of archival reading rooms where one might too 
easily be seduced by the idea that the more or less hidden hand of promotion always explains the 
product.
37
 However, Caute’s warning leaves would-be historians of Soviet cultural diplomacy in 
dire straits as to what then to utilize as source materials. Naturally, paintings, posters, sculptures, 
and so on can continue to exist beyond their time and context of creation, although not necessarily 
in the same condition as at the time of origin. This problem becomes even greater in regards to oral 
disseminations. Even if speech manuscripts have survived or have been summarized in the print 
media, there is no guarantee that the speaker has stuck to the script or that the summary is correct. 
Similarly, it is usually possible to locate a recording of a specific musician, orchestra, singer, or 
choir. But this will only seldom reproduce the specific event in question. Therefore, unprinted and 
printed source materials still remain the best means to document the organization, implementation 
and evaluation of the activities. 
The bibliography contains a full discussion on the utilized archival sources. Here I will only note 
that the key sources for the dissertation are primarily Danish and to a certain extent former Soviet 
archival materials stored outside Russia, especially at Lamont Library.
38
  
Generally speaking, it should be noted that archival sources seem to be better preserved for earlier 
periods of the Cold War, whereas they seem to dry out somewhat for the later years. In addition 
there is a flood stream of printed materials published by the involved organizations, and finally a 
few interviews were made. 
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David Caute laments that: “In the cultural field Soviet Studies and Cold War Studies do not inhabit 
the same planet”. 39 This dissertation aims at contributing to bringing these fields closer together by 
following Volker Depkat’s suggestion40 of expanding the field of Cold War Studies to recognize the 
importance of the role of culture in the conflict.  
 
METHOD AND OUTLINE 
 
This dissertation follows a classic source critical approach in answering the research questions. Due 
to the sheer magnitude of both the availability of source materials and manifestations of the cultural 
production of the Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark during the Cold War, it will often be 
necessary to give some kind of a quantitative presentation of the research results and then choose 
representative examples to present as case studies. 
The dissertation consists of nine chapters. 
The first chapter presents the theoretical and methodical framework of the dissertation, reviews the 
historiography, the main theories within the field, and the key schools within Soviet and Cold War 
studies, defines some key terms, and ends with the formulation of theoretical synthesis defining the 
methodical framework of the empirical research.  
The second chapter discusses how the structures of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy were 
organized and financed, and how decisions were taken. 
The following seven chapters analyze the organizations (especially the Danish) involved in Soviet 
cultural diplomacy, their activities, and discuss their possible impact. The chapters generally follow 
a chronological structure; 1945-1949 (in the spirit of the Grand Alliance), 1949-1956 (the first 
peace offensive), 1956-1974 (the humdrum years, 1974-1985 (the second peace offensive), and 
1985-1991 (the Glasnost years), although the start and end years should be regarded as indicative 
and not as set in stone. Two chapters will discuss long lasting Soviet activities that defy the 
chronology of the remaining chapters. Finally, the conclusions are drawn. 
In Danish historiography the Cold War, and especially the question of Soviet cultural diplomacy 
activities and participants, is a very sensitive topic. Therefore, it is very important to note that this is 
a dissertation within the field of history, not law. When describing and documenting the forms and 
practitioners of this involvement, we do not in any way imply that any Danish citizen named could 
                                                 
39
 Caute (2003b), 614. 
40
 Depkat, 177. 
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or should have been accused, tried, or convicted for committing any sort of criminal act in 
accordance with chapters 12 and 13 of the Danish Criminal Code. This Danish “fifth column law” 
did not forbid in peacetime (including the time of a Cold War) the promotion of views of foreign 
states against the political development or foreign policy of Denmark nor the acceptance of hidden 
economic support.
41
 In other words, the concepts of “cultural diplomatic practitioner” or “agent of 
influence” as used in this dissertation should in no way whatsoever be understood to imply the 
concept “spy”.  
  
                                                 
41
 Jensen (2014) II, 186-215. 
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Chapter 1: Approaches 
 
“Revisionism is a healthy historiographical process, and  
no one, not even revisionists, should be exempt from it”. 
John Lewis Gaddis
42
 
 
Invoking Isaah Berlin’s famous essay, Richard Ned Lebow compares political scientists to 
hedgehogs and historians to foxes. Political scientists, like hedgehogs, know one big thing very well 
and try to invoke it repeatedly, believing that one complex explanation for seemingly complex 
situations can be applicable for a wide range of situations. Historians, like foxes, know many things 
and tailor their strategies to the circumstances, believing every historical situation to be unique, and 
propose varied and layered explanations based on the assumption that complex events have 
complex causes.
43
 However, as Lebow criticizes, both political scientists and historians lack a 
connection between their fields and he points to the need for cooperation between theories of social 
science and the empirical studies of history. 
With this in mind the aim of the current chapter is to discuss the historiography of the study of the 
Cultural Cold War, the periodization, theories on methodical approaches, and various schools on 
Soviet, Cold War, IR theory, peace movements, and communism history with the purpose of 
establishing a balanced theoretical basis for the empirical study of Soviet cultural diplomacy in the 
following chapters. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
Although the field of Cultural Cold War studies is growing, research still tends to show a strong 
numerical majority of studies of the Anglo-American side over the Soviet side. Comparative studies 
of cultural diplomacy of both super powers are an even rarer find.
44
 Considering studies of Soviet 
cultural diplomacy it is notable that studies usually do not attempt to present the full picture, but 
instead discuss a special national framework, a particular theme, and/or movement or organization. 
  
                                                 
42
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Danish studies have so far been dedicated to partial studies of the early period,
45
 examples of 
activities,
46
 finding aids to the archival records
47
, a festschrift published by the major Danish 
organization involved in the activities
48
, a description of the perception of the Danish public of the 
activities,
49
 a study of the Soviet cultural center in Copenhagen,
50
 two preliminary studies to this 
dissertation,
51
 and the knowledge of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) of said 
activities.
52
  Only some of the studies such as those by Bent Jensen, this author, and DIIS have 
accessed relevant Danish and Soviet archival sources whereas the PET white paper is based on the 
incomplete files of the PET. However, as its task was to study the PET’s knowledge of the 
activities
53
 this was to be expected (and still rewarding, since prior to its publication this area 
constituted a blind spot in our knowledge), the problem being that no attempts to validate the 
perceptions of the PET were undertaken, and that the PET archival materials considering the history 
of other organizations were used uncritically. The same angle of interest is to be found in a 
Norwegian white paper on the Norwegian police intelligence and security services monitoring of 
politically engaged Norwegian citizens.
54
 
Likewise, international research repeats the tendency of national frameworks and singular themes, 
for example on the respective friendship societies with the USSR in Norway
55
, Sweden,
56
 Finland,
57
 
Canada,
58
 Great Britain,
59
 or Czechoslovakia.
60
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Existing studies focus on different themes such as the financial support of foreign communist 
parties
61
, tourism and travelling,
62
 sports,
63
 organizations such as The World Federation of Science 
Workers (WFSW)
64
 or The Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF),65 various 
international manifestations,
66
 a particular part of the Soviet apparatus 
67
 such as VOKS
68
 or 
activities within a certain time frame.
69
 Examples of Soviet practices prior to World War II
70
 give a 
clear impression of a form of continuity in the Soviet practices from the interwar years to the Cold 
War. These studies make good use of the possibilities to access former Soviet archives. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be said about Danish research on for example the Soviet use of inviting 
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travelers or students.
71
 These studies do not utilize Soviet source materials, and this omission causes 
them either to forget to consider a possible Soviet agenda behind the activities, or to simply and 
uncritically group together (sometimes impressive) listings of activities, practitioners or 
organizations in this or that cultural field.
72
 Despite the fact that several Danish studies show that it 
is possible to include considerations of the Soviet agenda even without possessing archival access
73
 
or the necessary linguistic skills.
74
 
During the Cold War Western studies tended not only to present research results but also to warn 
against falling for the siren songs of Soviet propagandists.
 75
 Authors of directories
76
 on the Soviet 
cultural diplomatic apparatus such as the annual reviews in Problems of Communism or Yearbook 
on International Communist Affairs made use of the publications of the organizations themselves. 
The same can be said for studies of departments in the Soviet party apparatus
77
, news agencies,
78
 
reviews of Soviet cultural diplomacy,
79
 or critical assessments of their western supporters.
80
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Although current Russian studies on Soviet foreign policy often neglect the element of cultural 
diplomacy,
81
 even in studies of bilateral relations,
82
 a new tendency of research interests in Soviet 
cultural diplomacy can be noticed especially regarding the interwar years
83
 or in specialized studies 
on news agencies,
84
 tourism,
85
 sport
86
 or key figures.
87
 A general trend is to publish collections of 
transcripts of sources either in the form of general collections of central Soviet organizations
88
 or on 
specific subjects such as education
89
 or sports.
90
 Since the end of the Cold War several Soviet key 
players published their memoirs
91
 Likewise, DKP members have published memoirs, which 
occasionally contain valuable information for this dissertation
92
 
As noted the above mentioned works generally give the impression of focusing on specific themes 
often within a given national context. Although due to space restrictions this dissertation must 
adhere to the latter principle, we shall attempt to draw a much fuller picture of the Soviet activities 
in Denmark. 
 
 
 
                                                 
81
 E.g. Владимир Гранин: Слово и дело: История советской дипоматии (Ростов-на-Дону, 2010); Леонид 
Млечин: Холодная война: Политики, полководцы, разведчики (Москва, 2011). 
82
 E.g. Леннарт Самуэлсьон, Александр Рупасов: Советско-шведские отношения: Вторая половина 1940-х-
начало 1960-х гг. (Москва, 2014). 
83
 E.g. А.В. Голубев, В.А. Невежин: Формирование образа Советской России в окружающем мире средствам 
культурной дипломатии 1920-е-первая половина 1940-х гг. (Москва/Санкт-Петербург, 2016). 
84
 АПН: От Совинформбюро до РИА “Новости“: 60 лет в поле информационного напряжения (Москва, 2001). 
85
 А.А. Иванов: История российского туризма (IX-XX века) (Москва, 2011); Йожеф Шнайдген, Игорь Орлов, 
Вардан Багдасарян: Советское зазеркалье. Иностранный туризм в СССР в 1930-1980-е годы (Москва, 2007). 
86
 Прозуменщиков. 
87
 Н.В. Борисова: Нина Попова: Хизнь как создание (Елец, 2005); Нами Микоян, Феликс Медведев: Екатерина 
Фурцева: Любимый министр (Москва, 2012). 
88
 В.Ю Афиани (отв. ред.): Идеологические коммиссии ЦК КПСС 1958-1964: Документы (Москва, 1998); С.Д. 
Тавасев (отв. сост.): Аппарат ЦК КПСС и Культура 1965-1972: Документы (Москва, 2009); А.А. Фурценко 
(глав. ред.): Президиум ЦК КПСС 1954-1964: Черновые протокольные записи заседаний, Стенограммы, 
Постановления В 3 томах (Москва, 2004-2008). 
89
 Т.Ю. Красовицкая (отв. сост.): “Возвратить домой друзьями СССР...“: Обучение иностранцев в Советском 
Союзе (Москва, 2013). 
90
 Н. Томилина (ред.): Пять колец под кремлевскими звездами: документальная хроника Олимпиады-80 в 
Москве (Москва, 2011). 
91
 Вадим Бакатин: Избавление от КГБ (Москва, 1992): К.Н. Брутенц: Тридцать лет на старой Плошади 
(Москва, 1998); A.F. Dobrynin: In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962-
1986) (New York, 1995); Valentin Falin: Politische Erinnerungen (Munich, 1993); Ibid.: Конфликты в Кремле: 
Сумерки богов по-руссики (Москва, 2000); А.С. Черняев: Моя жизнь и мое время (Москва, 1995); 
Л.В. Шебаршин: Из жизни начальника разведки (Москва, 1994). 
92
 Dagmar Andreasen and Torben Bjerg Clausen: Midt i verden (Copenhagen, 1988); Jørgen Grimstrup: I 
folkedemokraties tjeneste: En tidligere kommunist selvopgør (Copenhagen, 2011); Dan Lundrup: De satans typografer 
– mit liv som fagforeningsmand, kommunist og jazzmusiker (Rødovre, 2008); Freddy Madsen: Vilje til forandring: Mit 
liv som kommunist 2. reviderede udgave (Aarhus, 2002); Anton Nielsen: Som bølger af hav I-II (Aarhus, 2010); Eigil 
Nielsen: Med ideen som følgesvend: En dansk kommunists erindringer (Aarhus, 2013). 
24 
 
PERIODIZATION 
 
In this dissertation the Cold War will be defined as the period from the end of the overall military 
hostilities in Europe in 1945 to the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the ideological 
reason for the conflict disappeared along with one of the two main antagonists. As this is a fairly 
long period of time it is useful to discuss whether it should or could be broken in to shorter periods. 
 
Traditional timeline. Usually, three time periods are identified on the basis of the level of intensity 
of the systemic conflict and level of tension: 1945-1962 (the first Cold War), 1963-1978 (détente), 
and 1979-1991 (the second Cold War).
93
 It has been argued that the final years, 1985-1991, could 
be seen as a separate period due to the changes in the relationship between the super powers after 
Gorbachev’s ascension to power and the internal reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc 
countries.
94
  
As the focus of dissertation is the cultural Cold War we should also consider the timeline for Soviet 
cultural diplomacy suggested by Nigel Gould-Davies who identifies seven distinct periods:
 95
 
1: The 1920s and early 1930s. From1925 onwards, the Soviets regulated the contacts through 
VOKS.  
2: During the height of Stalinist terror in the second half of the 1930s the USSR followed a line of 
isolationism and contacts abroad were cut off.  
3: During the Grand Alliance of World War II the contacts flourished once more with the active 
support of both governments.  
4: After the victory, late Stalinist USSR returned to the pre-war isolationistic position of segregation 
from the surrounding world and the confrontational period was reinforced by American 
McCarthyism and restrictions on travel to the USA for Soviet citizens, including cultural workers.  
5: After Stalin’s death the new leadership made way for cultural connections as a result of renewed 
ideological optimism and the conviction that the world correlation of forces was turning to the 
advantage of the socialist camp which entailed a wish to open up to the surrounding world and 
showcase the Soviet capacities both in the economic and cultural fields by conducting a more 
proactive and outgoing foreign policy, including the cultural field.  
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6: With the ousting of Khrushchev the voices worried about the influence of Western culture on 
Soviet citizens due to the reciprocal openness came into power, which led to great restrictions on 
cultural connections abroad.  
7: The Gorbachev years where the doors were completely swung open to cultural connections 
abroad. 
It is worth noting that Gould-Davies moves the temporal point of origin of Soviet cultural 
diplomacy back to the inter-war years. Elsewhere, it has been argued that the starting point of the 
Cold War could be moved back to November 1917.
96
 However, although the apparatus of Soviet 
cultural diplomacy also operated in the interwar years, it would be an over-interpretation to talk of a 
Cold War prior to World War II, since neither the USSR nor the USA could be considered super 
powers in the inter-war years even if the USSR did direct a network of front organizations against 
Nazi-Germany (until the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact). 
 
A new timeline. In this dissertation we argue that a reading of the archival sources in both a 
Danish
97
 and a transnational
98
 comparative perspective calls into question whether it is, in fact, 
possible to identify such distinct periods during the cultural Cold War as Gould-Davis does.  
On the one hand, we acknowledge the increase in the quantity of activities fairly quickly after 
Stalin’s death and that this, more than anything, had to do with the new strongman Khrushchev’s 
wish to showcase to the world that the Soviet socialist system was superior to the competing 
system.
99
 A study of foreign scientific contacts of the Turkmen SSR (considered part of the cultural 
diplomacy by the Soviets) concludes that until 1956, international contacts were sporadic, but 
afterwards they became very frequent. It became possible for Turkmen scientists to participate in 
delegations going abroad for conferences and guest lectures. Most exchanges took place within the 
field of natural science. Within humanities most exchanges took place in the field of archeology. 
Programs for book exchanges also flourished.
100
 By the mid-1960s, the USSR was represented in 
270 international organizations within the fields of science and culture.
101
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On the other hand, based on the available sources
102
 it is not possible to identify the supposed neo-
isolationist position in the field of cultural diplomacy in the Brezhnev years. As my previous 
research on the Danish context has shown it is even possible to note an increase in and a further 
institutionalizing of the cultural work in Denmark.
103
 If anything, the archival documentation 
strongly suggests that the Soviet cultural diplomatic policies followed a certain set of themes and 
methods of conduct with occasional deviations for special commemorations such as the centennial 
anniversary of the birth of Lenin.
104
  
The Gorbachev years with their numerous reconstructions leave the impression that they more than 
anything brought frustration and bewilderment over loosing long time institutional partners and 
long established and well-functioning models of cooperation between Danish and Soviet 
participants.
105
 
The archival materials utilized for this dissertation allow us to argue for a new approach to the 
periodization of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Clear distinctions cannot be identified according to the 
methods, planning, or overall themes, but utilizing quantity as a marker we can identify three shifts: 
A late-Stalinist isolationistic trend, a post-Stalin increase in the activity level, and finally a period of 
difficulties due to the numerous reconstructions of the Gorbachev years. 
However, both for practical reasons and to take into consideration the importance of emphasizing 
the equal importance of both the recipient and the sender perspective it is possible to argue a 
periodization that corresponds to the chapter divisions in this dissertation. 
 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 
 
Any state’s diplomatic endeavors contain an element of attempting to approach foreign publics. 
Within academia this approach is known by various terms such as public diplomacy,
106
 cultural 
diplomacy,
107
 arts diplomacy,
108
 soft power
109
, nation branding,
110
 framing,
111
 or (negatively) 
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propaganda.
112
 The term depends on the academic discipline in question, but this differentiation is 
rather theoretical as they can all be considered grand theories for analyzing activities of seeking 
contact with foreign public spheres. Although it should be acknowledged that the term propaganda 
is usually defined negatively as political manipulation and subordination,
113
 Nye Jr. notes that 
skeptics who define public diplomacy as just another way of saying propaganda misunderstand the 
term because propaganda often lacks credibility and therefore is counterproductive as public 
diplomacy.
114
 As such this could be seen as a continuation by Cold War historians of the practice of 
evaluating the activities as either welcome or unwelcome from the point of view of the authorities 
in the recipient countries. In Danish historiography dealing with the Cold War period we can 
identify a tendency to describe American initiatives as public diplomacy and Soviet as 
propaganda.
115
 Furthermore, it is important to note that in an internal Soviet context the terms 
agitation and propaganda where not considered to be negatively valued words. The editor-in-chief 
of Pravda stated this in 1978 when he explicitly pointed out that the aim of the newspaper was the 
propaganda of the party and the state and that he saw no reason to hide this.
116
 
We will in this dissertation disregard the above mentioned boundaries and follow the broad 
definition of cultural diplomacy forwarded by the Russian historians Golubev and Nevezhin: The 
utilization of general, cultural, public, or scientific relations as a means to fulfill political, 
diplomatic, or propagandistic aims as part of a clearly defined and well-coordinated somewhat 
centralized policy with a number of clearly defined political aims that continues to be carried out 
over a number of years even if the aims or methods change over time.
117
 
 
Identifying key markers. This broad definition of cultural diplomacy enables us to utilize the main 
insights of the various disciplinary approaches to establish the key elements to be identified in a 
given study of cultural diplomacy. We need to establish a methodical approach to answer the key 
research questions of identifying the actors, their activities, main strategies for communicating the 
messages, and their possible impact.  
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As Simon Addams highlights the campaigns are a part of complex long-term strategies and we 
should strive to identify ten key markers:  
 The ideology behind the propaganda campaign (e.g. communism).  
 The context of the campaign.  
 The identity of the propagandists.  
 The context of the campaign.  
 The structure of the propaganda organization.  
 The relationship between members of parties or movements, and fellow-travelers. 
 The utilized media techniques. 
 The use of special techniques (for example music or a central figure).  
 Possible counterpropaganda. 
 The possible effect or impact. 
At the same time we also have to take into consideration what has been called the color of the 
messages:  
White propaganda has a clear sender and the information is mostly truthful. 
Black propaganda has a hidden sender and the information is mostly false (disinformation). 
Grey propaganda lies somewhere between white and black. It might be possible to identify the 
sender and the information may or may not be truthful.
118
 
At the same time we need to consider the target audience of the activities and messages. That is, 
whether they were directed towards as broad an audience as possible with some form of quantitative 
criteria for measurement of success, or whether they were directed individually. The latter holds a 
double meaning. Firstly, as cultural diplomacy directed at individuals, secondly as the actions of 
individuals.  In the context of the study of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy this should 
not be taken to mean that Soviet cultural diplomacy was carried out as individual initiatives outside 
of the system, but that the Soviet apparatus could be directed at individuals such as members of 
delegations. However, on a national Danish level individuals in fact acted on their own accord or 
gave public lectures upon returning from trips to the USSR. 
The specific choices of strategy within the markers discussed above should provide important 
information on the overall communication strategy of the sender. 
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Communication strategies. Following Joseph Nye,
119
 cultural diplomacy consists of three 
elements of equal importance and each demands a combination of direct information and long term 
cultural elements. The three elements are: 
The daily communication aims to constantly explain the contents of the domestic and foreign 
policy. 
Strategic communication consists of a number of arguments developed as part of a political or 
commercial campaign in order to communicate various themes or accentuate certain elements of 
governmental policies for example to highlight policy initiatives. 
Development of long term relationships with key individuals through scholarships, education, 
training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels. 
However, any communications strategy may be undercut by actual political events or actions. 
Deeds speak louder than words. In this manner public diplomacy is different from PR: both forms 
of communication pass on information and try to sell a positive image, but a key task of public 
diplomacy is also to build long-term relations within a positive environment for the policies of the 
given state. A country’s soft power therefore depends on its attractiveness by means of culture, 
political ideals and policies and on its success in bringing foreigners to admire its values and to 
aspire to follow its example. When a country’s policies are perceived as legitimate by the 
surrounding world the soft power of said country rises – and vice versa. When a country’s soft 
power is strong, fewer military or economic means are needed to achieve a desired outcome. But on 
the other hand, international actions that are perceived negatively by world opinion can undermine 
the actual message and its deeper values. Soft power is the ability to reach desired outcomes by 
influencing others to change their behavior. Naturally, this demands a high level of insight into the 
expected behavioral patterns of the target audience. In other words, the states we perceive as the 
most powerful do not always achieve the desired outcome if their actual deeds contradict their 
projected images or their influence on the target audience is misjudged.
120
  
This has also been pointed out by George Lakoff in a discussion of how messages are framed.
 121
 
The key argument of his framing theory is that a person depends on frames – deeply rooted neural 
structures – that define the common sense or basic understanding of how the world works. These 
frames facilitate our basic interactions with the surrounding world. They structure our ideas and 
conceptions, form our way of reasoning and influence how we perceive or act. These sets of 
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frames, deep frames, are our most basic frames that contain our view of the world. Executers of 
cultural diplomacy seek to influence these deep frames by utilizing various forms of 
frames. Surface frames introduce a concept (e.g. associations with the term “war on terror”). 
Then issue-defining frames are utilized to explain the concept, place blame for the existence of 
problems caused by the concept, and present a possible solution, at the same time they seek to 
identify possible objections to the solutions and present arguments in favor of the suggested 
solution. Finally, the issue-defining frames are presented to the public through message 
frames consisting of some variation of messengers, messages, audiences, media, and images, for 
example in the form of speeches, debates, advertising, news stories, editorials or 
commentaries. Well-planed long or short term campaigns are carried out with the purpose of 
establishing new deep frames on the side of the recipient. The key to success is effective 
communication as it is impossible to communicate without activating frames and give them a 
positive or negative value. In a context of public or cultural diplomacy a political argument is 
successful if it has a moral premise; (telling us what is right), utilizes versions of contested values 
taken from a moral worldview, contains an implicit or explicit narrative structure (telling a story of 
heroes, villains, victims, common themes etc.), also functions as counterarguments to the arguments 
of the opposition, includes both a problem and its solution, utilizes frames so widely recognized 
they immediately resonate among a broad audience whether they are true or not and utilizes a 
communication strategy that enables surface frames to influence deep frames. 
 
Reception/impact. In a review essay of several monographs dealing with public diplomacy 
Professor Emeritus D.C. Watt called for the inclusion of discussions of reception or impact in any 
study of cultural diplomacy and criticized it as the failing point of most studies at time.
122
 In this 
dissertation we shall attempt to meet his call. 
Naturally, there is no easy answer to the question of how this can be done. One approach is to 
assume that participation in a transnational context in itself facilitated influence and consequently 
seek to validate this hypothesis through memoir literature.
123
 Another approach is to comb through 
newspapers and magazines for articles about the activities without taking into consideration the 
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agenda or aims of the sender.
124
 Yet another approach is to comb through the Soviet archives for 
reports.
125
 However, none of these approaches provides us with a full picture. 
To get a fuller perspective of the possible impact of cultural diplomacy it is necessary to develop a 
method that incorporates the perspectives of both the senders and the receivers. To accomplish this 
we will include and compare materials belonging to a number of different categories. Firstly, we 
have internal Soviet documents of evaluations, reports, and proposals. Secondly, we have the 
materials of Danish participating organizations in the form of both internal evaluations and in some 
cases reports forwarded to the Soviet side. Thirdly, depending on the time period under 
consideration, it could be possible to include interviews with participants on how they perceive their 
involvement and whether they consider themselves to have executed influence or been influenced. 
Memoir literature should also be included in this category. Fourthly, we have media clippings 
primarily from the press in the country of reception, in our case: Denmark. Media products should 
be subdivided into two categories: pro-Soviet/fellow-travelling/communist press and non-
communist press respectively. It is particularly important to distinguish between these two sub-
categories when discussing the question of impact. We have to discuss whether pieces were framed 
differently depending on the intended target group, whether media outlets framed their perception 
of the activities depending on their view of the USSR, and whether pieces in the pro-Soviet press 
reached beyond that relatively narrow circle. As an example of the possible paths of influence we 
shall look at the dissemination of reports on the experience of participating in delegations travelling 
to the USSR. 
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Figure 1.1: Model of dissemination 
 
 
 
If we take the sum of Soviet cultural diplomacy and place it in a model of dissemination (figure 1.1) 
we see how public diplomacy could be disseminated in either written or oral form. For both forms it 
is possible to identify various possible target groups. But to reach any of them Soviet cultural 
diplomacy had to overcome the key problem of the language barrier. Russian was not ordinarily a 
second or third language among Danes. Therefore, dissemination had to take place primarily 
through translations into Danish, less frequently to English, German, Swedish, or rarely to French. 
The first target group was the members of the communist party (C). They must be considered the 
core group of Soviet supporters in any country, and as such it was also possible for them to function 
not only as a target group but also as a means of dissemination towards the general public (GP). It is 
highly likely that some members of the general public never came into contact with disseminated 
33 
 
Soviet cultural diplomacy, or that some of those who did reacted indifferently or even with hostility 
towards the Soviet messages. The sub-group of interest is therefore those members of the general 
public whose deep-frames became influenced by the Soviet issue-defining and message frames and 
in return acted in support of the Soviet messages. We name the members of the sub-group fellow-
travelers. The overall goal of the attempted influence through dissemination of cultural diplomacy 
was to especially influence the fellow-travelers, in the hope that they would be perceived as 
members of GP, so they in turn could attempt to influence political decision makers.  For example, 
Fredens Tilhængere through the collection of signatures on the Stockholm peace appeal in 1951 
clearly intended to organize a campaign that would create the impression of a strong public opinion 
against nuclear weapons and thus influence politicians.
 126
 Similarly, The Danish Communist Party, 
DKP envisioned the creation of strong popular movement against the NATO double track decision 
of 1979 to affect political decision makers.
127
 
A reading of Soviet archival materials gives the impression of a strong institutional focus on the 
number of participants as the most important measure of success, for example in the over 
fulfillment of the Intourist plan for incoming tourism 1961-1962.
128
 
Another example of how the aim of the dissemination was to influence the public at large is 
individual propaganda, here exemplified by delegations travels. A model for this form of 
dissemination consists of two steps (figure 1.2). The first step includes the selection of participants 
and the actual travel. The second considers the dissemination of the experience upon returning 
home. As we shall discuss in chapter 8, individuals were selected on the basis of an assumption that 
they would have something positive to state about their experiences and impressions upon returning 
home. Therefore, delegations included not only known communists and fellow-travelers, as it 
would also be difficult for them to reach a non-communist audience. Their opinions were 
disseminated in two forms; written and oral. The written dissemination could take the form of 
articles, feature articles, books, travelogues, op-eds, interviews, and so on, whereas oral 
dissemination most often took the form of public lectures. Again, both written and oral 
dissemination was targeted at two different audiences. One was the communist and, to a certain 
extent, fellow-traveling circles, the second – that should have been considered the primary – was 
the wider public. The latter public dissemination was more important because it did not solely 
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Figure 1.2: Model of dissemination through participants in delegation travels 
 
 
preach to the choir. In the case of written dissemination the communist and fellow-travelling press 
consisted of newspapers and journals published by the communist party, the friendship society, or 
front organizations, whereas the non-communist circles constituted the remaining press. 
Considering book publishing it should be noted that communist and fellow-travellers were not 
solely published at communist publishing houses, nor that other participants solely published travel 
accounts outside the communist press. The audiences of dissemination follow the same dividing 
line. The communist and fellow-travelling circle included local branches of the communist party, 
various front organizations and the friendship society. As a rule of thumb, non-DKP meetings were 
open to the general public. However, most lectures attended by the general public took place in the 
numerous non-political public lecture associations that constitute a defining feature of Danish 
society. These organizations included open lecture societies, evening schools, and various 
professional organizations among others. Lectures given in these organizations were occasionally 
referenced in various local newspapers. 
35 
 
In conclusion, as Ieva Zeka shows, the USSR employed a very strict utilization of culture and mass 
media activities in connection with uneven cultural exchange programs as instruments playing a 
central role in the self-promotion of the USSR vis-a-vis foreign countries with the purpose of 
changing the image of the USSR among foreign publics.
 129
  
 
TRADITIONALISM AND REVISIONISM 
 
Soviet studies primarily fall within two schools, traditionalism and revisionism, originating in the 
USA. Since this pattern is repeated within Cold War, communism, and peace movement studies we 
shall discuss them and position this dissertation within the field.  
Originally, the fault line dividing the schools related to the question of studying and understanding 
Stalinism. The American field of Soviet studies grew out of World War II with several military 
programs and general institution building. First generation scholars used the term totalitarian as a 
synonym for dictatorship when defining Soviet society.
130
  
Totalitarianism was originally a term coined in Italy in the 1920s as a synonym for anti-liberal 
dictatorship and then proudly adopted by Mussolini as a description for the regime he wanted to 
establish.
131
 In a scholarly sense the term came into prominence through the works of Carl Friedrich 
and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski who in 1956 inspired by the Frankfurt School (especially Hannah 
Arendt’s The Origin of Totalitarianism) and influenced by the ideological tightening of late 
Stalinist USSR conceived the model of totalitarianism to describe the dictatorships of Hitler, Stalin, 
and Mussolini as permanent and unchangeable by nature.
132
 They argued that it was possible to 
identify six features common to all totalitarian societies: 
• An elaborate ideology with a number of doctrines covering all aspects of existence that the 
members of the society are supposed to adhere to. The ideology usually projects an end goal 
of some form of ideal society and rejects the existing. 
• A single mass party led by one person (a dictator) and consisting of a relative small number 
of members of the society (up to 10 percent) of which the hardcore are completely dedicated 
to the cause. 
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• A system of physical and psychological terror run by the party and the secret police and 
directed primarily against certain classes of the society. 
• Complete control over all forms of mass communication. 
• Complete monopoly over the use of force. 
• Central control and direction of the economy through bureaucratic coordination.133 
A second school began to emerge when a new generation of scholars, who had had partly access to 
Soviet archives during study trips to the USSR, entered the field in the late 1960s.  This school, 
called revisionism, challenged the model of totalitarianism over the question of whether the Soviet 
society was static and emphasized social history and mobility and reforms from below instead of 
from above. The critics of the model of totalitarianism can be divided into two groupings. The first 
considers the model to be anti-socialist and/or anti-marxist and created with the purpose of 
discrediting the socialist countries wherefore it should be dismissed as an unscientific and 
politically undesirable product of the Cold War. The second group considers the model to be too 
vague and imprecise to take all factors of Soviet society into consideration, especially in regard to 
the study of post-Stalin developments.
134
   
The break-up of the USSR saw unprecedented short-time liberal access to the former Soviet 
archives, and they have yielded the impression that although Soviet society did not run smoothly 
according to planning and utopia did not come about, a clear ideologically defined end goal had 
been established and there was a continuous striving towards accomplishing this goal by totalitarian 
means. Totalitarian societies claimed to equate a scientific ideology with the interest of the citizens 
and demanded the popular support of the same citizens whether they sympathized with the regime 
or not. Dogmatism and doctrinaire fanaticism dictated the policy more than realist approaches, even 
when the ideology was tweaked for tactical purposes. These societies still suffered from structural 
flaws such as placing the virtue of loyalty above that of competences, which lead to corruption, 
arrogance, and an inaccurate knowledge of the governed society, however this did not, in turn, 
result in the ideology and the intention being relented.
135
 The Soviet totalitarian regime used its part 
in the victory over fascism as a means to give anti-fascism such a negative ring and communism 
such a certificate of democracy that any analysis of the nature of communist regimes became next 
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to impossible and made studies of the similarities academically awkward or undesirable.
136
 
However, the argument is not, that the two ideologies are identical, but that there are so many 
striking similarities that the terms ”left” or ”right” lacks any meaning as a theoretical approach to 
distinguish between them.
137
  
The strongest critique of revisionism was voiced in the 1990s by Russian historians with access to 
the formerly closed Soviet archives.
138
 Irina Pavlova bluntly states that revisionists set the research 
back several decades. By taking the words of NKVD documents literally and not understanding the 
meaning behind the various terms, they wrongly dismissed the leading role of the CPSU in all 
aspects of Soviet life due to a basic lack of understanding of Soviet reality. 
139
 
The second feature of critique of the totalitarian model regards the question of its inability to 
incorporate the changes that took place in Soviet society after the death of Stalin.
140
 For example, 
reforms were implemented that changed the relationship between state and society after Stalin’s 
death during “the thaw”.141 
But again we have to consider the question of ideologically based intention. The post-Stalinist 
leaders could not keep control over society whilst allowing freedom of speech, for example.
142
 A 
reading of the archives
143
 of Central Committee departments involved in cultural diplomacy both 
during and after Stalin gives the impression of a strong continuity in the intention of the regime to 
stay in total control, based on an ideological understanding of the activities, likewise, a continuation 
of the attempted total control over society can also be identified.
144
  
In conclusion, we acknowledge that although developments unforeseen in the model of 
totalitarianism did take place, the USSR continued to be a dictatorship based on a certain Marxist-
Leninist ideology throughout its existence, with the clear intention of the CPSU of keeping total 
control over society. This intention of control and conformity should not be ignored in the study of 
the history of the USSR, including its foreign policy. 
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Schools of Cold War studies. Similarly, Cold War studies have traditionally been divided between 
traditionalists and revisionists.
145
 The traditionalistic school considers the USSR to be a totalitarian 
state based on an all-embracing ideology, Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet desire for expansion and 
the forcing of its regime upon Eastern Europe are considered to be the main reasons for the Cold 
War, whereas the USA is considered to have played a much more passive role as a defender of 
democracy against communism. The Cold War is described as a struggle over values. 
Revisionism is to a large degree a mirror image of traditionalism. US economic interests and need 
for expansion to find new markets is considered to be the main reason for the outbreak of the Cold 
War, whereas the USSR merely reacted to the American expansionism and arms race. Soviet 
leaders were not controlled by ideology, but were careful and flexible with limited security 
interests. The Cold War could have been avoided if the American side had been more 
accommodating. 
Post-revisionism is a much more vague school, often connected with the name of John Lewis 
Gaddis and especially differs from the above by its use of archival sources. The Cold War is 
considered a more interactive affair and although points are made about a gradual Soviet expansion 
(lacking a master plan, but not an ideologically motivated discourse) into Eastern Europe due to 
security interests, this school does not shy away from pointing out the forceful manner of the 
expansion. On the other hand, the USA is not considered to have played only a passive, defensive 
role, but US economic interests are considered to have been utilized for an active containment 
policy. At the same time post-revisionists call for the inclusion of consideration of other states’ 
interests and an expansion of the map to include other scenes than the European in the analysis 
more actively and point to the difference between the USA as an “empire by invitation” in Western 
Europe compared to the USSR as an “empire by imposition” in Eastern Europe. 
When the Cold War ended, numerous archives, especially Eastern ones, opened more for 
researchers.
146
 The new findings led to developments especially in the research on the origins of the 
Cold War, where a clear emphasis could now be placed on the active role of the USSR and the 
influence of ideology on the decision-making process, thus confirming many of the original 
traditionalistic positions.
147
 The new archival documentation indicates that the USSR made all of 
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the first moves and that the West was too complacent at least until 1947 or 1948 when the die was 
already cast.
148
  A second important point to be learned from the archives was that interests in 
material terms – what people possessed or wanted to possess –was not as important as ideas – what 
people believed or wanted to believe.
149
 This latter point is especially important when studying the 
Cultural Cold War with its intent on winning over public opinion of certain ideas and points of 
view. 
 
Avoiding triumphalism. After the end of the Cold War, a new political discourse on the Cold War 
declared American liberalism, capitalism, and presidents like Ronald Reagan winners of the 
conflict, thereby creating a narrative to support the so-called New World Order. In recent years this 
approach has been challenged as a school of triumphalism.
150
 
Within the field of cultural diplomacy the triumphalist approach has been promoted by Yale 
Richmond who argues that the USSR collapsed due to an active American use of the US-USSR 
exchange programs.
151
 
Naturally, one should be especially careful not to fall back on a triumphalist approach when 
studying the “losing” side152 since this approach does not in any way add to our understanding of 
the reasons why events turned out the way they did. However, it is not “triumphalism” to state that 
the USSR lost the systemic conflict, if for no other reason than because the USSR ceased to exist.
153
  
 
Avoiding neo-triumphalism. At the same time it is possible to identify a new trend, especially 
within Danish, Cold War studies. We shall name it neo-triumphalism. At the very end of a recent 
article on the Danish US oriented journal Perspektiv, Regin Schmidt, without any knowledge of 
Russian and never having utilized Soviet archival sources, argued that because the Soviet system 
                                                                                                                                                                  
The DIIS white paper is not written in this traditionalistic veins and therefore does not acknowledge these points (DIIS 
I, 27-32). 
148
 Gellately, 9. 
149
 Marc Frey: “Gender, Tropes, and Images”, in Gienow-Hecht/Schumacher, 215-230. 
150
 Ellen Schrecker: “Introduction: Cold War Triumphalism and the Real Cold War”, in Ellen Schrecker (ed.): Cold War 
Triumphalism :The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism (New York, 2004), 1-24. 
151
 Yale Richmond: “Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the West Won”, American Communist History 
2010(9): 1, 61-75. 
152
 When we understand the Cold War as an ideological borne systemic conflict the losing party is the system that 
vanishes and thereby erases the grounds for the existence of the systemic conflict. 
153
 Jensen (2014) I, 31. 
40 
 
collapsed while the US survived and continued to be a super power the study of Eastern attempts at 
accomplishing influence via cultural diplomacy was irrelevant.
154
 
However, as Odd Arne Westad has rightly pointed out, interpretations similar to Smith’s can be 
considered to be reductionist since they attempt to reduce Cold War history to a history of US 
foreign policy after World War II instead of embracing the inclusion of new research trends and 
archival evidence in broadening the horizons of Cold War studies.
155
 Following this line of thought, 
it should be considered just as relevant or important to study why something did not work out as 
intended as why it did. 
 
IR theory. The prominent schools within the contemporary field of international relations theory 
(IR) were the realist and neo-realist paradigms closely associated with Hans Morgenthau and 
Kenneth Waltz. They argue that policy decisions by politicians are not made under the influence of 
personal, philosophic, moral, or ideological motives, but are influenced by a comprehension of the 
current political needs and the ability to translate this understanding into political action as they best 
serve the interests of the given state, and that states pursue their national interests in terms of 
power.
156
 
 
The role of ideology. IR theory on the Cold War has been heavily criticized on two accounts – a 
systemic and an ideological. 
In a systemic perspective IR is criticized – along with American Soviet studies in general – for not 
having foreseen the breakdown of the USSR because IR theory was formed during a bipolar world 
order with the purpose of explaining it without incorporating the possibility of change.
157
 However, 
this is a judgment made with the benefit of hindsight. Nobody else foresaw the breakdown of the 
USSR and thus the end of the systemic conflict.
158
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The second point of critique, the lack of emphasis on the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, 
is very important.  
Disregarding ideology, IR theory defines the Cold War as a conflict between two superpowers that 
were enemies by position, as heads of competing blocs competing solely for power and spheres of 
influence while locked in a traditional strategic rivalry; by this definition ideology is seen as 
completely separated from state (or national) interests whereas power maximization becomes the 
primary theme in the zero-sum approach by the involved superpowers.
159
 
In this dissertation, we argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology was deterministic, rejected political 
rights as charades of the bourgeoisie, and contained an element of messianism. It was built upon the 
centrality of class conflict and transformations of societies. Ideology was a key part of the 
framework of Soviet foreign policy, despite any policy shifts. As political actors, Soviet leaders 
proactively used their ideology for building and maintaining institutions, defining situations 
planning action. Ideology was not a smokescreen. Marxist-Leninism was the deep frame about 
discussion and for making decisions about foreign policy. Soviet leaders were prepared to help 
history along by supporting the working class in capitalist countries as well as national 
independence movements in the third world, and generally worked on persuasion campaigns 
targeting foreign audiences by advancing a utopian vision.
160
 As David Brandenberger argues, the 
USSR should be considered a propaganda state where ideology, propaganda, and mass 
indoctrination through transmissions belts such as mass media and culture were key elements in the 
state’s means of communication with the surrounding world.161 Stalin is an excellent example of the 
role played by ideology. During his wartime dealings with the allies of the USSR he did not 
formulate Marxist-Leninist sounding demands but instead framed them in terms of guarding his 
country’s security interests. However, his ideological perceptions informed everything from 
military strategy to personal values. In a 1936 internal party form he formulated his job description 
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as professional revolutionary and party organizer.
162
 Stalin and his contemporaries, including 
foreign minister Molotov, viewed foreign policy through a prism of revolutionary Bolshevik 
ideology combined with the geopolitical inheritance from czarist Russia, and this revolutionary-
imperial paradigm was formulated as a mixture of geopolitical ambitions and ideological 
promises.
163
 Stalin’s influence continued after his death. The system he built was sufficiently strong 
to survive the half-hearted attempts at destalinization of his successors, since they knew no other 
method of governing. It was not until Gorbachev came into power that they were willing to 
dismantle Stalin’s structural legacy.164 A typical example of ideology being the controlling factor is 
found in the minutes of the June 1963 CPSU CC plenum. Foreign policy was framed through the 
prism of a struggle between the peaceful and progressive forces of socialism versus the reactionary 
and aggressive forces of imperialism, with socialism safely on the winning side due to the 
deterministic discourse embedded in the ideology.
165
 A MID policy brief divided the world into 
“democratic” (socialist) countries and capitalistic countries operating in aggressive blocks. 
Denmark was placed in the latter block due to its NATO membership.
166
 A MID note about 
Denmark preparing for the state visit of premier and foreign minister H.C Hansen contains wild 
overestimates of popular support for the peace movement and the opposition to NATO 
membership.
167
 It is strangely out of tune with the sober tone of the rest of the document and seems 
to be a concession to the dictates of ideology. 
Simply put, Marxist-Leninist theory predicts a relatively simplistic story of a sequence of social 
formations following a specific line of development, from primitive communalism to an end point 
of voluntary association by free individuals (communism). The intermediate period is a series of 
upheavals brought forward by class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. The fifth 
stage is a transitory society, socialism, between capitalism and communism. Socialism as a society 
would then be superior to the capitalistic society, both because of its socially optimal use of 
resources based on collective ownership and central planning and because it would come after the 
capitalist stage. This master narrative played the deciding role in determining the discourses 
formulated by generations of Soviet leaders brought up and educated within the belief system of 
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Marxism-Leninism. It gave the system historical legitimacy and justified the privileged position of 
the communist elite. The identity of the members of the elite was anchored in this narrative and it 
filled them with a historical mission and calling. The master narrative of Soviet socialism created a 
historical project and over a long historical period provided a powerful mental mechanism for 
constructing a systemic identity for socialism.
168
  
Thus, we have a very strong argument that ideology did play a central role in Soviet policy planning 
during the Cold War, as Soviet leaders followed a strictly deterministic discourse. The definition of 
Marxism-Leninism may have been changed by CPSU leaders over time,
169
 but they continued to 
consider themselves Marxist-Leninist, and the ideology was utilized as a means of communication, 
a way of legitimizing CPSU rule, the expression of the worldviews of Soviet leaderships, and the 
rationalization for policies.
170
  
Without going too far in the direction of the school of traditionalism and the theory of a completely 
static society for the entire period, we wish to emphasize the fact that for its entire existence the 
Soviet Union was a one-party dictatorship and police state where the party leaders may have been 
able to tweak definitions according to their needs but where they did not cease to see the Cold War 
and foreign policy in accordance with a master narrative of a deterministic development of history. 
Furthermore, the archives do not indicate any changes over time in the way the cultural diplomacy 
apparatus functioned or the kinds of the activities that were conducted in foreign countries. 
  
Fellow-travelers. Neither American nor Soviet cultural diplomacy was primarily aimed at 
preaching to the choir. In the case of the USSR with regards to Denmark this means that it was not 
primarily aimed at the members of DKP but rather at those who Soviet terminology called 
“progressive and liberal persons” and the Americans called “the non-communist left”. In the Danish 
context this included members of the social-democratic party, the social-liberal intelligentsia, and 
various left leaning personalities and cultural workers. These possible sympathizers who were not 
members of DKP, but somehow involved in the circles of DKP related organizations were called 
“fellow-travelers”.  
The term fellow-travelers or poputchiki was originally coined by Aleksandr Herzen to describe 
what he believed would be a close relationship between the USA and Russia in the future. In 1923 
                                                 
168
 György Peteri: “Introduction: The Oblique Coordinate Systems of Modern Identity”, in, György Peteri (ed.): 
Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Pittsburg, 2010), 5-6. 
169
 Rachel Walker: “Marxism-Leninism as Discourse: The Politics of the Empty Signifier and the Double Blind”, 
British Journal of Political Science 1989(19), 161-189. 
170
 Jonathan C. Valdez: Internationalism and the Ideology of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 1993), 13. 
44 
 
Leon Trotsky redefined the term as a label for the hesitant or doubtful supporters of the Bolsheviks. 
Trotsky originally applied the term to Russian cultural workers and intellectuals, but from the 1930s 
onwards it was (in a Soviet context) used as a common political notion of Western intellectuals who 
supported the socialist experiments in the USSR. The communists were more than happy to 
welcome them as showpieces for showcasing the existence of independent and unprejudiced 
support for the Soviet experiment. They could be utilized for writing politicized journalism and 
lending their prestige to legitimatizing front organizations or supporting other Soviet foreign policy 
initiatives.
171
 
In a Danish context, two schools exist in the debate over the role of intellectual fellow travelers’ 
support of the Soviet Union. 
In his book on fascination with Stalinism, the historian Bent Jensen asks why so many intellectuals 
became fascinated or supportive fellow-travelers of communism. He dismisses both of the classic 
arguments: That they either were attracted to it due to the economic crisis of the time and the Soviet 
resolute struggle against fascism, or that it was impossible to know the reality of the horrible 
conditions in the totalitarian USSR. Instead, he advocates the psychological explanation of “double 
thinking”. They accepted Marxism-Leninism as a special form of science based on the principle of 
dialectics that enabled them to deny all accusations against the Soviet regime and based their 
arguments on the utopian promises of the future society. Stalinism fulfilled a need for a substitute 
religion and resulted in voluntary self-deception in support of a system that seemed to promise the 
ability to overcome all conflicts and offered intellectuals an important role. Additional 
psychological explanations include a fascination with power, and a faith in the eventual victory of 
reason (in the form of the Marxist-Leninist science) combined with a belief in the illusion of the 
possibility to establish such a society.
172
 
In direct opposition to Bent Jensen, the historian Morten Thing dismisses that entire argument. He 
does not refute that left-wing, communist or fellow-travelling intellectuals actually praised Stalinist 
USSR in uncritical tones, but he considers reducing the overall evaluation of them to only cover this 
aspect too one-sided. Thing argues that in reality the intellectuals were not fascinated by the mass 
deportations of kulaks and communists (he does not mention the millions of other innocent victims 
of the communist regime throughout the history of the USSR), but that they were fascinated by 
freedoms, planning, and human happiness and therefore believed the USSR to be a utopia, and that 
they themselves were the bearers of humanism and modernity in the inter-war years. Thing declares 
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Bent Jensen a non-marxist historian and thereby seems to infer that Bent Jensen is unfit to study the 
subject.
173
 
The final part of Things argument is deeply problematic. Following the line of argument that only 
socialist historians should study the history of socialism would mean that only fascist historians 
should study Nazi-Germany or other brown totalitarian dictatorships. The latter argument is just as 
unthinkable as the former should be. Secondly, it is deeply problematic that Thing dismisses the 
fellow-travelers’ praise of a fairy-tale version of the USSR, because it was this version they decided 
to convene to a broader public audience despite the actual conditions they had experienced first-
hand in the USSR.  
 
Travelling to the Soviet Union. During the Cold War the CPSU placed great emphasis on the 
possibility to influence travelers with a positive impression of the USSR and the Soviet form of 
society.
174
 
The traditionalist model for the study of this phenomenon was developed by Paul Hollander. 
Hollander considers the travelers as political pilgrims that the USSR sought to utilize for 
propaganda purposes through a set of so-called “techniques of hospitality” consisting of six 
elements that are identifiable in all communist regimes: 
 
1. Thoroughly organized and well-planned tours with choices of possible excursions presented 
in advance as to give the traveler a fake impression of influence on the contents of the travel. 
2. Fully packed program that causes physical and psychological exhaustion and hinders critical 
reflection. 
3. Model institutions for showcasing to foreigners. 
4. Attempts to bribe the travelers through VIP treatments of comfortable means of 
transportation, luxury hotels, and fashionable restaurants. 
5. Travelers offered non-material privileges such as meetings with high-ranking politicians. 
6. Participants selected on the assumption of them being of a positive mind and reporting 
positively upon returning home.
175
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This approach has recently been challenged. Revisionism-like critics recognize that the travels took 
place in a political context by participants of ideological motivated circles, but argue that they 
should not be considered political pilgrims, but rather travelers who attributed to the journey a 
special meaning as a practice that gave the landscape a special symbolic importance and filled them 
with utopian ideas, ideologies, and practices to which they attached a special authenticity and 
potential.
176
 
There are several difficulties with both approaches to analyzing traveling to communist 
dictatorships. Firstly, it is unlikely that all travelers should be considered political pilgrims, at least 
if we differentiate between delegation participants on the one hand and, on the other, tourists who 
may have just have wanted to go on a cheap summer holiday, or high school and university students 
who might not have had influence over the destination.  Secondly, it is reductionist, to consider the 
frame of traveling, as the revisionist approach does, as merely a study of more or less naïve 
travellers and as such dismiss the way the Soviet authorities were closely monitoring, guiding, and 
reporting on all travel groups that came to the USSR
177
 down to detailed reports on the doings and 
comments of each individual group.
178
 We have to place emphasis on the importance of the Soviet 
intention to utilize each and every traveler to the USSR as a possible propagandist upon his or her 
return to their own country.  
 
The debate on possible Soviet involvement in the peace movements. Within the field of peace 
movement studies there is a strong disagreement between various schools as to whether or not the 
USSR can be said to have played a role in the revival of the peace movement in the late1970s and 
early 1980s or if these movements should be considered social movements. 
A typical representative of the latter point of view is Steve Breyman who argues that social 
movements were the most important force for progressive social change and that the peace 
movements in the 1980s were essential in dismantling the threats of the arms race.
 179
 Breyman was 
an active participant in the West German movement.  According to the bibliography in his book he 
does not speak Russian, nor does he make use of former Soviet archival materials, but he still 
denies that the World Peace Council had any leading role in the development. He considers this 
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discourse a “fever fantasy” of the then president Ronald Reagan and he blames the arms race solely 
on the American side. In Denmark a similar analysis has been presented by Søren Hein 
Rasmussen.
180
 Although he acknowledges that some peace movements could be considered to have 
been influenced by the Soviets, he still places the main emphasis on an understanding of the 
movements as popular mobilizations on a grass roots level against the official state position on 
foreign policy questions. That means that, overall, the role of Soviet influence and the activity level 
of the DKP is dismissed as a primary engine of the Cold War peace movements. Hein Rasmussen 
claims that the communists should be acknowledged as very active worker bees, but that they were 
unable to promote any of their political agendas through the various peace movements.   
We see several examples of historians who were embedded in the movements in their youth and 
made it the subject of their professional studies, and while for linguistic reasons they are unable to 
include any Soviet sources and instead base their research solely on the written materials of said 
movements, they nevertheless still feel confident to dismiss influence by communists or Soviet 
organizations, as we have also seen, this pattern is not an exclusive feature of peace movement 
studies.  
Søren Hein Rasmussen in particular has been challenged by the former DKP member Jørgen 
Grimstrup, who calls him a poor historian and points out Rasmussen’s membership of DKU, DKP, 
and the communist peace movement SAK, and criticizes the fact that he on the one hand 
acknowledges the numerous communist representations, but on the other does not acknowledge 
their communist character. For his part, Grimstrup remembers the selective anti-militarism of the 
DKP that did not include national resistance movements in the third world nor the Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 rockets. He remembers how DKP mobilized both communists and non-
communists in a one-sided campaign against the NATO reaction to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 
missiles, the double track decision.
181
  
A similar denial of possible Soviet influence to that of Hein Rasmussen can also be found in works 
written by participants in the third generation non-communist Danish peace movement Nej til 
Atomvåben (‘No to nuclear arms’). A leading participant Judith Winter describes the movements as 
a popular reaction from below to the general political development of the time, concentrated in a 
protest against the double track decision even in cases of evident Soviet front organizations such as 
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IPPNW.
182
 A similar absence of possible Soviet influence or involvement can be identified both in 
general studies
183
 and in studies of the British peace movements
184
 – and even in cases where 
monographs
185
 do include a chapter on the Marxist peace movement the perception remains 
domestic and the USSR disappears out of the picture. 
The hardest debate over the possible involvement in or control over the peace movement seems to 
have taken place among German scholars. On one side, the Russian speaking historian Gerhard 
Wettig has argued based on studies of Soviet source materials that the Soviet activating of the more 
or less inactive peace movements, especially in Western Europe, should be considered part of a 
well-thought-out and formulated strategy. His analysis shows that the intention was to utilize the 
mass mobilization through various networks, such as national communist parties and front 
organizations of public opinion, to counter government decisions in reaction to the Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 missiles – thereby leaving the USSR with the military advantage gained by 
initiating a new arms race. Based on Soviet sources he traces this plan back to the 1969 
international meeting of communist parties in Moscow. Upon being hatched, it lay dormant until the 
time was deemed right to implement it.
186
 Wettig’s position has been challenged by the historians 
Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann who dismissed this allegedly outdated understanding of the 
peace movements as remote controlled by the USSR, and instead presented the movements as a 
popular mobilization of social activism.
 187
 Again, critics who are unable to include Soviet archival 
sources dismiss concrete sources and base their arguments solely on contemporary writings by 
German peace activists and secondary non-Russian literature, while overemphasizing  the role of 
the non-communist Christians and other parts of the movements. 
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As such the latter position must be found lacking due to its disregard for the well-documented fact 
that the USSR was very active in initiating parts of the late Cold War peace movements, and that 
this was possible due to a shift in the public sentiment towards the US in a post-Vietnam War 
environment. Unlike the situation in the 1950s, this made larger portions of the public attentive to 
the Soviet position and willing to engage in a campaign against the Western reaction to the Soviet 
initiated new arms race.
188
 
Memoirs of leading Western participants such as Bernard Lown
189
 illustrate the aspects people were 
prepared to overlook in their active campaigning against the NATO defense initiatives. Lown 
apparently believes that it was mere chance that he just happened to run into the personal physician 
of the Soviet general secretary after it had become publicly known that he was searching for a 
Soviet representative to cooperate with. More than anything, such memoirs showcase the naiveté 
and anti-American position and feelings of some participants.  
It would be more fruitful to follow in the footsteps of the American scholar of peace movement 
studies Lawrence Wittner. He approaches the question of the peace movements and Soviet 
involvement by acknowledging that the peace movements were multifaceted and to a lesser or 
greater extent populated by persons feeling a genuine sense of fear (defined as uncertainty of the 
future and what it could bring in pain and losses to themselves and their loved ones
190
) faced with 
possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race. These participants were to be found both in the 
communist and the non-communist parts of the movements.
 191
  
That the USSR attempted to utilize part of the movement to further its own aims, by having 
communists place themselves in central positions of various national movements, means that this 
part of the movement should be included in a study of a greater Soviet network of front 
organizations. 
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Regarding this connection it should be taken into consideration that as early as the third Cominform 
congress in 1949 the emerging CPSU chief ideologist Mihail Suslov had placed special emphasis 
on the newly founded World Peace Council and stated that the national communist parties should 
play a leading role in the peace struggle by attracting all kinds of movements (peace, female, youth, 
cooperative, sports, culture, religious, other associations, trade unions, scientists, writers, 
journalists, parliamentarians, and other public figures), into a singular movement.
192
Another 
important fact is that at the very beginning of the campaigns against the NATO double track 
decision the Secretariat of the CPSU CC ordered its various news agencies, international front 
organizations, and the communist parties abroad to activate their contacts in Western Europe and 
create an international public movement against the deployment of new NATO missiles.
193
 The 
Secretariat also issued an order to various Soviet public organizations to coordinate their efforts 
among themselves and those of the Socialist countries, for the struggle for peace prior to the 
sessions of the Second World Parliament.
194
 In December 1980 the Secretariat ordered a meeting in 
Moscow for peace movements of the Socialist countries to decide WPC activities in 1981.
195
 
Furthermore, at a 1983 Politburo meeting it was decided to actively utilize the upcoming WPC 
congress in Prague in the campaign against the deployment of NATO missiles.
196
 The former 
British NATO ambassador Clive Rose has convincingly argued that the Soviet leadership 
mistakenly analyzed the decision by President Jimmy Carter in April 1978 to suspend the 
construction of a neutron bomb to be a result of giving in to public pressure, when in fact the 
decision was made due to internal disagreement within NATO.
197
 However, the USSR considered it 
the result of a communist led campaign, concluded that it was possible to influence Western 
political leaders through public opinion, and building on this mistaken conclusion over-estimated 
the influence of public opinion when activating the campaign against the deployment of Pershing II 
and cruise missiles.
198
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The Soviet documents are not necessarily “smoking guns”, but they are very strong and telling 
evidence of the clear intent of the CPSU to control the international peace movement, and as such 
prove that this Soviet intention of control should not be dismissed from any discussion of the roles 
and functions of 20
th
 century peace movements.  
 
Soviet understanding of “struggle for peace”. The struggle for peace was a dominant theme in 
Soviet foreign propaganda. Departing from Lenin’s theory on imperialism, overall communist 
ideology, Soviet foreign policy history, and various statements by Soviet leaders, the communist 
movement formulated a theory that only socialism and communism could bring about world peace. 
Capitalist states were considered expansive by nature in their thirst for new markets, whereas 
socialist societies were peaceful by nature because they had rooted out the reason for war; private 
ownership, and thereby created the only possible road to world peace. Hence, capitalist and socialist 
states became each other’s mirror images of socialist “peace” and capitalistic “war-mongering”. 
Despite the theory’s hostility towards capitalist society, so-called progressive forces of all political 
observations were to be considered possible allies in the struggle for peace – as long as it took place 
under communist leadership. The Norwegian historian Lars Rowe calls it “the communist peace 
mythology”.199 
The peace mythology also formed the basis of the “two-camp theory” formulated by Andrei 
Zhdanov at the 1947 founding meeting of Cominform. According to Zhdanov, two opposite camps 
existed in the postwar world. On one side, the imperialistic camp under the leadership of the USA 
sought to strengthen imperialism, prepare for a new war, struggle against socialism and democracy, 
and support anti-democratic or pro-fascist governments. To carry out these tasks the imperialistic 
camp was willing to utilize any reactionary or anti-democratic force in any country, even former 
enemies, in the struggle against a former ally. On the other side were the anti-imperialistic and anti-
fascist forces under the leadership of the USSR and the new governments in Eastern Europe 
founded on workers’ and democratic movements, the communist parties, independent movements 
in the third world, and progressive and democratic forces anywhere. The aim of this camp was to 
struggle against the threat of new wars or imperialistic expansion. The end of World War II had 
tasked all peace-loving humans with securing a lasting democratic peace that would secure the 
victory over fascism. The basis for success was the USSR and its foreign policy line, because the 
Soviet socialist state was fundamentally estranged to aggressive or exploitative motives and only 
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worked to ensure the best possible conditions for building the communist society. One of these 
conditions was external peace. As the bearer of a new, more highly developed social system the 
USSR in its foreign policy mirrored a wish of the entire developed human race for a lasting peace, 
as the USSR did not have any interest in a new war, because wars were products of capitalism. The 
USSR was the defender of the freedom and independence of all people, and the enemy of 
nationalism, racism, and suppression.
200
 
The same year, in a private conversation, Zhdanov explained the official Soviet view of the reasons 
for a future ideological confrontation between the blocks: 
 
“The situation is quite serious and complicated. The plans of the imperialists to defeat us on the battlefield have failed. 
From now on, they will be engaged in an increasingly determined ideological offensive against us. We must keep our 
powder dry. And it is completely out of place for us to indulge in hypocritical complacency: ‘we won, so now we can 
do anything. 
Things are difficult, and most difficulties lie ahead. Serious difficulties. Our people showed self-sacrifice and heroism 
that defies description. Now they want to live well. Millions of them tasted life abroad, in many countries. They saw not 
only the bad but some things that made them wonder. And much of what they saw they interpreted incorrectly, one-
sidedly. Anyhow, people want to reap the fruit of their victory, live well – have good apartments like the ones they saw 
in the West, eat well, dress well. And we are duty-bound to give them all that /…/ 
These moods are all the more dangerous when they are accompanied by kowtowing before the West. ‘Ah, the West!’ 
ah, democracy!’ There is literature for you!’ look at those polling stations!’ What a disgrace, how demeaning to our 
national dignity! There’s just one thing these gentlemen sighing for the ‘Western way of life’ cannot explain: Why was 
it we who defeated Hitler, and not those others with their pretty ballot boxes in the streets?”
201
 
 
At the third and final Cominform congress Mihail Suslov had picked up the mantle of the peace 
struggle in his report on the defense of peace and the struggle against war mongers. He claimed that 
the fault line in international politics between the two camps had become clearer, that NATO was 
preparing a new war, and that the anti-imperialistic Soviet-led camp was carrying on an ongoing 
struggle against imperialistic reaction, for peace among the peoples, and democracy.
202
  
A second objective of the Stalinist peace struggle was to create a link between a popular movement 
for peace and popular support for American withdrawal from Europe, thereby leaving the USSR in 
control of Germany. Since the days of Lenin, a socialist Germany had been considered the 
necessary cornerstone for a socialist Europe. The founding of NATO thwarted the continued 
expectation by Soviet leaders throughout the Cold War that the USA would at some point withdraw 
from Europe as had been the case following the end of World War I, and that since socialism was 
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historically determined to be superior to capitalism, half a century of peace in Europe was expected 
to provide the necessary time for the correlation of forces to come out in favor of socialism as the 
USSR expected to attract popular support in smaller and medium sized European countries.
203
 
At the 20
th
 Party Congress in 1956 Stalin’s successor Khrushchev not only gave his famous “secret 
speech”, but he also presented the new foreign policy doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The doctrine 
had two important points. On the one hand, Stalin’s thesis of a coming inevitable war with the West 
was denied, but on the other, it held on to the idea of a world divided between capitalism and 
socialism with a continued rivalry expected to change from direct to indirect.
204
 
That peaceful coexistence should not be understood as a campaign for world peace, but merely as 
the new Soviet leadership’s attempt to avoid a direct confrontation between the two camps until the 
correlation of forces would be in favor of the USSR, was made clear at the 22
nd
 Party Congress in 
1961 when Nikita Khrushchev explained the Soviet understanding of peaceful coexistence. 
According to Khrushchev, two systems existed in international politics. One was the socialist 
system of social progress and peace; the other was the reactionary capitalist system of oppression 
and war. The socialist camp would eventually show itself to be superior to the capitalist, and the 
USSR was prepared to defend – also by military means – any gains made by socialism.205 Whereas 
peaceful coexistence outside of the USSR seems to have been understood as an agreement on 
moderation, the Soviet leaders understood it as a continued rivalry, ideological mistrust, and a 
continued attempt to weaken the opponent through a combination of political, economic, cultural, 
and ideologically motivated activities that would make it possible for the USSR to keep, improve, 
and strengthen the security of the territorial gains of World War II, drive wedges among alliances 
aimed at the USSR, keep the leading position of USSR in the communist world, continue the 
proletarian internationalist support of national independence movements (if it was in the interest of 
the USSR), and minimize any risk of being attacked on several fronts at once.
206
  
A similar line of thought was presented by GKKS chairman Sergei Romanovskii concerning the 
cultural exchange program. In his book on the subject he repeatedly highlights that peaceful 
coexistence does not mean peaceful coexistence between the ideologies. He states culture plays an 
important role in the continued confrontation because it gives foreigners the opportunity to 
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experience Marxist-Leninist ideology, the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist, the 
successes of the Soviet and fellow socialist countries in building socialism and communism, the 
socialist countries’ results within the fields of science and technology, and the high quality of Soviet 
cultural life. Referencing CPSU resolutions, he states that in the cultural relations with the capitalist 
countries neither the ongoing ideological battle nor the sharpening of the confrontation should be 
forgotten. A compromise between the ideologies – despite all talks of peaceful coexistence – could 
never be found.
207
 
At the 24
th
 CPSU congress in 1971 Brezhnev presented a new peace program. It had two general set 
of aims: 
 Pragmatically impossible aims of disarmament in Western Europe. 
 Pragmatically achievable aims of a security conference that would secure the Soviet gains in 
World War II and open for possible mutual disarmament and arms-control negotiations. 
In the periodization of the Cold War, the Brezhnev years almost correspond with those of détente. 
Soviet foreign policy had stalled and the USSR was no closer to achieving its revolutionary goals, 
but by promoting itself as the defender of détente it would have a positive influence on changes in 
the correlation of forces favorable to the USSR in the long run.
208
 
Mikhail Gorbachev also presented his own initiative on the peace front. It has been argued that 
Gorbachev can be seen as a reformer who attempted to seek a way out of the East-West 
confrontation and make concessions to secure the stability of the relationship by the casting out of 
ideological positions that hemmed this development.
 209
  
However, it would be too far to claim that Gorbachev’s project was one of removing ideology and 
zero-sum thinking.  
It should be remembered that Gorbachev did not come into power intending to dismantle the USSR. 
He genuinely believed that the USSR would become the world’s most dynamic society and 
economy and thereby eventually overtake capitalist societies if the USSR was just given a breathing 
space in international politics whereby it would be able to reorganize itself and eventually reach the 
deterministic endpoint of history, the communist society.
210
 Alongside the overtones of peace, the 
Soviet propaganda continued to demean USA as an imperialistic power that sought to rule the world 
and wished for a nuclear war while the Soviet Union was presented as leading the progressive 
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forces in the struggle for world peace – in May 1985 Gorbachev personally stated: “American 
imperialism is at the forward edge of the war menace for mankind” due to “the aggressive strivings 
of the elite of that country” that wanted to “[step] up the arms race” and held: “dangerous plans for 
the militarization of space”, whereas the USSR stood for “a world without wars, for a world without 
weapons”.211 At the time the USSR was engaged in its own Vietnam War in Afghanistan.  
As one contemporary commentator noted, Soviet leaders continued to talk of the class nature of 
international relations, the eventual victory of socialism over capitalism in the economic, political, 
and ideological competition,  and as such Gorbachev’s plan should be seen as no more than an 
update of the classic peace offensive without alteration of Soviet long-term strategic aims.
212
 
In conclusion, peace policies from Stalin’s peace campaigns to Gorbachev’s promotion of the 
common European home in connection with the campaign against the NATO double track decision 
should, as several historians have argued, be seen in the light of the Soviet attempt to drive a wedge 
between the European and North American NATO allies. There was continuity from one Soviet 
leadership to the next, including dissatisfaction with the international status quo. Any discontinuity 
was in the cadres, not in the foreign policy goals, even when strategies seemed to change. The 
keyword for the Soviet leadership was “eventually”. There was a continued strong belief in the 
dogma that eventually history would follow its deterministic route.
213
 
Finally, we have to take in the non-equality of the various Soviet peace and disarmament proposals. 
At the end of the Russian civil war the Red Army had 5 million men at arms. It was not 
economically possible to sustain such a large army during peacetime and the army was reduced to 
800.000 men. Lenin had the idea that if the Soviets were to reduce their number of soldiers then so 
should everybody else. In November 1922 representatives of the neighboring countries were invited 
to a conference in Moscow and met with a proposal to lower their armed forces with 75 pct. This 
would leave the USSR with more than one million men under arms, but countries like Poland and 
Finland with only 2-3 divisions, and Estonia or Latvia practically without an army.
 214
 Throughout 
its existence the USSR continually tried to weaken the opposition and strengthen the country’s own 
military position through campaigns for peace and/or disarmament. For example, Yury Andropov’s 
proposal to establish a 600 km nuclear weapons free zone on each side of the point of contact 
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between the military blocs in Central Europe would have made the Soviets move their missiles back 
a few hundred kilometers, but effectively empty the European mainland of NATO missiles.
215
 
During The Cold War the Soviet and Warszawa pact conventional forces continued to outweigh 
NATO forces,
216
 despite all talks of peace and disarmament. 
 
Three generations of peace movements. It is possible to identify three generations of peace 
movements in the 20
th
 century both internationally
217
 and in Denmark. The first generation was the 
liberal peace movements. They were pacifist by nature. The first Danish pacifist peace movement 
was Dansk Fredsforening (‘Danish Peace Society’) founded in 1882. This was later followed by 
Kvindernes Internationale Liga for Fred og Frihed (the Danish affiliation of Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom) founded in 1916 and Aldrig mere Krig (‘No More War’) founded 
in 1926 as the Danish affiliation of War Resisters’ International.218 
The second generation was the Stalinist peace movement. It was born out of the Zhdanov two camp 
theory presented at the founding meeting of Cominform.
219
 The second generation had a very 
different understanding of the term peace struggle. Instead of pacifism, understood as the evolution 
towards a just world peace, they promoted an image of the USSR and the socialist form of state as 
the powerful moral protector of suppressed peoples and the global defender of the Peace. For 
example, in 1951 the Chinese peace movement bought 2000 war planes and 200 tanks. Critics of 
the USSR were frozen out of the movement. Pravda repeatedly reminded its readers that the 
primary task of the peace struggle was to strengthen the power of the USSR as the fortress of peace 
for the entire world.
220
 Some contemporary commentators considered the peace movement  a Soviet 
means to attempt to split the Western powers and that the slogans of class struggle of the interwar 
years were exchanged for the peace struggle as part of the Soviet psychological warfare.
221
 
Therefore, it is possible to speak of a special kind of Soviet peace ideology or philosophy aimed at 
securing international relations that furthered the building of communism in the USSR, and 
protected its national interests. However at the same time the Soviet leaders argued that they were 
obliged to support armed revolutionary struggled against non-socialist governments. This meant 
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that the Soviet leadership followed the argument that the USSR needed peace, but that the anti-
imperialistic forces needed the support of the USSR, and ergo the anti-imperialistic forces were also 
struggling for peace. By this definition, defensive and liberation wars were just and therefore 
progressive while the wars of the imperialists were aggressive.
222
  
In the late 1970s the third generation of peace movements came into existence, when movements 
were activated in connection with the struggle against the double track decision. These movements 
disappeared simultaneously with the demise of the USSR and DKP.
223
  
 
Nylon or Iron Curtain. Yet another example of a problematic approach proposed by non-Russian 
speaking scholars is the multilevel-multipolar interaction paradigm which is especially advocated 
for by several Finnish historians. They argue that relations between East and West were not solely 
based on confrontation of ceaseless mutual distrust, but also on collaboration, since as the 
ideological dividing line did not penetrate the whole of society it was possible for lower-level actors 
to engage in mutual beneficial cooperation. Applying this paradigm should lead to new modes of 
explanation and re-evaluation of the boundaries and a conclusion that the interactions rather 
weakened than strengthened the internal structures of the two blocs. These scholars argue that the 
Iron Curtain was not an insurmountable mental boundary, that the role of small states and 
organizations on a national and transnational level so far have been overlooked, and that the 
argument of the realist school – that non-state or sub-state actors in reality are practically irrelevant 
– should be dismissed, because even when the state systems controlled cultural exchanges the 
participating orchestras, theater groups, sport clubs, research institutions and individuals interacted 
despite the Cold War divide.
224
 
This argument is very similar to that of György Peteri’s so-called Nylon Curtain theory. Peteri 
argues that historians should not fall so heavily in line with Churchill’s Fulton speech on the 
existence of an Iron Curtain, but instead place emphasis on the existence of a Nylon Curtain due to 
the many economic, cultural and political penetrations of the boundary carried out by both eastern 
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and western cultural actors who supposedly acted on a level of equal strength and therefore with a 
distinctive element of free competition for the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.
225
 
However, proponents of both the paradigm and the theory fail to take into consideration not only 
the intentions, demands, and expectations of the state leaders but also the difference between living 
in a western liberal-democratic state and an eastern dictatorship.  
 
Traditional and comparative studies of communism. The final central debate between traditional 
and revisionist schools concerns the question of the relationships between CPSU and the national 
communist parties. 
The traditional school sees the communist movement as monolithic, totalitarian, and directed from 
Moscow without internal conflicts of interests or other noteworthy disagreements, and the national 
communists’ loyalty to their homeland is doubtful. This tradition harkens back to the days of the 
Comintern when all national communist parties were member sections of the communist 
international. As argued in the next chapter, Comintern was only dissolved on paper in 1943 and the 
organization’s framework continued to exist. The national communist parties constantly received a 
stream of instructions via the Soviet embassies.
226
 
The critics belonging to the neo-revisionist, so-called comparative school argue for the existence of 
a so-called double frame of the national communist parties as acting not only in relation to a 
politically dominating USSR, but also individually according to the national, cultural, political, and 
personal differences across Europe, with strong emphasis on national differences rather than on 
attempts at transnational unity.
227
 It has been argued that communists were equipped with a special 
set of double patriotism that included loyalty both to their home country and to the world 
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communist movement, and since they themselves did not see a problem in this, it should be 
considered unproblematic.
228
  
However, as the Danish architect and multi-artist Poul Henningsen once pointed out, at the end of 
the day a communist would have to choose between feelings of nationality and political outlook, 
and a communist would eventually choose the latter.
229
 
The main difference between the two schools is whether they emphasize the primacy of the 
intentions of the center or the possible comparability of the periphery. Two questions should be 
answered when analyzing the validity of these approaches. Firstly, we need to consider the question 
of the view of the world communist movement in Moscow. Secondly, we have to question whether 
there were more similarities or dissimilarities in the organization of the communist parties with 
affiliates in various countries. 
Again, our point of departure for answering these questions is the founding meeting of Cominform 
where Andrei Zhdanov clearly stated the continued Soviet insistence on a closely knitted world 
communist movement. Even if the movement developed within national frames, the national parties 
had the same assignments and interests and there was the same need for consultations and 
voluntarily coordination (as it was called in Soviet wording).  Alternatives were considered 
wrongful, damaging, and unnatural.
230
 Afterwards, Zhdanov could report home to Stalin (code 
named “Filippov”) that the participating communist parties had fallen into line with the Soviet 
demands for a new political course.
 231
 Furthermore, when inviting foreign communist parties to 
send delegations to CPSU congresses, the International Department evaluated them on their support 
of the general line stipulated from Moscow; 
232
 Khrushchev expected foreign communist parties to 
recognize the leading role of CPSU on the basis of ideological affinity
233
 and at CPSU CC plenums 
the unity of the world communist movement was a recurring theme. Great emphasis was placed on 
the question of unity based on central ideological principals outlined from Moscow, and various 
parties such as the Chinese were condemned if they did not adhere to this general line.
234
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DKP was one of the most loyal national parties. In a 1950 speech at a CC meeting the party 
ideologist Ib Nørlund stated that it was the strong bond with the USSR that would eventually bring 
the party to victory in Denmark.
235
 An important Italian study of the PCI clearly shows that 
communists did have a form of double identity, but contrary to the revisionists’ argument it 
stemmed from a belief that the USSR was their true home country and that their task in their 
country of residence, therefore, was to represent and promote Soviet interests.
236
 CPSU closely 
monitored the communist parties’ positions to see if they kept in line with the signals from 
Moscow.
237
 The similarities between Danish and Italian communists’ perceptions and agendas are 
striking. 
Therefore, we must conclude that there are several central aspects that the comparative school does 
not take into consideration. Those are the continued existence of Comintern (under another name), 
the intention of the CPSU to preserve a power monopoly over a coherent international movement, 
the dependency on financing from Moscow, the newly available Soviet sources (as most supporters 
do not speak Russian), and the unwillingness to call things by their right name.  Instead of 
acknowledging the widespread schooling of foreign communist in Moscow
238
 and considering its 
implications for the center-periphery relationship it is vaguely referred to as “a form of international 
cooperation.
239” Furthermore, it is highly problematic when historians uncritically take over 
communistic terms such as double patriotism, simply because the communists themselves saw it as 
unproblematic. 
Even when we acknowledge the differences in membership figures, activity levels, and possibilities 
of operating, there are more similarities than differences between the communist parties within 
various countries with regards to the pattern of operations of the communist parties, front 
organizations, book shops, and programs from Radio Moscow. This pattern of similarities needs to 
be taken into account. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we have discussed a number of key theories and schools on various themes central to 
this dissertation. On the basis of these debates we will seek to establish a coherent theoretical 
framework for the empirical studies in the following chapters. 
The empirical analysis will focus on both the organization, the framing of the messages, and the 
reception. The level of organization is important in order to identify the various participants in and 
senders of the Soviet messages. When analyzing the activities themselves it is important to consider 
both the context of the messages and the strategy used to present them to the public, and finally 
whether the senders wanted to disclose their identity or not. Finally, when analyzing the reception 
of the messages/activities we have to take into consideration the evaluation on a Soviet level, on an 
internal Danish participation level, and – to the degree to which it is possible to identify this – the 
reception in wider public circles. 
Although we recognize that Soviet society was not completely static and that everything did not 
necessarily worked out as planned we still base our empirical study on a mostly traditional approach 
that emphasizes the importance of the ideology, and the importance of the intention of the center 
and the similarities of the periphery compared to the differences.  
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Chapter 2: Structures 
 
“We must create a whole solar system of organizations and 
smaller committees around the Communist Party, small 
organizations, so to speak, actually working under the 
influence of the party but not under its mechanical control” 
Otto Kuusinen
240
 
 
 
Several historians have highlighted the importance of including considerations of the significance of 
the key role played by the Soviet apparatus in studies of USSR cultural diplomacy. As Jennifer 
Anderson states: 
 
“What is clear is that Canadian historians have for too long overlooked the importance of VOKS in negotiating both 
high and grass-roots cultural exchanges, and as actors in international relations”.
241
 
 
Ludmilla Stern support this point: 
 
 “Attempts to explain Western intellectuals’ attraction to the Soviet Union are incomplete as long as they exclude the 
Soviet Union’s contribution to these relations. The commonly accepted view, that this attraction was spontaneous and 
that the support of intellectuals was inspired from within, overlooks the fact that, to a large extent, these relations were 
instigated and manipulated by the USSR. It has been recognised that the Soviet Union had a vested interest in attracting 
and influencing its foreign friends; however, it has not been adequately understood how the Soviets manufactured this 
support”.242 
 
In this chapter we discuss four elements: Apparatus, financing, cultural agreements, and the 
decision-making process. Regarding the apparatus, this chapter places focus on the Soviet level of 
the apparatus. The international as well as the national, Danish levels will primarily be discussed in 
the following chapters. 
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STRUCTURES 
 
Culture and causes. The Soviets aimed at presenting themselves, in self-comparison with their 
American rivals, as the saviors and keepers of European high culture (Kultur) through the 
presentation of music, paintings, history and performing arts such as internationally staged 
productions of orchestral concerts and ballets.
243
  Additionally the USSR also sought to promote a 
number of causes such as peace or the interests of workers, youth, women, professional, and other 
groups. Both culture and causes were seen as part of the same structure for promoting Soviet 
interests abroad and therefore were directed by the same administrative system.  
 
Mono-organizational socialism.  In the analysis of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus we 
utilize the theory of mono-organizational socialism developed by T.H. Rigby,
 244
 who bases his 
theory explicitly on the ideological nature of the world view of the Soviet rulers.  
All groups in power have an ideal they seek to implement.  For the Bolsheviks the ideal was to 
create the communist society foretold by Karl Marx and in the process they were willing to violate 
their ideal in the interest of its fulfillment. The violations were seen as unfortunate but temporarily 
necessary to ensure the full and genuine realization of the ideal. They developed a hierarchical 
administration for the whole country and intended to secure party supervision of all spheres of 
social activities, from retail sales and internal security to farming and the arts. Soviet society 
became a command society defined, as a relationship with one active and one passive side in the 
decision-making process. One actor alone formulated and transmitted goals, assignments, tasks, and 
prescribed methods. Although various changes in the hierarchy of the structure of the administrative 
system took place after Stalin’s death, the USSR was run by a combination of official hierarchies 
with a monopoly in a given field of activity and bound together and integrated by the hierarchy of 
the Communist Party apparatus. This bound them into a single centralized organizational structure 
and coordinated their activities as if the entire country was run by a single giant firm. The USSR 
became an enterprise both in the way society was developed and how it operated. All spheres of 
social activity were not only managed but directed by formal hierarchical organizations set up by 
the political authorities, with the purpose of integrating all organizations under the leadership of the 
Communist Party so it could determine their goals, structures and management and thereby protect 
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the end goal of building the communist society from any possible competition. This was clearly 
stated in the preamble to the 1977 constitution, were it said that the supreme goal of the Soviet state 
was to build a classless communist society, and in article 6 it was stated that the Communist Party 
was the leading and directing force in Soviet society and the nucleus of among other all state and 
public organizations.
245
 
Soviet society should be perceived as being run by an ideologically driven political party that 
played the pivotal role and directed the operation of various sub-trees;
 246
 these could be anything 
from regional administration to an international network of front organizations pursuing goals that 
benefitted Soviet foreign policy aims. 
 
Three level sub-tree. When we develop a model for the apparatus for Soviet cultural diplomacy we 
should divide it into three levels. 
1: The Soviet level: The CPSU, ministries, state committees, public organizations, and state 
enterprises. 
2: The international level: International front organizations. 
3: The national level: DKP, the friendship society, Danish affiliations of international front 
organizations, and travel agencies. 
Due to the large numbers of organizations involved it is necessary to strike a balance between 
giving an accurate picture of the sub-tree and emphasizing the elements related to our Danish case 
study. Although fronts without threads to Denmark did receive attention in the Danish press,
247
 we 
shall limit our analysis to fronts with Danish affiliations or otherwise Danish involvement, even in 
cases where the attempt to create a national Danish affiliation was not met with success, that we can 
identify from the available archival materials. Table 2.A lists an overview of the International front 
organizations, the Soviet public organizations assigned to them, and Danish organizations affiliated 
with them. 
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Figure 2.1.: The Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus
248
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Tabel 2.A: The interconnections between international fronts, Soviet controllers, and the 
Danish Affiliations. 
 
 
* indicates that a Danish organization either disaffiliated itself or that it did not fully act as a national affiliation. 
For an explanation of the abbreviations, see appendix 1. 
The various Danish organizations are discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. 
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Three generations of Soviet apparatus. Although the outlook and tasks of the Soviet apparatus for 
foreign propaganda did not change, it is possible to identify three apparatus generations separated 
by structural changes. 
The first generation consisted of structures and organizations either in existence at the outbreak of 
the Cold War (such as VOKS) or founded during the time of Stalin. 
The second was the result of a post-Stalin attempt at sweeping changes. In the time leading up to 
the 20
th
 party congress, several reports criticized the lack of impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy 
abroad, argued it was too non-centralized and uncoordinated and recommended either a complete 
reorganization of the existing apparatus or the creation of new organizations.
249
 However, the 
overhaul only resulted in the renaming and restructuring of some organizations and the founding of 
numerous bilateral Soviet friendship societies. Therefore the changes should be seen more as 
belonging to the destalinization process than an actual attempt at structural revision. 
During perestroika several reorganizations also reached parts of the foreign apparatus. They could 
be seen as an attempt by Gorbachev to move power from the party apparatus to his new power base 
that eventually became The Presidential Council with Soviet president, Gorbachev, as chairman. 
Traditional departments of the party apparatus were structurally placed under the control of sub-
committees of the council, although this apparently did not diminish either the assignments or the 
influence of the party apparatus departments.
250
  
 
CPSU CC’ apparatus. The single most important entity in the Soviet Union was the Communist 
Party (CPSU)
251
. The country was ruled by various small groups within Politburo/Presidium of the 
CPSU Central Committee.
 252
 
The day-to-day affairs were run by the central administrative organ, the secretariat. It consisted of 
approximately 22 departments (the number varied throughout the years) directed by 10-12 
secretaries, some in charge of several departments. In 1970 the secretariat had approximately 3300 
employees, 900 were party functionaries (called “responsible employees”), the rest worked as office 
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or technical personal.
253
 Several of the departments came into contact with the organization of 
cultural diplomacy abroad, but here we will focus on the two directly intended for this work.
 
 
The Department for International Information. The Department was in charge of the Soviet 
news and press agencies, both controlling their dissemination and filtering back the information 
gathered by the agencies abroad254 - especially form the various news agencies. 
The first Russian news agency was the state-owned Russian Telegraph Agency founded in 1870. 
Due to an international cartel agreement it was completely dependent on the Prussian Bernard 
Wolff’s Continental Telegraph. In 1904, as an attempt to escape the dependence on the German 
agency, the new Saint Petersburg Telegraph Agency was established (later to be renamed 
Petrograd 
Telegraph Agency). As part of the coup d’état the Bolsheviks took over the news agency and kept it as a 
window to the world, formally answering to Sovnarkom. At the same time The Press Bureau of the 
all-Russian executive committee of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ soviets was founded. In 1918 
Lenin merged them into the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA). In 1925 ROSTA was renamed 
TASS (The Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union).
255
  
TASS sent a large number of journalists abroad, and following the end of the Cold War it has been 
discussed whether (and to what degree) they operated under the auspices of the KGB. The first two 
TASS correspondents reached Denmark from Sweden on May 5
th
 1945, immediately following the 
German capitulation, and reported home in long secret reports (rather than news articles) on the 
political situation in Denmark.
256
 One of them, Mikhail Kosov, obstinately denied having any KGB 
contacts for many years.
257
 Only shortly prior to his death did he admit his KGB status.
258
 The KGB 
defector Ilya Dzhirkvelov gives a very detailed description of the KGB’s leading role and strong 
influence on Soviet journalism, both in the Union of Journalists and TASS, including on his own 
tenure as TASS correspondent (as a cover identity) abroad.
259
 However, this role is hardly 
surprising considering that one of the daily tasks of TASS was to compile digests of the most 
important international news items for distribution among the upper echelon of the Soviet 
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leadership.
260
 The “operative information” was gathered from Western telegram agencies and 
translated into Russian.
261
 
Following, the Nazi-German attack on USSR the Soviets opened a second news agency, 
Sovinformburo, led by
 
the TASS chairman,
 
by a resolution of
 
June 24
th
 1941 “On the strengthening 
of the leadership the overall work of explaining to international developments, the country’s inner 
life and military development by founding a Soviet information bureau.” It was tasked with three 
assignments: 
1: To take control of the information on domestic and foreign developments. 
2: To organize countermeasures against hostile foreign propaganda. 
3: To publish information on the developments at the war fronts. 
Sovinformburo consisted of several departments: The military department (reporting on the war 
effort), the department on international affairs (political articles), the department of 
counterpropaganda, the department of literature (fiction), and various other departments. Following 
the end of World War II, seven main editorial offices with the responsibility for specific 
geographical areas were introduced. In February 1961 it was renamed APN,
262
 which could be seen 
as one of the final features of the post-Stalin reform. Officially the founding of APN was the result 
of a congress initiated by various public organizations.
263
 
According to its constitution, APN should function as the information agency of Soviet public 
organizations and disseminate information in the form of articles, commentaries, interviews, 
discussions, photo journalism and other forms of information materials on the life, economy, 
culture, and society of the Soviet peoples, Soviet foreign and domestic politics, and national and 
international developments – preferably in cooperation with foreign publishers and news media. 
On the management level APN was run by a board. The board oversaw the running of the main 
secretariat, which in turn ran a number of departments, groups, boards, and yhe main editorial 
offices.  They can be divided into three groups. 
The first group, consisting of departments and boards, were in charge of the material aid and 
secretarial functions of the day to day operation of APN. 
The second group, consisting of the main editorial office of operative information, the main 
editorial office of centralization of information, the main editorial office on information programs,  
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Figure 2.2: APN 
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the group of political commentators (the internationally well-known Spartak Beglov belonged to 
this group), the main editorial office for political publications, the main editorial office for 
teleinformation, the main editorial office for photo information, the main editorial office for 
information programs (including exhibitions), the publishing arm, and the main editorial office for 
translations, provided the materials to be distributed by the third group. The main editorial office on 
the methods and effectiveness of propaganda moreover studied and measured APN activities and 
campaigns abroad and issued recommendations as to how they could be improved.  
The third group consisted of eight main editorial boards each in charge of dissemination of APN 
products to specific geographical areas. Denmark belonged to the area covered by the main editorial 
board for Western Europe. As part of its program, points of correspondents (offices) operated 
abroad. Additionally, in 1976 the publication of periodicals abroad was withdrawn from the main 
editorial boards and turned over to seven united editorial offices under the auspices of the main 
editorial office for periodical publication.
264
  
By a CC decree of February 12
th
 1957, a Sovinformburo office was opened in Denmark,
265
 staffed 
by a director, two employees and a radio operator.
266
 The task of the office was to strengthen the 
publication of the Danish language Soviet publication Fakta om Sojvetunionen (FOS) and begin the 
publication of a daily news bulletin aimed at Danish newspapers to better the image of USSR in the 
Danish press.
267
 Upon arriving in Denmark the first director L. Malov stated at a press conference 
that he had come to find out what news items (news, culture, politics, sports) Danish newspapers 
would be interested in. As his office was in direct contact with the main office in Moscow he would 
be able to fairly quickly obtain materials for the Danish press.
268
 The office had several Danish 
employees with the primary assignment of translating Soviet texts received in Russian (using the 
Latin alphabet) via teleprinter from Moscow for the various Danish language publications.
269
 
APN had a special publishing branch, Progress, for the publication of books and pamphlets – 
primarily abroad.
270
 This publishing house had a department for Scandinavian literature.
271
 In 1982 
Raduga was established for publishing children’s literature.272 During the 1980s Progress employed 
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two Danish translators and Raduga one. At Progress they were part of the Northern European 
section. Based on overall production plans and negotiations with the Danish recipient publishing 
houses, Tiden and Sputnik, who received the books free of charge the translators were tasked with 
translating specific books such as the speeches of Yury Andropov or the history of Comintern. 
Other titles, for example written by members of the front organization Generals for Peace also saw 
publication. Each book was proofread first for linguistic errors, and then the proofs were read three 
times. Many errors had to be corrected at this stage, as the Soviet typographers could not read the 
print, and therefore there were often several errors in each line. Due to financial concerns Progress 
closed its doors in 1992.
273
 
During perestroika APN was renamed The International News Agency (IAN) without this affecting 
either its activities or its organization. By decree of then president of the Russia Soviet Republic 
Boris Yeltsin, in September 1991, IAN was renamed RIA Novosti.
274
 Following the collapse of the 
USSR merging TASS and APN under the acronym ITAR (Information and Telegram Agency of 
Russia) was considered. The merger never happened, but as a result TASS was renamed ITAR-
TASS.
275
 
 
The International Department (ID)
.
 The most important departments for international relations 
was the so-called “party foreign ministry“, The International Department – the direct continuation 
of Comintern.  
Comintern was founded in January 1919 as a world party. National communist parties were 
considered sections of Comintern and had to follow the general line issued from the Executive 
Committee. In 1943, officially as a goodwill gesture to the USSR’s allies in The Grand Alliance, it 
was decided that Comintern should be dissolved. However, the dissolution was an illusion. The 
Comintern apparatus moved inside the party apparatus and in the following years took on various 
names such as Institute 99,100, and 205, OMI, or the Commission on Foreign Policy.
276
 In 1953 it 
was reorganized as The Department for Contacts with Foreign Communist Parties with cadres and 
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Figure 2.3: The International Department
277
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assignments intact.
278
  In 1957 it permanently became The International Department. At that point 
the control of the ruling socialist parties in Eastern Europe and elsewhere was transferred to a 
separate department. Throughout the name changes, the cadre continuity from Comintern was 
evident. Both management and staff stayed unaltered. 
Throughout its existence the ID had three different chairmen. The first was the orthodox communist 
Boris Ponomarev, who made sure that the general party line was followed both at home and 
abroad.
279
 He was replaced by the unwilling former long-time Soviet ambassador to the US Anatoly 
Dobrynin,
280
  who was quickly followed by Valentin Falin.
281
 
The chairman had a number of deputies each in charge of one or more sectors overseeing either a 
geographical area or a cause. Each geographical sector had a number of national desks, each run by 
a rapporteur (referent). For many years the deputy in charge of the Scandinavian sector was Vitalii 
Shaposhnikov and the rapporteur Vladimir Savko. Each spoke Danish or another Scandinavian 
language.
282
 The department had approximately 200 employees
283
. Unlike other party departments 
they were not recruited from within party ranks, but from amongst teachers at institutions of higher 
education, journalists, and diplomats. They had to speak at least two foreign languages and possess 
knowledge of the country they were to work with.
284
 
The ID was tasked with five assignments: 
 Ensure the implementation of the general line of Soviet foreign policy. 
 Maintain contacts with foreign communist parties.  
 Maintain contacts with foreign liberal and left-wing parties, revolutionary groups, and 
national liberation movements. 
 Maintain contacts with front organizations. 
 Recommend which parties and movements should receive economic support from the so-
called “Trade Union Foundation”. 285 
The contact with foreign communist parties was maintained either through consultations in Moscow 
or through conversations and transfer of written instructions at the local Soviet embassies.
286
 The 
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archives are full of examples of the ID receiving copies of the records conversations of the embassy 
staff with local communist representatives.
287
 After Aksel Larsen’s fall from grace, the party 
leadership was invited to a meeting in Moscow both to be evaluated and to strengthen their 
domestic position.
288
 
 
Cominform as non-continuity. In the literature on this topic the role of The Communist 
Information Bureau (Cominform) as the new Comintern has been overemphasized.
289
 Although we 
should not completely dismiss the role of Cominform in tightening Soviet control and coherence in 
Eastern Europe,
290
 the misunderstanding has more to do with the way the new bureau was presented 
to the world.
291
 It would be much more accurate to understand Cominform as a relay station for 
shifts in Soviet policies. 
The first meeting took place in 1947, in the deepest secrecy in the Polish village of Szklarska 
Poreba.
292
 The overall theme of the congress was Andrei Zhdanov’s introduction of the two camp 
theory of two opposing camps in world politics,
293
 thereby signaling the return to an ultra-left line 
following the popular front strategy of World War II and the earliest post-war years. The second 
congress in 1948 marked the political break between the Tito and Stalin
294
 and signaled the 
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the ranks of communism and communist controlled fronts (as we 
shall see below). The third and final congress in 1949 signaled the initiation of the peace struggle,
295
 
which was to become a corner stone of Soviet cultural diplomacy. 
After the third congress Cominform lost any importance and the fourth meeting was continuously 
postponed.
296
 In 1956, Khrushchev finally decided to dissolve it.
297
 Only Cominform’s heavily 
subsidized journal, For Lasting Peace, For People’s Democracy,298 survived in its headquarters in 
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Prague as a platform for theoretical communist debate.
299
 The journal finally closed in 1990 when 
the USSR could no longer afford the subvention.
300
 
DKP also loyally followed the signals from CPSU, even when they came through Cominform, and 
the shifts in the international communist movement coming from Moscow can be seen in identical 
shifts in DKP’s positions.301 
 
Public organizations. Within the society of mono-organizational socialism the organizations of 
public life controlled by the party called themselves public organizations (‘obshchestvennye 
organizatsii’). They served a twofold purpose: To monopolize public life or interests within a 
sphere such as “sport”, “trade unionism” or “the struggle for peace” and to be the sole official 
Soviet representatives for contacts with Western organizations and to dominate the international 
front organizations by having members in key office positions and by controlling financing.
302
 The 
role of public organizations to actively support Soviet foreign policy aims through engagement with 
foreign organizations was even written into the 1977 Soviet constitution.
303
 
The Soviet Peace Committee was one of the key organizations in Soviet Cultural diplomacy. SPC 
was founded at the initiation of the massive Soviet peace campaign run throughout the Cold War at 
an August 1949 congress in Moscow.
304
 SPC was divided into two departments and several 
committees. SPC played a leading role in an international front organization (in this case WPC) 
through the employment of Soviet citizens in the WPC bureau.
 305
 CPSU placed high value on the 
control of SPC through WPC to such a degree that SPC chairman Yury Zhukov (formerly of 
GKKS) was removed as WPC vice-chairman when he proved to be unable to cooperate with non-
communists.
306
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Figure 2.4: SPC
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Other public organizations such as the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Association 
of Soviet Lawyers, The Committee of Soviet War Veterans, The Committee of Soviet Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War, The Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR, The 
Soviet Women’s Committee, Retired Soviet Generals for Peace and Disarmament, The Soviet 
Students’ Council, and The Association of Soviet Journalists all played similar roles as Soviet 
controllers in international front organizations (see table 2.A.).
308
 As part of the new openness under 
Khrushchev, between 1956 and 1958 The Academy of Sciences entered 38 international 
organizations and 69 forums.
309
 
CPSU closely monitored the development within the various organizations and controlled the 
election to key positions. When E.P. Pukhova was elected chairman of the Women’s Committee in 
1987, her appointment, salary, and benefits were pre-approved by the CPSU CC Secretariat.
310
 
After 1917, the Bolsheviks were interested in inviting foreigners to Soviet Russia to experience the 
new regime with their own eyes and, hopefully, present it in a positive manner upon returning 
home. During the 1921 Volga famine the Bolsheviks established the All-Russian Committee for 
Helping the Hunger Victims. Under the leadership of Olga Kameneva the committee eventually 
took over the contacts with foreign intellectuals. In 1925 the work was continued through VOKS. 
VOKS was tasked with penetrating the circles and institutions outside of the working areas of 
Comintern and NKID. Being Trotsky’s sister and Kamenev’s wife was not a healthy position in the 
1930s. Kameneva was fired, jailed, and eventually executed (1941). However, the organization she 
founded continued to exist, although several successors and employees suffered similar fates during 
The Great Terror. In the end, VOKS was almost closed, but survived thanks to the outbreak of 
World War II on the eastern front that made it necessary for the USSR to invest in improving its 
image abroad and gain allies in its struggle for survival. VOKS was considered important enough to 
be one of the organizations transferred to Kubyshev.
311
 
VOKS was organized as seven bureaus. Six of them were in charge of a general area such as book 
exchanges, PR, promotion through photographs, exhibitions, delegation exchanges, and the city 
level local branches of VOKS. The seventh bureau consisted of a number of departments for  
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Figure 2.5: VOKS
312
 
 
 
                                                 
312
 Based on Roithaug 13-16. 
80 
 
contacts with certain geographical areas. Each country within a given geographical department was 
given its own office operated by a secretary with knowledge of the language and culture of the 
specific country. In its capacity of cultural exchange organization VOKS (and later SSOD) was able 
to establish contacts with countries without diplomatic relations with USSR.
313
 
In 1957 it was decided that VOKS would be discontinued. It was argued that VOKS could no 
longer fulfill its task of broadly engaging foreign publics and Soviet party leaders wanted an 
organization that involved more public organizations.
314
 In 1958 a new decree ordered that the 
republic level OKS reorganized along the same lines.
315
 The Russian historian Borisova argues that 
VOKS was closed because it was perceived as being too closely connected to the MID and not an 
independent NGO, it had to be restructured to appear softer.
316
 Interestingly, neither historians nor 
Soviet archival sources consider the influence of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 on the 
increasingly difficult working environment of VOKS. 
In connection with the dissolution of VOKS, CPSU CC decided to establish SSOD by organizing a 
conference with 700 participants in Moscow and pre-approving the list of participating 
organizations in the conference.
 317
 Soviet leaders placed great emphasis on the role of SSOD. Both 
Yury Andropov and Andrei Gromyko were personal members of SSOD. The Soviet leadership 
chose Nina Popova chairman, a party veteran of cultural diplomacy and member of the Supreme 
Soviet who was simultaneously chairman of the Soviet Womens’ Committee, active in WIDF, and 
had a strong international name. She continued as SSOD chairman until her retirement in 1975.
318
 
Popova was succeeded by Zinaida Kruglova
319
 and, later by the first female cosmonaut Valentina 
Tereshkova.
320
 
SSOD was a larger organization with more assignments than VOKS, although this was not reflected 
in the number of employees. SSOD initially had 235 compared to VOKS’ 228. The Scandinavian 
department had 7 employees; a chairman, a vice-chairman, four rapporteurs (the Danish and 
Icelandic desks shared one), and a typist.
321
 According to SSOD vice-chairman Mikhail Palshak,  
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Figure 2.6.: SSOD
322
 
 
 
                                                 
322
 Based on ГАРФ/Р-9576/20, Предисловие. 
Unfortunately I have only had access to the finding aid. 
82 
 
SSOD included 134 Soviet friendship societies with 50 million members overall.
323
 
The SSOD constitution stated that SSOD had been established in accordance with § 126 of the 
Soviet constitution to strengthen the friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and 
foreign peoples, promote Soviet culture and science, and coordinate the work of public 
organizations for contacts abroad. SSOD Established several departments, operated a friendship 
house and organized lectures, exhibitions, parties, and meetings. SSOD could also operate similar 
houses abroad.
324
 By the mid-1980s SSOD was in contact with 9000 organizations, including 
international fronts, in 141 countries and in charge of the twinning city program.
325
 Another new 
feature of SSOD was the direct contact between republic level SODs and organizations in foreign 
countries assigned according to a CPSU CC Secretariat decree.
326
 DKSU was contacted first by the 
Latvian SOD
327
 and a few years later by the Belarusian SOD concerning the establishment of direct 
contacts.
328
 
In a report concerning the establishment of SSOD it was noted that since SSOD could not count on 
any income, but would have a significant expenditure, the state should bear the operating costs. At 
the same time, the report recommended the creation of special bilateral societies in other 
countries.
329
 The Soviets established 72 bilateral, Soviet friendship associations.
330
 One of them was 
the Society USSR-Denmark which was established in 1958. The list of participants in the founding 
conference, coverage of their travel expenses, the members of the board, and the presidency of 
MGU Vice-Rector, Professor G. Vovchenko, had all been pre-approved by the CPSU CC on the 
recommendation of SSOD chairman Nina Popova.
331
 Although the friendship society also included 
individual members, the larger part of the membership was made up of collective members. They 
included a wide variety of Soviet research institutions, factories, editorial boards, football clubs, 
collective farms, collective fisheries, shops and public schools from numerous Soviet republics.
332
 
Most collective members did not have a business related reason for joining. This supports the 
impression that we are dealing with GONGOs (Government Organized NGO’s presenting 
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themselves as independent) where the CPSU decided both collective and prominent individuals’ 
membership. 
Nevertheless, the Soviets tried to convince foreigners that organizations such as SSOD and SUDK 
were formed on the basis of spontaneous public initiative of ordinary citizens and organizations 
with the benevolent purpose of strengthening international peace and mutual understanding.
333
 
Such claims were made to the main Danish partner, DKSU. Following the founding of SSOD Nina 
Popova framed her case in this manner when writing DKSU with a proposal for future 
cooperation,
334
 and repeated it in her speech as a guest at the 1965 DKSU congress.
335
 In their first 
written contact with DKSU, SUDK framed their founding in a similar way.
336
 Apparently, 
individuals from all parts of the USSR had decided simultaneously and spontaneously to gather for 
a conference in Moscow. The communists and fellow-travellers from the DKSU executive 
responded overwhelmingly positively to the explanation and suggestion of cooperation.
337
 Only 
blind loyalty towards the USSR explains such a reaction. Following its inception, SUDK took over 
as the main Soviet point of contact between the USSR and DKSU.
338
 
The Danish foreign ministry had a very different attitude to SUDK. The Danish ambassador in 
Moscow reported that the congress had been tightly controlled, everything well prepared in 
advance, and the coming chairman, Vovchenko, had not even been present, so he highly doubted 
the spontaneous nature of the founding of SUDK.
339
 After long deliberations
340
 the ambassador had 
been allowed to attend the founding meeting
341
 and gave a non-committing speech,
342
 but especially 
due to SUDK cooperation with DKSU
343
 the official Danish representation kept its distance. 
Following Prime Minister Krag’s speech at the SSOD house during his 1964 state visit to Moscow 
the embassy had to change its policy
344
 
 
                                                 
333
 Nyheder fra Sovjetunionen 1958:411, 1-2.  
334
 ABA/DKSU/6/SSOD to DKSU 3.26.1958. 
335
 ABA/DKSU/1/Congress minutes 1.31.1965. 
336
 ABA/DKSU/6/SUDK to DKSU undated [late 1958]. 
337
 KB/JJ/27/Telegram DKSU to SUDK 1.29.1959. 
338
 KB/JJ/27/SUDK to DKSU 2.25.1959; SUDK to DKSU 4.2.1959; SUDK to DKSU 6.17.1959. 
339
 RA/UM.17.I.126/Embassy report 855 11.5.1958. 
340
 RA/UM. 17.I.74/Embassy telegram 7.18.1958; 17.I.84/ Umtel 196 2.21.1958; Ambassador Mørch to UM 7.26.1958; 
17.I.125/Embassy to UM 7.24.1958. 
341
 RA/UM.17.I.126/Summary 11.3.1958 
A DKSU delegation was also present (ABA/Fridericia/1/Пригласительный билет 1958). 
342
 RA/UM.17.I.126/Speech manuscript undated 
343
 RA/UM.17.I.84/Svenningsen to Mørch 12.1.1958; Embassy report 322 5.29.1962; 17.I.126/Summary 6.16.1958. 
344
 Jensen (1999), 152. 
84 
 
Organizing sport. During the interwar years the USSR did not participate in relations within 
international sports. But in 1945 the soccer club Dinamo toured England, and finally, in 1952, 
Stalin allowed Soviet athletes to participate in the summer Olympics.
345
  
The All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport oversaw all sporting activities in the 
USSR. The committee consisted of separate departments for each sport as well as a department for 
international sports’ relations. A mirror organization existed in each republic.346 It was later 
renamed The Central Council of Sport Unions and Organizations and The Committee for Physical 
Culture and Sport. Despite the name changes, it was generally referred to as The Sports 
Committee.
347
 Local sports clubs were formed in each republic down to city level as work and 
trade-union based sport societies such as Spartak for producer cooperatives, Lokomotiv for railway 
workers, Torpedo for auto workers, and so forth. National sport leagues came into existence in the 
1930s.
348
 
From the late 1940s the USSR actively sought IOC membership, but critics highlighted the state-
run sports system, that did not correspond with the mantra of athlete amateurism of the time. In the 
end, however, IOC was won over, and the USSR was allowed to compete. Stalin gave his approval, 
when he had been assured, that the Soviets would win the overall medal count (an unofficial 
Olympic competition). The Soviet National Olympic Committee (NOC) was organized in 1951. 
Despite giving the impression of living up to the IOC demand of national independence of NOCs, 
the Soviet NOC was tightly controlled by CPSU.
349
 Simultaneously, the USSR joined numerous 
international sporting federations, hoping to influence them through a coordination of efforts with 
East European representatives. The practical work was carried out by the international department 
of the Sports Committee.
350
  
 
Ministries and State Committees. The second aspect of the Soviet state executed cultural 
diplomacy was the government apparatus. In the following we shall identify key institutions in the 
cultural diplomacy apparatus.  
On March 15
th
 1946 the government, earlier The Council of Peoples Commissariats 
(Sovnarkom),was renamed Council of Ministers (Sovmin). In 1990 it was renamed The Cabinet of 
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Ministers of the USSR.
351
 Formally, Sovmin was the Soviet government. However, as we shall 
discuss further below, the government was answerable to the top party echelon. Sovmin was 
comprised of both ministries and state committees. The ministries were led by a minister who held a 
seat in Sovmin, whereas the state committees were led by a chairman who did not hold a seat in 
Sovmin. 
For a fairly long period of its existence the USSR did not have a regular Ministry of cultural affairs. 
In 1936 a Committee on Cultural Affairs was formed. Later an actual ministry was founded by 
merging several ministries and state committees. The most notable of the ministers of culture 
throughout the years was the first ever female Soviet minister EA. Furtseva.
352
    
In 1954 the state security organizations were reorganized as the state committee for state security 
(KGB). Although the committee was formally placed as a State Committee under Sovmin it was 
understood that it should answer directly to the top echelon of the party. When founded, KGB had 
15,956 employees and an annual budget of 346 million rubles.
353
 
By a CC decree of March 4
th
1957 The State Committee on Cultural Connections abroad (GKKS) 
was founded.
354
 It had 80 responsible employees and 36 technical. It existed from 1957-1967 to 
coordinate the annual plans for international cultural and scientific connections of various 
ministries, public organizations, and the Academy of Sciences into one package for CC approval
355
  
to coordinate the work and avoid parallel or uncontrolled activities.
356
 Additionally, GKKS 
participated in the process of entering into state cultural assignments with foreign countries.
357
 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of GKKS is the fact that it was created as part of the post-
Stalinist overhaul and that it was an untraditional attempt to move responsibility and a lower-level 
decision-making process from the party apparatus to the government apparatus. 
For the same reason, GKKS never came to function as originally intended. The first chairman, Yu. 
Zhukov, emphasized this problem in a report were he complained that because GKKS had been 
established not as a ministry but as a state committee under Sovmin its capacity to fully control the 
activities of the ministries was undercut because they tried to avoid it and instead directly contacted 
                                                 
351
 В.И. Ивкин: Государственная власть СССР: Выцшие органы власти и управления и их руководители 1923-
1991 гг. Историко-биографический справочник (Москва, 1999), 20-29. 
352
 К.А. Заёесский: Кто есть кто в истории СССР (Москва, 2011), 13-14, 141, 149, 331, 389, 506; Ивкин,, 162-
167, 194, 278, 285, 314-315, 428, 476-477, 570; Микоян/Медведев. 
353
 Фурсенко Т. 1, 19-24; Т. 2: Постановлеия. 1954-1958, 19-24. 
354
 РГАНИ/5/30/235/62-64/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.20.1957.  
355
 RA/Danica/105/ Д. Шевлягин [и др.] к заседанию Секретариатов ЦК КПСС 11.29.1963. 
356
 РГАНИ/5/30/235/62-64/Жуков ЦК КПСС 5.20.1957. 
357
Barghoorn, 31, 159. 
86 
 
CC.
358
 Following its dissolution its assignments were transferred to the Ministry of Higher 
Education.
359
 
The State Committee for radio and television broadcasting (Gosteleradio) was founded in 1962
360
 
and was responsible for Radio Moscow among other things. Radio Moscow’s broadcasting for 
foreign audiences officially began on October 29
th
 1929.
361
 The first Danish broadcast took place in 
1943 with Georg Motlke (Laursen) as the first speaker, under the pseudonym “Peter Hansen”.362 
The Danish desk evolved and eventually consisted of seven Soviet and three Danish citizens. The 
best known Danish radio speaker was Erik Carlsen.
363
 The Danish desk was part of an overall 
Scandinavian editorial department with the (in Denmark) well-known translator Nina Krymova in a 
leading role.
364
 95 % of all radio broadcasts were prerecorded and to be censored editorial groups 
and the Soviet censorship institution Glavlit. Technical issues such as communications 
infrastructure were controlled by the Ministry of Communications, investing and financing by 
Gosplan and the Ministry of finance, and jamming of foreign broadcasts by the border police.
365
 
The State Committee for Cinematography (Goskino), first established in March 1938 and 
reestablished in 1963,
366
 was responsible for all aspects of movie production from financing to 
ideological control and had departments at republic level. It answered to Sovmin on economic 
matters and CPSU CC on ideological issues. Goskino controlled film export (Sovexportfilm), co-
productions (Sovinfilm), and film festivals (Sovinfest). In the final years of Gorbachev’s rule, 
Goskino was reorganized. All movie studios gained the opportunity to decide their own annual 
productions both in regards to screenplays, production plans, and financing. Goskino was to play a 
coordinating role in distribution at home and abroad. In reality Goskino lost its influence and in 
1989 had to close Sovinfilm.
 367
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State enterprises. Sovexportfilm (founded in 1924 as Sovkino) was the production and renting 
company of the Soviet movie industry and from1945 also in charge of all movie imports and 
exports.
368
 The 1987 “Law on state enterprises” ended Sovexportfilm’s monopoly on selling Soviet 
movies in the international market, but Sovexportfilm quickly adapted to the new situation thanks to 
its large organization and many resources. In the summer of 1989 alone, Sovexportfilm sold 500 
different titles to foreign movie theaters, TV stations, and the video rental market in 110 countries 
and bought 150 titles (half of them from socialist countries) for Soviet movie theaters.
369
 The 
purchase of foreign movies from non-socialist countries had to be approved by the Ministry of 
Culture’s Committee on the Selection of Movies from Capitalist Countries. Usually both an 
ideological and economic reason for the recommendation of the purchase of a film was given. In the 
case of the Danish movie Altid Ballade it was stated that:  
 
“The movie illustrates the strong social problems and shows the viewers the hard, unhappy life in a capitalist country 
for an ordinary working class family, and the constant fear of unemployment. The movie also illustrates the bourgeoisie 
society’s destructive influence on the youth”.  
 
A purchase was recommended because it would help Sovexportfilm establish contacts with Danish 
movie rental companies and further the renting out of Soviet movies in Denmark. The movie cost 
28,955 rubles (50,000 kroner) and the payment was established within Sovexportfilm’s import 
plan.
370
 Sovexportfilm had a representative in Denmark.
371
 Its main business partner in Denmark 
was Dan-Ina Film although the cooperation between the two companies did not always run 
smoothly.
372
 It was not until 1958 that a formal agreement was signed that gave Dan-Ina Film first 
choice with a 3 month right of first choice on any Soviet film intended for the Danish market.
373
 
The other half of Dan-Ina, Folkefilmen, received various documentaries free of charge.
374
 
In 1921 Lenin signed a decree on “Acquiring and Distributing Foreign Literature” which led to the 
formation of the Russian-German joint company Kniga as an import-export company operating out 
of Berlin with the Soviet trade representative as director and operated under the directives of The 
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Council of Books under The National Committee on Foreign Trade. In 1922 the joint venture 
opened a branch in Moscow, which from 1923 known as Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. By a 1923 
decree issued by the Council on Labor and Defense it was reorganized as a joint stock company 
owned entirely by the Soviet state.
375
 This state company became the leading soviet trade 
organization for selling books, newspapers, magazines, journals, various forms of prints and 
reproductions of art works, musical recordings, stamps, maps, atlases, movie recordings, and slides 
in the various languages of the USSR as well as in numerous foreign languages, and it had contacts 
to book shops, publishing houses, companies and galleries in more than 140 countries.
376
 At the 
same time Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was responsible for the import of foreign reading materials to 
the USSR as well as related payment transactions.
377
 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga continually had a 
business representative in Denmark.
378
 No later than 1978 it opened a special Danish department 
that primarily worked with translations.
379
 
 
Delegations and tourism. Travelers usually entered the USSR either as part of a delegation invited 
and usually paid for by the Soviet side (delegations were formally invited through national 
organizations such as the friendship society)
380
 or as members of tourist groups (paying their own 
expenses, even if organized as a study group).
381
 Although examples of individual travel for 
businessmen do exist,
382
 traveling was usually limited to group travel.  
By a decree of the Council for Labor and Defense, Intourist was founded April 12th 1929 as a state 
joint stock company with a founding capital of 5 million rubles and 80 % of the shares maintained 
by Intourist (the rest were distributed among government organizations). Intourist had a near 
monopoly on foreign tourist services in the USSR (the exceptions being VOKS’ guests, for 
example).
383
 Another reason for the near monopoly was a chronic lack of hotels and tourist 
facilities.
384
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Following World War II it took several years to rebuild the tourism infrastructure,
385
 such as the 
construction of new hotels.
386
 Having solved this problem along with the problems of lack of 
interpreters, means of transportation and high travel costs, the Soviets opened for foreign tourism in 
higher numbers.
387
 
Intourist’s monopoly on mass tourism was finally broken in 1957 when the Central Trade Union 
was allowed to begin operation on a mass basis of foreign tourism as part of a plan to improve the 
work of Soviet trade unions
388
 and promote the results of Soviet power, and increase the influence 
on non-communist western trade unions.
389
 Centrotourist owned hotels, restaurants, cruise ships, 
trains, charter plains, and buses. Beside tourist travels they organized study trips and languages 
studies.
390
  
The following year Sovmin approved the operation of Komsomol’s own youth travel agency, 
Sputnik, to improve the political, cultural, and fraternal relations with foreign youth and provide 
truthful information on the development of the USSR.
391
 As with other agencies, ministries, public 
organizations, state companies and party departments partaking in Soviet cultural diplomacy 
archive material indicates an organizational structure of geographical sectors with Denmark 
belonging to a Scandinavian sector.
392
 
 
Soviet travel abroad. A study of Soviet travelling shows that the number of Soviet tourists 
traveling abroad was constantly lower than incoming tourism.
393
 The explanation concerns the 
difficulties of obtaining permission to travel abroad. Applicants had to pass a severe screening 
process. Adults had to apply to the local chapter of their trade union at their place of employment, 
younger employees to the Komsomol department. After the first sorting, candidates were send to 
the oblast party office (obkom) where a commission consisting of a representative of the obkom, the 
trade union, and KGB seperated them into groups and gathered information on them, including 
character assessments, and had them fill out questionnaires, health sheets, and a deposit for the 
travel to the Intourist account in the State Bank. Filling in the three page questionnaires included 
giving information on your personal history, your history of employment, nationality, party 
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membership, previous travels abroad, and appendixes had to include personal character assessments 
(kharakteristika)  from the place of employment or the local party office. This usually summed up 
information about the applicant’s education, nationality, job title, party or Komsomol membership, 
and achievements and personal qualities. Any mistake, even a typo, meant rejection. Any successful 
applicant then had to be able to pay for the trip that could cost up to one sixth of an average Soviet 
salary.
394
 
 
DKP. A special role in the cultural diplomacy apparatus was allocated to the national Communist 
Parties, in our case The Danish Communist Party (DKP). DKP and its youth organization (DKU) 
was not a typical Danish political party. During its existence it loyally followed every policy change 
directed from Moscow and it was deeply dependent on CPSU for its political and economic 
survival.
395
  
Following World War II, DKP, like other Western communist parties, held a strong parliamentarian 
position thanks to its role in the resistance movements and believed influence could be achieved 
through the ballot box.
396
 However, when this policy proved unsuccessful and the Soviets had used 
the first Cominform congress to criticize the foreign communist parties for following the policy line 
expected of them by the Soviets, DKP was also heavily criticized.
397
 As always, DKP fell in line 
with the directives from Moscow and swung back to an ultra-left line.
398
 When the Yugoslavs were 
expelled DKP once again loyally followed the Soviet directives and completely denounced the 
Titoists.
399
 When the third Comintern congress announced the peace struggle as the main 
assignment, the DKP congress promptly adopted this directive,
400
 and during the Cold War played a 
deciding role in numerous local and national peace movements
401
 as we shall discuss in further 
chapters. 
At the same time, DKP attempted to portray itself as the party of kulturnost. The party newspaper 
was generally considered by the public to be the primary paper of news on culture in the early post-
war years.
402
 DKP operated Oplysningskontoret (Enlightenment Office) run by actors Valsø Holm 
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and Bjørn Ploug, who organized special evenings commemorating specific poets and writers. Other 
cultural activities included concerts, a folklore music school, and art exhibitions.
403
 An early 
highlight was a December 1953 international exhibition of progressive art in Copenhagen.
404
 
Khrushchev personally approved the Soviet participation, and coverage of the expenses.
405
 
In the early post-war years DKP tried to organize the various groups of intellectuals who had 
become members since 1945 into professional groups. On April 10
th
 1946 DKP held a meeting in 
Copenhagen to promote the image of DKP as the party of progressives and intellectuals.  A 1950s 
overview lists groups of architects, kindergarten teachers, writers, youth recreation center 
pedagogues, historians, engineers, lawyers, teachers, musicians, doctors, actors, students,  and 
economists. A representative of each group took part in a special cultural committee with the 
purpose of creating a coherent cultural policy for DKP. However, the groups never functioned as 
intended. They worked erratically, as many cultural workers were unable to uncritically follow the 
dogmas of the struggle with titoism, the Hungarian events of 1956, or the primacy of socialist 
realism.
406
 
 
CULTURAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Usually cultural agreements are understood as bilateral agreements between states. However, this 
understanding is too narrow. Most Soviet cultural diplomacy operated through frames of signed 
agreements. As such it is possible to identify four different kinds of bilateral cultural agreements. 
 
State-level. During the Cold War Denmark entered into cultural agreements with 13 countries. The 
one with the USSR was the most active.
407
 The first Danish-Soviet cultural agreement was agreed in 
1962 and made public in 1963. It spoke of furthering the knowledge of culture, science, and 
university and school teaching through the exchange of scientists, teachers, researchers, specialists 
within the fields of industry, construction, transport, business, nuclear energy and sport, and 
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through exchanges of educational films, audiovisual materials, radio and television programs. It 
also included an agreement to encourage tourism, and the unhindered relations between Danish and 
Soviet non-government organizations and institutions.
408
 The contents were similar to those 
agreements the USSR entered into with other states.
409
 On the Soviet side, it was primarily used for 
the training of young natural scientists, whereas the Danes primarily sent students in the field of 
humanities to the USSR.
410
  
Following the Soviet insistence on natural sciences and the need for secrecy, it was particularly 
emphasized in the overall plan for cultural and scientific exchanges with foreign countries for 1964-
1965 that  GKKS as well as all ministries, departments, and organizations must exercise strict 
control over the preparation and instruction of all Soviet delegations, artist collectives, and other 
representatives of science and culture going abroad. It was also stressed that they should keep in 
mind that every Soviet citizen should be an active propagandist for the Soviet ideology in the 
foreign community and that representatives of science and culture absolutely had to keep state 
secrets. This also applied to receiving delegations from abroad.
 411 
The State Committee for Keeping 
State Secrets in the Press was to make sure that no Soviet printed materials distributed abroad 
contained any state secrets and as such discouraged the exchange of any technical literature.
412
 All 
travels abroad had to be party approved.
413
 Soviet scientists were screened on several parameters. 
Only CPSU members could travel for training in the US or UK. Others could be selected for 
exchanges to smaller countries such as Denmark. Applicants were screened by the local trade union 
and party committee (including non-party members), linguistic skills were tested, only married 
scientists could travel (the family would stay back as a guarantee of return), and finally all 
applicants had to pass an interview (including a test on the knowledge of the country in question) at 
The International Department, where they also received instructions on how they should act during 
their stay abroad.
414
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The Danish state purposefully entered the cultural agreements as a means to outmaneuver the 
friendship society,
415
 and DKSU was deeply frustrated by their lack of influence on the contents of 
the agreements and the lack of subvention for activities covered by them.
416
 
 
Party. DKP and CPSU entered into their own agreements on exchanges of delegations, primarily 
delegations of Danish communists going to the USSR to study Soviet society and the role of the 
Soviet party in national and municipal politics, whereas Soviet representatives primarily came to 
Denmark to participate in various celebrations.
417
 
 
Friendship. In 1960 a DKSU delegation traveled to Moscow. During negations it was agreed that 
the communication and cooperation between the two sides should be improved.
418
 In 1962 further 
negotiations resulted in the signing of a general agreement of cooperation between DKSU, SSOD, 
and SUDK.
419
 Each year a specific agreement of cooperation was signed on activities to take place 
within the framework of the general agreement. Originally the agreements consisted of four parts: 
Exchange delegations and tourism, exchange of literature, exhibitions, and other materials, the 
dissemination of information on culture and society of the other party, and the commemoration of 
red-letter days, both national and the jubilees of the birth or death of famous persons, especially 
cultural workers. Each part contained detailed descriptions on how the parties were to fulfill the 
agreement. The number of exchanges and kind of materials were specified along with the number of 
delegations and the participants’ professional fields. Concerning tourist groups, it was stipulated 
that the parties were to organize meetings and excursions according to their professional interests.
420
 
In 1972 the agreements were extended with an additional four paragraphs on the invitation of trade 
union delegations; extending help in the establishment of contacts between public, educational, 
trade union, youth, and women’s organizations; working for the establishment of friendship city 
contacts; and keeping each other informed of the implementation of the plans.
 421
 
The 1973 plan serves as a representative example of the contents of the cooperation plans. 
Paragraph one dealt with the knowledge of the Danish and Soviet peoples of each other’s life and 
                                                 
415
 Marianne Rostgaard: ”Dansk kulturdiplomati overfor Østblokken ca. 1960-1972”, Historisk Tidskrift (2011:111):2, 
489-492. 
416
 ABA/DKSU/3/EC minutes 12.2.1972. 
417
 RA/Danica/106/ План связей и сотрудничества с Коммунистической партией Дании на 1978 год. 
418
 ABA/DKSU/1/Draft report 1960 congress. 
419
 ABA/DKSU/1/Report on activities 1961-1962. 
420
 ABA/DKSU/1-2/Copies of various agreements 1960s-1970s. 
421
 ABA/DKSU/2/1972 agreement. 
94 
 
culture through lectures, travels, exchanges, exhibitions, movies, and other information materials. 
This meant that DSKU was obliged to celebrate the 30
th
 anniversary of the battle of Stalingrad, the 
100
th
 anniversary of birth of Sergei Rachmaninov, Lenin’s birth, the 80th anniversary of the birth of 
Maiakovskii, the 15
th
 anniversary of SUDK, the 56
th
 anniversary of The Great Socialist October 
Revolution, as well as other red-letter days. Additionally, DKSU was obliged to organize friendship 
evenings, exhibitions and lectures on the USSR, showcase Soviet movies, promote translations and 
publication of Soviet books, further the study of Russian in Denmark, and publish information 
materials regarding the USSR. DKSU was obliged to further the involvement of businesses, 
educational institutions and others in their activities and promote the establishment of contacts 
between interested collective members of the respective friendship societies.  
Paragraph two concerned the number of delegations each side was to invite. The Soviet side was 
obliged to invite 11 persons overall, including two Russian teachers for the 13
th
 seminar for teachers 
of Russian as a foreign language. The travel agency Sputnik would arrange the trip of the two 
winners of the annual essay competition for pupils and students to the USSR. DKSU would invite 
two delegations and two lecturers. Both sides should strive to assist citizens of the opposite party 
who traveled to Denmark through other channels and Soviet cruise ships visiting Denmark.  
Paragraph three on the work with tourists further defined the tasks listed above. For example, both 
parties should strive to establish contacts corresponding with the professional or other interests of 
tourists.  
Paragraph four further defined the organizing of exhibitions, movie screening, and exchanges of 
literature (including detailed listings of the specific interest in folklore).  
The final paragraphs indicated intentions to promote the idea of twinning cities, generally expand 
the work to include new fields, and keep each other informed of activities through other channels.
422
 
At a later point the cooperation plans became bi-annual without this influencing the contents.
423
 
Each plan was formally signed at a ceremony in either Copenhagen or Moscow by high-ranking 
representatives of each organization.
424
 
 
Workplace/special interests. It is possible to identify one example of workplace agreements 
between the United Union Club at the shipyard B&W and the Soviet Shipbuilders’ Union on 
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exchanges of delegations.
425
 Similarly, The Danish Sports Federation (DIF) signed a bilateral 
agreement on the exchange of athletes, coaches, scientists, and experiences in projecting and 
building new facilities.
426
 
 
FINANCING 
 
 Danish communists continuously denied the existence of “red gold”. In 1959 then editor-in-chief of 
the communist daily Martin Nielsen claimed that the only capital that kept the newspaper running 
was the communist capital of confidence, generosity and faith.
427
 A few years later the author Hans 
Scherfig claimed that the newspaper’s monthly deficit of 30.000 kroner was covered by volunteer 
payments to its Guarantee Fund.
428
 Then former chairman Aksel Larsen stated in several interviews 
with CIA in 1959 that various front organizations and DKP received secret funding from the USSR 
but denied that the party had received any Soviet funding during his tenure as chairman.
429
 
 
DKP as a (poor) business. A full study of the economic history of DKP and the front organizations 
would be a dissertation in itself. Instead we will briefly discuss the business side of DKP and its 
economic results, documenting why DKP needed foreign subvention, the size of the Soviet 
subvention, and how subventions were laundered. 
To understand DKP’s business affairs we have to understand it as a cooperation with various 
subsidiaries that all seemed independent of DKP but were interlocked in a complex system of 
ownerships of stocks and shares,
430
 and, as we shall see, more often than not showed minus figures. 
 
Ejendomsselskabet af 25/9-1945. DKP owned two holding companies that made up the center of 
its economic activities. Both of them are overlooked in the existing research.
431
 One of them was a 
real estate company that owned the party headquarters and overall center of activities on 
Dronningens Tværgade. Part of the building housed all party activities; the remaining office space 
was rented out to various companies.
432
 At first the stocks were shared between the party 
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newspaper, the party, and the party publishing house.
433
 Later the company changed into a private 
limited company with DKP as sole shareholder.
434
 
 
Figure 2.7: Annual results for Ejendomsselskabet 1946-1988
435
 
 
 
 
On the surface figure 2.7 might give the impression of a small but relatively stable company, at 
least until the final years. However, unmentioned in the accounts are a long list of 
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reprioritizations,
436
 requests for deferment,
437
 payment of default interest,
438
overdrafts on the bank 
credit,
439
 and a building mortgaged to the hilt.
440
 On top of this, the company seems to have been 
considered some kind of money bin for the other DKP companies. Occasionally, strange looking 
debts to other parts of the DKP cooperation that should not have had show up
441
, and the company 
guaranteed loans and credit lines
442
 for everybody from the party’s travel agency443 to DKU.444 
 
Foreningen Folkepresen. Folkepressen was the main holding company of DKP. The private 
limited company operated the various party press activities. In 1949 the company had 254 
shareholders distributed between party branches, trade unions, workplaces, fractions, and 
individuals.
445
Although it was intended to appear independent, its statutes clearly state that the task 
of the board was to secure the necessary funds to continue operations and executive power belonged 
to the DKP CC.
446
 The activities were divided into 4 departments: Editorial, printing, distribution, 
and administration.
447
 
Originally, Folkepressen consisted of the communist daily newspaper Land og Folk, several local 
newspapers, the printer Terpo-Tryk, the provincial printer Rota-Tryk, and several publishing houses. 
Later a book shop was added to the activities. The overall impression of the activities is the huge 
deficit as seen in figure 2.8. Unfortunately the figures for the entire period are not available. The 
negotiation protocol merely states that the accounts had been presented at the annual general 
meeting. However, the 1987 accounts with a deficit of over 3 million kroner confirm the picture.
448
 
Between 1945 and 1955 the newspaper lost three out of four readers. The newspaper’s circulation, 
aside from a small period of progress in the 1970s, continued to decline. Several times the page 
count was cut, and the newspaper ceased to be published daily, for example in the weekend. The 
number of staff was also cut on several occasions. The local newspapers folded fairly quickly, and 
an attempt to establish a special provincial weekly also folded within a few years.
 449
 In 1950  
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Figure 2.8. Annual results for Foreningen Folkepressen ApS 1945-1955:
450
 
 
 
 
the economy was so poor that the then editor-in-chief Børge Houmann ordered that all stamps on 
incoming letters should be collected and sold for the benefit of the newspaper.
451
 The newspaper 
had been the party's problem child since its earliest incarnations and always showed deficits.
452
 One 
of the main problems was the question of distribution. Subscriptions and kiosks aside, the 
newspaper was primarily sold on the streets, by going door to door, and at various major factories 
by party activists
453
. At times of international crisis such as the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian 
uprising in 1956 not even kiosks wanted to sell the paper.
454
 Special emphasis was placed on the 
Friday edition as activists were able to sell more copies on that day.
455
 In 1989 the then editor-in-
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chief Frank Aaen wrote that the newspaper needed a capital injection of 5 million kroner 
immediately to survive.
456
 Attempts at reconstructing the newspaper failed and it folded in 
December 1990.
457
 
Terpo-Tryk was the main economic provider for Folkepressen thanks to commercial contracts, both 
Soviet, such as the printing the journal Fakta om Sovjetunionen,
458
 as well as various prospects, 
brochures, calendars and so on for Soviet companies and for Danish, such as local commercial 
newspapers.
459
 For example, in the year 1982 Terpo-Tryk had a turnover of 13 million kroner and a 
surplus of 850.000.
460
 However, a few years later, despite large Soviet orders, Terpo also began to 
go into deficit
461
. An external consultancy report described Terpo as a printer with a daunting 
economy, lack of financial management, poor internal communication, poor division of tasks, and 
general mismanagement.
462 
DKP ran a number of publishing companies. The main one was Forlaget Tiden.
463
 The PET white 
paper incorrectly states that the publisher folded in 1957.
464
 This mistake has continuously been 
repeated in the literature,
465
 despite the fact that a bibliography
466
 and later catalogs
467
 clearly 
demonstrate the continued existence. When the publisher was threatened by bankruptcy in 1958, the 
DKP economic holding company Folkepressen acquired the company and at the same time changed 
its statute to allow for the operation of a publishing business.
468
 The party secretariat continued to 
control the production plans for all publications.
469
 
In 1955, after negotiations between DKP chairman Aksel Larsen, Tiden director Gelius Lund, and 
Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, a second publishing companyfor publishing Soviet fiction in Danish was 
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established: Mega.
470
 According to the agreement Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga selected the books for 
translation and covered the production costs and Mega was allowed to keep a commission for sold 
books of 4000 kroner pr. month. The surplus, excluding the commission, was to be transferred to 
Mezhkniga. Initially, each book had a print run of 4000 copies.
471
 The office was placed outside the 
DKP building.
472
 The director was Gottlieb Japsen, who had worked for the Comintern publishing 
house The Foreign Worker.
473
 The publishing seems to have been discontinued after the publication 
of the initial program. 
In addition, In 1957 Børge Houmann started his own publishing company, Sirius, mostly publishing 
fiction, his own extensive research on the writer Martin Andersen Nexø, and translations of ancient 
Greek and Roman literature. Until he was ousted from all party positions and moved to Aarhus, the 
party leadership insisted on checking all publications as they were very skeptical about the lack of 
ideological profile of the company. The outside world also continued to be very skeptical, but this 
had to do with Houmann’s continued party membership.474 
Aside from these companies various departments and local branches published primarily schooling 
materials,
475
 the communist daily occasionally published political pamphlets, and several high-
ranking communists published at Athenæum
476
 and Melbyhus.
477
  
The primary reason for the 1957 near bankruptcy was the problem of distribution. In 1982 only 20 
% of Tiden’s books were sold through book stores.478 Instead, most books were supposed to be sold 
through so-called literature leaders appointed in each party cell. Sales were poor and the archives 
are full of a combination of pleas and threats to either return payments or unsold books, but they 
seem not to have been met.
479
 The publishing house had the same problem with the sale of the 
booklets and schooling materials published by various DKP committees.
480
 Eventually, the 
publishing house, in contradiction with the party's ideological principles, hired travelling salesmen 
and this proved to be very effective in comparison with the weak sales in the party cells.
481
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The theoretical party journal also had the title Tiden (with the insert Verden Rundt – the Danish 
language version of World Marxist Review).
482
  As figure 2.9 (which isbased on sales figures of the 
first and final issue of each volume between 1984 and 1989 as well as scattered information on the 
following three years) indicates the journal suffered from the same problems of not attracting 
readers. 
 
Figure 2.9: Subscription figures for Tiden 1984-1991:
483
 
 
 
  
Earlier reporting indicates that each issue showed a deficit of 6306 kroner.
484
 Party ideologue Ib 
Nørlund played a key role in editing
485
and personally transported the subvention from World 
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Marxist Review to print the insert Verden Rundt in cash to Denmark from Prague.
486
  The 
subvention enabled a continued high circulation of 3-4000 copies per issue despite the poor sales 
figures.
487
   
 
Land og Folks Boghandel A/S. Several satellite businesses existed outside of the DKP holding 
companies. The first of these, a book shop, was opened as an independent stock company in the 
basement of the party building by Helga Kastoft (the then wife (later divorced) of DKP chairman 
Aksel Larsen). The stock company had 70 stocks, all of them owned by party companies 
Foreningen Folkepressen, Land & Folk, and Ejendomsselskabet.
488
 Archival materials show the 
board consisted entirely of communists representing the DKP-owned business.
489
 A reading of the 
sparsely worded minutes of general meetings gives the impression of a stable bookshop (figure 
2.10), but if we scrutinize the economics of the shop a different picture similar to that of the real 
estate company appears.  
 
Figure 2.10: Annual results for Land og Folks Boghandel A/S 1946, 1951-1954, 1962-1969:
490
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There were five reasons for the bookstore’s 1972 bankruptcy. 
Firstly, the company continually struggled with debts
491
 and survived on a combination of credit 
lines,
 492
 loans from employees
493
 and various unknown sources.
494
 
Secondly, external events such as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary severely hurt the 
turnover.
495
 
Thirdly, the introduction of paperbacks on the Danish book market in the early 1960s lowered the 
profit on the individual titles and led to a decline in the sale of non-paperbacks. This happened 
almost simultaneously with the introduction of the new Danish sales tax (“OMS”) on the wholesale 
level, imposed on the store due to the import of Soviet books.
496
 
Fourthly, the accounts show that the bookstore maintained a disproportionately large stock of goods 
in relation to the store size, to such an extent that the company’s auditor complained about it and 
warned against it.
497
  
Fifthly, the auditor’s reports, for example the 1971 report, showed serious deficits, large debts, and 
large outstanding credit.
498
  
In 1967, when the economy of the bookshop started to falter an addition was made to the statutes of 
Foreningen Folkepressen so that it could operate a bookstore. A new bookstore, Tidens Bogsalg, 
owned by Folkepressen and operated in connection with the publishing company Tiden opened a 
year after the bankruptcy of the former bookstore. The annual turnover was around 2.8 million 
kroner. The annual accounts of one year showed a profit of 41,000 kroner the next a deficit of 
28,000 kroner
499
 and this tendency continues throughout the years. When the party building had to 
be sold, Tidens Bogsalg was sold off, the name was changed to Tidens Bog og Papir Handel ApS 
and the shop moved to another address in Copenhagen.
500
 
 
Travel agencies. The second large collection of satellite companies was travel agencies, the first, 
Folketurist A/S, was run by DKP members Helge Kierulff and his son Søren Kierulff. The former 
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had been a business manager for the communist daily Land og Folk. In 1960 he began to arrange 
cruises for various trade unions
501
 and in 1962 he founded Folketurist as a stock company, with the 
main purpose of arranging holiday trips and stays at health spas in the Eastern European and later 
on, Egypt.
502
 It is unclear who owned the stocks, but the usual collection of centrally placed 
communists party members made up the board.
503
  However, not all employees were communists. 
The travel agency had a large turnover, it did not result in a large surplus, only in the creation of 
large debt to Danish and foreign creditors.
504
  
 
Figure 2.11: Annual results for Folketurist A/S 1962-1977
505
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Following the 1977 bankruptcy of Folketurist, the DKP EC discussed the reasons for the collapse. It 
was stated that the travel agency opened for two reasons, partly from the standpoint of a possible 
political function of tourism, partly in the hope of creating profits for the party. During the 
discussion two main reasons for the bankruptcy were highlighted. The first had again to do with the 
actual actions of the USSR. The crushing of the Prague Spring had resulted in a large number of 
cancellations, requests for refunds, and troublesome work to restore confidence in the socialist 
countries as travel destinations. The second major problem was the lack of earnings and high debt 
to foreign firms. Folketurist had a long credit line at Intourist and other eastern travel companies 
and signed a standstill agreement with the four main socialist partners, but this was not enough to 
make a profit. When it finally became clear that it was necessary to secure a large capital injection 
and that this could not be obtained, the DKP EC ordered the travel company to enter into 
receivership.
506
  
 
HANSA Folketurist A/S. Shortly after the bankruptcy of Folketurist a new travel agency, HANSA 
Folketurist, quickly opened. Like the old company it provided travel to socialist countries in 
Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean. Half of its business was supposed to come from school and study 
trips. The agency intended to cooperate with various friendship societies. As a starting capital it had 
an exclusive deal on sending Danish participants to the youth festival organized by WFDY and IUS 
in Cuba in the summer of 1978.
507
 Based on information on the composition of the board and the 
company name, it is likely that the company was created by funding from the East German travel 
company Hansa.
508
 
When the company advertised for guides to destinations in GDR, Poland and Bulgaria the 
advertisement stated: “Prerequisites: Knowledge of German/English and a positive attitude to the 
socialist countries.”509 
At the beginning of the 1980s the company seemed sound. It expanded and opened new satellite 
offices.
510
 The company had an annual turnover of approximately 50 million kroner. However, it 
started to develop debts at all destinations totaling roughly 10 million. In the end all business 
partners accepted a 9 year repayment plan except the Yugoslavian company Kompas. HANSA went 
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bankrupt in 1987. At that time the director, Jeppe Strange, had been fired by the main shareholder, 
the chairman of the seamens’ union, Preben Møller Hansen, who prior to being ousted from DKP, 
by DKP secretary Ingmar Wagner had been talked into investing in the travel company through one 
of the many foundations owned by the union.
511
 
 
Fremadrejser The final travel company to be discussed here belonged to DKU. DKU had for some 
years organized travels to Eastern Europe such as the 1984 “friendship train” to Poland.512 
Eventually this developed into a full-fledged travel company that began operation in 1986. The 
daily management consisted of enthusiasts working around the clock, but despite an annual turnover 
of 7-8 million Kroner this was still not enough to provide black figures.
513
  
Despite the continued massive deficits, Fremadrejser continues to exist.
514
 
 
Figure 2.12: Annual results for Fremadrejser 1986-first half of 1988:
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“Red figures”. As we see from the above, DKP was a party of very poor financial management. 
This is also confirmed by the memoirs of Freddy Madsen who remembers how DKP Aarhus was a 
mess of financial mismanagement.
516
 CC minutes show that the local branches quickly accumulated 
a large debt to the party of non-payment for contingent stickers, newspapers, and books.
517
 In 
addition other entities in the DKP circle such as the friendship society and the movie importer Dan-
Ina Film also owed DKP money.
518
 In 1951, the newspaper's managing editor noted that debt from 
party branches to the paper corresponded to more than two months' revenue.
519
 This trend continued 
and in 1989 it was noted that for the party accounts to balance the branches had to reduce their debt 
so that it corresponded to a maximum of three months' revenue, and preferably only two.
520
 
Following the end of the German occupation DKP received 750.000 kroner in reparations from the 
Danish Social-democratic led government, in the hope that it would put an end to the attempt by the 
communists to overplay their role as political martyrs in the upcoming general elections.
521
 By 1947 
the money had been spent.
522
 As we have seen above, they had many expenses and not enough 
income to cover them. By 1950 the DKP leadership seriously considered selling the party house and 
tried to find a buyer who would let DKP rent some of it afterwards.
523
 
However, due to the Soviet subvention this did not become necessary. 
 
Paying overprice. The Soviet subvention of DKP took on two forms. One was paying overprice for 
the printing of various materials at Terpo-Tryk. As we have seen, Terpo-Tryk took on “foreign 
work” as its main source of income. However, it is not clear from the sources when this term began 
to include Soviet orders. The earliest identifiable order from 1965 amounted to 1 million kroner. 
For a number of years they averaged 3-4 million kroner, whilst the final identifiable contract in 
1988 amounted to 10.2 million kroners. Folkepressen’s business manager negotiated the annual 
contracts with the Soviet company Vhezhtorgizdat, and their importance can be gleaned from 
documents based on the shock waves that went through the party one year when it seemed that the 
expected orders would not be placed.
524
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Table 2.B.: The Trade Union Foundation and DKP, 1950-1990
525
: 
 
 
 
                                                 
525
 РГАНИ/89/38/1-56; Thing (2001), 291-292. 
All amounts are in US dollars, except italics for Kroner. 
Years marked “-“ does not necessarily mean that DKP was not subvented, but that no archival evidence was identified.  
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The Trade Union Foundation. The second form of Soviet subvention was cash. No organized 
Soviet funding similar to that of the interwar years existed from 1945-1950.
526
 However, a CC 
decree of January 17
th
 1950 founded The Foundation for Support to Left-Wing Workers’ 
Association (called The Trade Union Foundation). Formally the Foundation was controlled by the 
Soviet Central Trade Union, but executive power lay within the ID. To hide its origin it was 
formally placed in Bucharest as part of the Rumanian Central Trade Union. Each year the 
Foundation received new means from the Eastern Bloc countries, which were then distributed 
among the applying communist parties
527
 outside the communist bloc.
528
 For many years, Boris 
Ponomarev’s handwritten recommendations were agreed on in advance with Brezhnev and Suslov, 
who both signed the voting slip before it was sent around to the other Politburo members.
529
 
The transfers were kept very secret, and KGB was responsible form them. ID transferred the funds 
to the KGB department for foreign intelligence against proper receipt. KGB then transferred the 
funds abroad and the local KGB resident told the representative of the local Communist Party that 
the union funding had arrived. Then the representative came to the Soviet Embassy and was handed 
the amount against proper receipt, along with a report on the transaction this receipt was sent to the 
Central Committee; where it was filed (see figure 2.13).
530
 
As seen in figure 2.B., DKP was among the recipients. Former KGB resident in Denmark Mikhail 
Liubimov gives this account of the procedure:  
 
“The Danish party leader came, had a glass of whiskey, and receipted for the money. Then we proposed a toast for 
proletarian internationalism. Afterwards we had one of the embassy's drivers bring the envelope containing the money 
to the Danish party office”  
 
And he stated that the amounts were paid in Danish kroner.
531
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Figure 2.13: The whirlpool of money:
532
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Guarantee Foundation and party collections. However, as we have seen, DKP representatives 
continuously denied Soviet subvention – according to their narrative, the economic means for 
continuing operations originated from private donors. Such subvention did, in fact, exist in the form 
of a monthly collection for the Guarantee Foundation and an annual collection conducted by the 
party for the benefit of the party press. 
 
Between September 1949 and august 1950 the monthly fund-raising goal was 30,000 kroner. This 
aim was not reached once.
533
 Similarly, in 1956, the overall monthly target for the provincial 
branches was 10,147 kroner. Not once was the target met, and by the end of the year the monthly 
collection yielded only half of that amount.
534
  If we approach the question from the point of view 
of a local party branch we reach a similar conclusion. DKP-Gladsaxe, for example, was able to 
meet the monthly target of 1000 kroner, but after the target had been raised to 1200 Kroner in May 
1956, it was not met once.
535
 
However, it is highly plausible that collections served another purpose – the laundering of the red 
gold. Naturally, Danish communist archives do not contain smoking guns stating how Soviet 
subvention was received and laundered, but a few examples are known. For example, a 1986 
comment thanks the USSR for a contribution to a collection.
536
 Former editor-in-chief of Land og 
Folk Frede Jakobsen remembered how Ingmar Wagner in 1990 gave him a substantial cash sum for 
the newspaper and that he afterwards followed procedures and added the sum (that he without doubt 
considered to be of Soviet origin) to the collection lists under “anonymous contributions”.537 These 
examples strongly indicate that the collected means were handed by the party to Foreningen 
Folkepressen in exchange for shares. At one point Folkepressen introduced a new series of shares 
with a nominal value of 100,000 kroner so the board did not have to sign as many shares purchased 
by the party.
538
  These cash injections made it possible for Folkepressen to write off the annual 
deficits.
539
 
 
Ole Sohn’s knowledge. In Denmark both historians and journalists of major national media outlets 
have been very interested in the possible knowledge of the last DKP chairman (and former minister) 
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Ole Sohn about the Soviet cash subvention, resulting in several rounds of heated public debates in 
Denmark. As such, it is a major and central question within Danish communist studies that is still 
unsolved, but if answered would shed new light on the questions of the role and position of DKP 
both as a political party in Danish society and its relations to the world Soviet communist 
movement. Ole Sohn has repeatedly stated that although he was party chairman he did not have full 
knowledge of DKP’s economic situation prior to surviving an attempted coup by high-ranking DKP 
members in November 1989 and that he never received or knew about amounts of subvention in 
cash, but he has acknowledged the procedure of subvention through overpricing.
540
  
However, Ole Sohn’s papers are full of various minutes, speech manuscripts, and notes written in 
his own hand that clearly indicate that he, contrary to what he remembers about the question, did 
have a solid knowledge about the economic situation in DKP prior to November 1989.
541
 In 
addition, the journalist Vladimir Pimonov, who in the early 1990s wrote the first articles concerning 
the question of Soviet subvention in the Danish newspaper Ekstra Bladet, in 1992 interviewed 
Vitalii Shaposhnikov who confirmed that he, in approximately 1987, in his office in Moscow held a 
meeting with DKP chairman Ole Sohn and explained to him the possibilities and procedures of 
Soviet subvention through the channel of the Trade Union Foundation (read: cash subvention), how 
it had taken place for many years, and how it should continue. Shaposhnikov states that Ole Sohn 
was not a naïve young man and that he fully understood and accepted the information he was 
given.
542
  
In conclusion, we have to note the clear differences between what Ole Sohn remembers and the 
picture drawn by contemporary sources, including his personal files. This documentation indicates a 
continuation of established procedures during his tenure as DKP chairman. 
 
DKSU. DKSU was also among the recipients of Soviet subvention. This form of subvention was 
not a special Danish case. In 1956, for example, the French-Soviet Society received 1.14 millon 
rubles in foreign currency.
543
 
It is not clear when DKSU began to receive Soviet subvention in cash. A tapping of DKSU and 
DKP vice-chairman Alfred Jensen's apartment in the 1950s revealed that following visits to the 
Soviet Embassy he counted large amounts of cash, but it is not known whether the money was 
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intended for the party or the friendship association.
544
 DKSU accounts contain vague information 
on income through subsidy from unnamed institutions and organizations,
 545
 but it is not known if 
this included Soviet sources. On the other hand, it is well known that DKSU from an early point 
received numerous handicrafts to sell for the benefit of the association on a national and local 
level.
546
 The earliest identified example of cash subvention is a 1962 decision to provide 4000 
currency rubles (40,000 kroner) pr. year.
547
 By 1969 the subvention amounted to 14,500 currency 
rubles (145,000 kroner) pr. year,
548
 and in 1977 it was decided to more than double the annual 
amount from 84,000 to 171,000 kroner pr. year for each of the Scandinavian-Soviet friendship 
societies.
549
 As we shall discuss in a further chapter this increase took place simultaneously with the 
Soviet purchase of a building in Copenhagen for DKSU. Following this, DKSU constructed a 
special annual budget that vice-chairman Ingmar Wagner personally presented to the Soviet 
embassy where he also collected the cash subvention and brought it to the DKSU building where it 
was placed in a safe. The subvention never figured in official accounts, but special accounts were 
provided to the Soviets.
550
 This system must have been established after 1978, when the Soviets had 
wrongly accused Ingmar Wagner of embezzlement due to the unexpected high cost of running the 
new building.
551
 This system continued until the break-up of the USSR.
552
 
 
Front organizations. A third party to receive Soviet funding was the international front 
organizations. As shown in table 2.C. based on estimation presented in a report to a sub-
commission in the House of Representatives.By 1979 this was by no means a new accusation and it 
was furiously denied by the various fronts who claimed to receive their funding, primarily through, 
membership fees from national affiliated organizations. 
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Table 2.C: Estimation of economic support of international Front organizations in 1979.
553
 
 
 
 
However, this claim is easily dismissed if we for example look at the ability of Danish national 
affiliations to pay fees. Although DDK, the Danish affiliation of WIDF, paid fees for some years
554
 
they repeatedly had to write and tell WIDF that it did not possess the necessary means to pay 
membership fees.
555
 Similarly, based on the accounts, it seems thet Fredens Tilhængere paid a 
membership fee to WPC as a lump sum in 1950, and none of the accounts for the following years 
contain this expense.
556
 
Overall, the Danish front organizations seem to have been very poor. Archival evidence indicates 
that, for example, Fredens Tilhængere constantly had to be creative to come up with income 
whether it was by selling specially produced stamps or
557
 scarves
558
, or organizing flea markets
559
 
and Sunday matinées.
560
 Niels Barfoed argues that one of the associations’ journals Tænk i Tide 
folded primarily due to political disagreements.
561
 However, a reading of steering committee 
minutes shows that all of the various journals published at one time or the other folded due to 
chronic financial woes.
562
 
A more creative claim on sources of income was made by IUS. IUS claimed that one third of its 
income came from bazars organized in Eastern Europe to sell goods that recipients of IUS travel 
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grants had brought back with them.
563
 Apparently, IUS had not considered the fact that this claim 
undermined Soviet propaganda of no shortages in socialist countries.  
However, in 1991 IUS admitted to both its propagandistic purpose and source of funding and 
promised to adopt a new democratic constitution and find new sources of income.
564
 IUS was not 
the only organizations to have to look for a new source of income. In 1978, CPSU decided to give 
additional funding to WPC and increase the number of free Aeroflot tickets,
565
 in 1980, they chose 
to help WIDF send Asian and African representatives to a women’s conference in Copenhagen,566 
and in the same year they covered several delegates’ travel expenses to an IOJ conference,567 or to a 
national affiliation of WPC.
568
  
To finance international front organizations and similar activities
569
 the Soviets officially 
established the Peace Foundation in 1961 as “a public fund to provide financial aid to Soviet public 
organizations in their work for strengthening peace, solidarity, and friendship among peoples”.570 
It never made its accounts public or had a board of publicly elected members –  nonetheless, 
thousands of Soviet citizens occasionally had to pay part of their salary to the foundation or “work a 
shift for peace”.571 
 
An expensive habit. The Soviet Union had extensive costs for the maintenance and operation of its 
extensive apparatus for foreign propaganda. In addition to costs to maintain the parts of the 
apparatus within Soviet borders there were a number of expenses: The Trade Union Foundation, 
The Peace Fund, subvention of friendship societies, expenses to directly state executed activities in 
foreign countries.
572
 Additionally communist parties, friendship societies, and front organizations 
received an unending stream of gifts. 
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Estimation of costs varies between $ 2 billion in 1960s
573
 and $ 4 billion in 1980s.
574
 
As an overall conclusion on the financial situation, Freddy Madsen, concludes:  
 
“On the whole, I was sure that the poor economy was not due to dishonesty, but a poor overview, lack of accounting 
and realistic budgets”575 
 
For DKP these conditions suddenly became very immediate in the late 1980s. In 1989 Ole Sohn 
stated that DKP had to pay annual interest charge of over 5 million kroner and that it was 
impossible for such a small a party to survive this situation in the long run.
576
 Due to personal 
disagreements in the leadership for several years nothing had been done to solve the problem.
577
 
Therefore, in 1989 it became necessary for them to sell half of the party building since they could 
not overcome the overall debt, which in 5 years had increased from about 11 million to 43 million 
kroners.
578
 The property’s value had been assessed at 70 million kroners579, but despite warnings the 
party leadership initially decided to only sell half of the building. Subsequently, the property had to 
be divided into two cadastral numbers, and as this could take up to a year, and that payment would 
not be released for at least a year. Therefore, it became necessary to sell the rest of the property.
580
 
The remainder of the property was sold for 43 million korners, and in connection with the sale the 
party had to rent an expensive office property in Avedøre Holme.
581
 At the same time, the party 
leadership established a new economic structure to ensure the DKP concern. DKP was to establish 
the DKP-Foundation for business purposes. The Foundation would own the company DKP-Holding 
A/S. The holding company would own five companies, each dealing with a part of DKP’ business, 
Land og Folk A/S, Terpo Tryk A/S, Forlaget Tiden A/S, Rotatryk A/S, and Thor International A/S. 
This construction would ensure DKP against claims if one of the companies filed for bankruptcy, 
and expected losses could be written off in the overall tax payments by the holding company.
582 
However, the collapse of the USSR put an end to the subvention and therefore also to the DKP’ 
business activities. 
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Therefore, overall Freddy Madsen’s comment only shows us half of the picture. The second half is 
that when discussing the possible impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy we have to take into 
consideration the difficulties they encountered of literally selling their message on market terms. 
 
 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, when we discuss the decision-making process we have to 
differentiate between the de facto government (CPSU) and the de jure government (Sovmin). The 
party and executive branch upheld this divide at each level from local and regional to national.
583
 
In 1947, Stalin once again reorganized the ruling circles of the USSR by placing the 
Politbureau/Presidium in charge of the political decision-making process and the government 
(renamed Sovmin) in charge of regulating economic politics and the execution of political 
decisions. As such it could be argued that the ministries and state committees played a coordinating 
role with the purpose of optimizing the technical-administrative level. In the Stalin years, political 
decisions were taken within various informal groups, known at various times as “the selects group”, 
“the close circle”, or “the ruling group”, depending on whomever Stalin decided to trust at any 
given time.
584
 During the Khrushchev years we see a tendency to place the decision-making process 
in the Politbureau/Presidium.
585
 As one Russian historian notes, on any given day in meetings of the 
Politburo/Presidium or the secretariat a very diverse number of questions had to be decided, from 
anti-missile defenses to preparing for spring sowing or the publication of new school text books to 
the sending of Soviet athletes abroad.
586
 As such it was considered a promotion to be named a party 
secretary, while an appointment to minister or president of parliament was effectively a 
demotion.
587
 This was most dramatically expressed through party secretary Yekaterina Furtseva’s 
failed suicide attempt following her demotion to become minister of culture.
588
 The Central 
Committee became a de-facto parliament or sounding-board. This had to do with the fact that the 
Supreme Soviet did not function as an actual parliament, but was an artificial institution of pre-
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approved reports, speeches, and unanimous votes.
589
 The CC minutes
590
 do appear polished and 
somewhat ritualistic in form, the meetings did grow in number – and length – during the 
Khrushchev years. Regarding the Brezhnev years we can identify a tendency to move the focal 
point of decision-making to the party secretariat, which as Gorbachev has described was primarily 
due to the failing health of Brezhnev. This resulted in 15-20 minutes long Politbureau meetings 
where the various party secretaries, as decided in advance said they would deal with the question, at 
each point of the agenda.
591
 This corresponds with the materials in the Danica collection of the 
Danish National Archives where we can identify a movement from decrees of the Politbureau to 
decrees of the Secretariat on questions of cultural diplomacy. Similarly, a reading of the various CC 
departments involved in Soviet cultural diplomacy
592
 paints a very uniform picture of the decision-
making processes. Usually letters, questions, and reports arrived addressed to CPSU. The document 
was then forwarded to the relevant department of the Secretariat, where employees carried out the 
actual processing of the issue, after which they made a final recommendation addressed to a 
particular party secretary and attached a draft decree, which in principle only needed the signatures 
of the participants at the following meeting in the higher party body, where the decision was 
formally taken at a given time. 
However, this should not be taken as an indication that party leaders did not control the decision-
making process. Ideology played a leading role in the decision-making process, and the top party 
leaders (be it Stalin, his compatriots like Andrei Zhdanov or their party descendants) could and did 
alter, reject, or demand any proposal or decision at any point in the process.
593
 
Due to the number of questions forwarded to the ruling circles, the responsible workers of the 
various party departments were instructed to keep recommendations and oral reports to a minimal 
length in words and time.
594
 
  
Planning Soviet cultural diplomacy. An overall plan for cultural and scientific relations with 
foreign countries was annually put forward for approval. The plan also included detailed country 
plans for each of the countries involved, regarding the quantity of incoming and outgoing 
exchanges, number of persons, and which Soviet institution or public organization had 
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responsibility for the activity.
595
 In the following we will discuss the development of country plans 
for Denmark for the years 1956 and 1958 and what they tell us about the Soviet cultural diplomatic 
system. 
In early March 1956, the Soviet minister of culture Mikhailov put forward the proposal for cultural 
relations with Denmark for that year. Initially, Mikhailov praised the results of the 1955 plan. The 
Ministry of culture had implemented a number of measures to expand and strengthen cultural 
relations with the Scandinavian countries. In this context, Mikhailov particularly highlighted Soviet 
artists' participation in the so-called "friendship week" organized by friendship associations where 
artists performed at concerts, operas, and ballets. On the basis of the invitation of the Danish Prime 
Minister H.C. Hansen to visit the Soviet Union in 1956 Mikhailov saw good opportunities for the 
expansion of cultural relations between the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries.. Against 
this background Mkhailov suggested that the Soviet Union should send a choir of 80 people, a 
group of dancers, a group of actors, and organize an exhibition of Soviet books including lectures 
by writers and literati in 1956.
596
 The draft was then submitted to the CC cultural department for 
comments. It supported the proposal, and called it "useful", a term that in the Soviet documents 
often recurs as a marker for approval of a project or request, and extended it to recommend 
negotiating with the Nordic public broadcasting companies on the exchange of radio programs of 
musical and literary content. Lists specifying the 7 artists (opera singers and ballet dancers), who 
were to participate in friendship month, and 10 ballet dancers, who would travel first to Iceland and 
then to Denmark, were attached to the document of approval.
597
 On April 18
th 
 1956, the CC 
approved the plans for cultural exchange with Denmark and the other Nordic countries in 1956.
598
 
In 1958 the country plan for Denmark became the victim of Soviet bureaucratic infighting between 
various institutes and the newly established GKKS. A shortened version of the original plan
599
 was 
presented in April of that year and included performances by a choir, a ballet group, a circus group, 
and the violinist Igor Oistrakh.
 600
 It was approved in principle, but by June a definitive plan had 
still not received final approval.
 601
 Among other reasons, this was because the ministry of culture, 
ignoring GKKS, had forwarded its own more extensive plan that included both a full cultural 
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ensemble and a puppet theater,
 602 
and this had resulted in the CC cultural department presenting yet 
another reworked proposal that included several concerts of Soviet musicians and several travelling 
art exhibitions.
603
  To solve the problem, A.I. Mikoian was put in charge of a special commission.
604
 
This inspired the minister of culture to  put forward yet another proposal to Mikoian.
605
 It was not 
until early August 1958 that the commission presented a recommendation for CC approval.
606
 
However, the proposal did not appear to take into consideration that three quarters of the year when 
the plan was to be realized had already passed. Finally, in mid-August the CC approved a plan 
including a ballet group, an artist ensemble, a puppet theater, a quartet, 3-5 soloists with 
accompaniment, a Soviet actor to perform at DKP’ October celebrations, and the screening of 1-2 
movie premiers.
607
 
As a result of the infighting no Soviet artists performed at DKSU or elsewhere until September of 
that year
608
 and DKSU had to postpone the annual congress from spring to autumn to secure Soviet 
participation at the congress and the following cultural friendship month.
 609
 
Late confirmation of the cultural exchange program was not the only problem with the Soviet 
model. Although decisions were taken far in advance, the Soviets did not always communicate them 
to their cooperation partners. In September 1955 the Soviets instructed DKSU very specifically as 
to which cultural workers they were to invite to perform in the USSR, for how long, and at what 
expense.
610
  
When the Danish Foreign Ministry was presented with a Soviet country plan for a given year they 
had to explain to the Soviets that plans had to be presented much earlier as they had to be 
incorporated into the Danish fiscal budget for the coming year.
611
 Danish authorities also wanted as 
many activities as possible to take place through private impresarios.
612
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The rigidity of the Soviet apparatus was also exposed when the organizers of the agricultural fair in 
Bellahøj asked for a Soviet exhibition on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and an accompanying 
troupe of Cossacks that had been a great success in Sweden. Despite the fact that both the 
organizers and DKSU strenuously tried to convince the Soviet side of the unique propaganda 
opportunity with 175,000 potential spectators
613
 neither the exhibition nor the show ever 
materialized since the Soviet system was not able to incorporate a new possibility that had not 
originally been included in the annual plan. 
The overall impression of the Soviet apparatus for planning and organizing the cultural diplomacy 
is that it was very rigid and inflexible and worked very slowly. Everything had to be planned and 
approved of in advance even if it meant that activities came to a standstill, and possibilities could 
not be incorporated since everything had to take place in accordance with the approved plan. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This chapter is by far the longest chapter of the dissertation, but it is necessary to discuss all four 
central aspects of Soviet cultural diplomacy – Apparatus, bilateral agreements, financing, and the 
decision-making processes – in one comprehensive chapter if we are to understand the framework 
that the activities and organizations discussed in the following chapters takes place within. 
An overall conclusion stands clear. The Soviet apparatus was on the one hand extensive and had 
many methods for reaching as many potential audiences as possible, but on the other hand it was 
constrained by its large size. It was bureaucratically heavy, inflexible, hierarchical, and highly 
expensive. There was a strong emphasis that everything had to be planned and approved in advance 
and that more spontaneous possibilities could not be exercised. At times it seems as though the 
planning and approval was more important than the actual implementation of the plans. On the issue 
of the economy of the activities is worth noting that they could not take place under normal market 
conditions, but that a significant financial support was needed. 
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Chapter 3: In the spirit of the Grand Alliance, 1945-1949 
 
“We now have the opportunity to 
 pursue and defend our foreign 
policy interests under much more 
favourable conditions than before”. 
Andrei Zhdanov, 1946
614
 
 
Following World War II the USSR attempted to utilize the euphoria to set up a network of new 
international front organizations to replace those that had been compromised by the Soviet-Nazi 
pact of 1939. Over the current and following chapters we will discuss the origin of these new 
organizations on both an international and national level, their activities, coordinated campaigns, 
their reception, and results of actual Soviet policy actions. 
In 1954 WFDY attempted and quickly failed to publish a Danish version of its journal World 
Youth.
615
 This is one of the few examples of activities organized by international front organizations 
taking place directly in Denmark. Therefore, our interest mostly concerns the Danish national 
affiliations of the international front organizations, Danish participation in the various major 
manifestations (congresses and festivals) of the fronts, and those manifestations and other meetings 
that took place in Denmark. 
 
INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The Soviets always denied that they had established a network of international front organizations 
and called them “international public organizations”.616 Similarly, the organizations in question 
presented themselves as international NGO’s. However, in reality they were GONGO’s – 
Government-organized Nongovernmental Organizations. A GONGO is an organization that 
presents itself as independent but is in reality run and funded by a government whereby it becomes 
an agent of the government’s foreign policy aims or is used to in domestic politics to silence 
oppositional voices within civil society.
617
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The Peace cause. As discussed in Chapter 1, the highest priority of Soviet cultural diplomacy was 
the peace struggle. This was also stated in internal Soviet documents.
618
 To emphazize the peaceful 
intentions of the Soviet peoples an international peace prize called The Stalin Peace Prize had been 
installed. An international committee was set up to give out the award. Among the members of the 
committee was the famous Danish author Martin Andersen Nexø who tried, and failed, to nominate 
the Danish MD, peace activist, and unofficial DKP member, Mogens Fog.
619
 One of the reasons of 
the committee’s indifference to the suggestion was that Stalin – as was the case with all prizes given 
out in his name – took a keen personal interest in who was presented with the prize.620 Following 
Stalin’s dead the CC Presidium continued to decide the recipients of the prize621  despite the formal 
existence of an international committee.
622
 In 1956 the prize was renamed the Lenin peace prize.
623
 
The first Danish recipient was the communist artist Herluf Bidstrup. A Danish embassy 
representative witnessed the ceremony and afterwards complained that it had been impossible to 
recognize Denmark based on the negative description given by Bidstrup and the communist author 
Hans Scherfig.
624
 
Due to the importance of the peace cause, the primary Soviet front organization was The World 
Peace Council founded at an August 1948 Soviet-organized World Congress of Intellectuals for 
Peace in Wroclaw. The congress established the International Connection Committee of 
Intellectuals, who convened the World Congress of Partisans for Peace (Les Partisans de la Paix) 
organization in Paris in April 1949. At the second congress in November 1950 the name was 
changed to the World Peace Council. The first three presidents were (in order of succession) the 
French scientist Professor Frederic Joilot-Currie, Professor J.D. Bernal, and the Belgian politician 
Isabelle Blume.
625
 The Soviets closely monitored the development, organization, and activities of 
WPC.
626
  
The earliest Danish participants in WPC were Martin Andersen Nexø and Agnete Olsen.
627
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First generation Soviet front organizations. The first new front organizations with participation 
covering a broad political spectrum came into existence as early as 1945. 
With the aim of healing the wound in international trade unionism between Comintern’s Red Labor 
Unions and the Second International’s labor unions, the British Trades Union Congress invited 
representatives of 71 trade unions from 31 countries to participate in a congress in Paris in October 
1945. Although, the non-communist sir Walter Citrine was elected president in 1945, the 
communists won the more important post of general-secretary enabling them to fill the secretariat – 
which as in the USSR was the most powerful part of the organization – with their own supporters, 
and thereby succeeding in not creating a genuine trade union international, but a communist front. 
By 1949, the non-communist groups left and on the initiative of the British and American national 
trade unions formed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) in Brussels. 
Citrine was replaced by an Italian communist. WFTU operated a number a trade union 
internationals (TUI) as rivals to ICFTU’s International Trade Secretariats. To make them seem 
more independent they were given individual constitutions in 1966. Examples of TUI are the 
Energy Workers’ TUI or the Transport Workers’ TUI.628 The chairman of the Danish Seamen’s 
Union, Preben Møller Hansen, became vice-chairman of the latter in 1987.
629
 
The Women’s International Democratic Federation. WIDF was founded at a congress in Paris in 
November 1945 organized by the communist dominated Union des femmes Francaises. WIDF 
claimed to work for the unification of all women in a common struggle to win and implement their 
rights as mothers, workers, and citizens, and to struggle against racism and fascism and for world 
peace and disarmament.
 630
 WIDF placed great emphasis on a claim of originating from the German 
KZ camps of World War II,
631
 but this must be seen primarily as an attempt to continue the war 
time popular front strategy into the postwar period. For many years the president was Eugine 
Cotton, but the most active force was Nina Popova.
632
 
The World Federation of Democratic Youth was founded at a congress in November 1945, which 
took place in London. The founding conference had a very broad political composition. The 
honorary committee included among others eight British cabinet members, and Danish members 
included foreign minister John Christmas Møller (conservative MP) and the Danish Minister in 
London, count Reventlow, but communists were notably missing. The congress received a greeting 
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from king George wherein he expressed his conviction that a true cooperation among the youth 
would by the best warrant for continuous world peace. The Danish delegation also had a very broad 
non-partisan composition. Non-communist Svend Beyer-Pedersen and Jørgen Jessen were elected 
as Danish representatives in the WFDY leadership.
633
 However, the political honeymoon was short 
lived.  A non-communist had been elected chairman, but communists and fellow-travelers occupied 
seven of the nine seats on the executive committee and the position of treasurer. Within a few years 
non-communists such as Svend Beyer-Pedersen and non-communist membership organizations 
were ousted. DKU chairman Aage la Cour took over as secretary for Scandinavia and member of 
the executive committee.  In connection with the 1949 expulsion of Yugoslavian representatives the 
non-communists left and formed the counter-organizations World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and 
International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), which was at first headed by Danish Social 
Democratic Youth chairman Per Hækkerup. On several occasions the IUSY and WAY headquarters 
were situated in Copenhagen. WFDY claimed to work for the education of youth in the spirit of 
freedom, democracy and solidarity to end imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, fascist and 
neo-fascist regimes, and ensure world peace and security.
634
 One of the fronts of WDFY was The 
International Committee of Children’s and Adolescents’ Movements (CIMEA) founded at the 4th 
WFDY assembly in Kiev in 1957, which was situated in Budapest and aimed at 6 to 15 year olds 
(the age group younger than WFDY’s target group), but operated by WFDY. 635 
The second of the original front organizations aimed at world youth was the International Union of 
Students formed in 1946 at the World Students’ Congress in Prague with a broad political and 
religious participation. IUS was situated in Prague. IUS claimed to work for the promotion of 
universal right to education, the struggle against fascism, for peace, and genuine national 
independence.
636
 Figure 3.1. illustrates IUS organizational structures as a perfect example of how 
communists controlled the supposedly non-partisan organizations through indirect elections. 
Formally, the congress was the governing body made up of the delegates from national unions of 
students (NUS), but through a number of indirect elections of bodies that med seldom (but in 
accordance with the IUS constitution) leaving power in the hands of the secretariat that more or less 
consisted of communists. 
637
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Figure 3.1. IUS
638
 
 
 
Among the non-communist NUS there was strong dissatisfaction with the communist dominated 
executive organs’ promotion of Soviet foreign policy positions. This became especially clear during 
the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia when the IUS executives refused to protest arrest and 
exclusions of non-communist Czech students. The fractures grew even wider, with the expulsion of 
the Yugoslavian NUS following the Tito-Stalin break being the final straw. Western NUS withdrew 
and formed the counter-organization International Student Conference where the executive 
secretariat played a coordinating role but held no policy-making powers.
639
 
WPC was not the first front organization with Joilet-Curie and Bernal among the founders. The 
World Federation of Scientific Workers grew out of the interwar professional and political 
cooperation between British and French scientists united in a common struggle against Nazism. 
Following a February 1946 London conference a second conference took place in July and WSFW 
was founded with Joilet-Curie as chariman and Bernal as vice-chairman along with a Soviet 
representative. The first task stated for WFSW was to utilize science for the promotion of peace and 
welfare for mankind.  Initially, the USSR had declined to participate, but eventually the Soviet 
                                                 
638
 Based on Mangelia, 63 
639
 RA/DSF/606/Report on DSF’ international activities august 1964. 
127 
 
aligned countries decided to join, and then non-communists, as it was the case with other fronts, 
quickly started to vote with their feet.
640
 
The International Association of Democratic Lawyers was also founded in 1946 at an international 
conference of lawyers in Paris. The Association attempted to create a bureau with participation of 
many internationally recognized lawyers, but controlled by communists. Most non-communists left 
the association in 1949 after the exclusion of Yugoslavian members.
641
 Soviet archival materials 
disclose the intended leading role to be played by Soviet lawyers from the very beginning.
642
  
The international Federation of Resistance Fighters best known by its French abbreviation, FIR, 
was founded in Warszawa in 1946 as an association of former political prisoners of Nazi-Germany 
later situated in Vienna with an agenda of national independence of their country, liberty, and world 
peace. The expulsion of Yugoslavian members in 1949 led to the formation of the counter-
organizations World Veterans’ Federation with a strong anti-communist profile and protests against 
political prisoners in the Soviet-controlled sphere.
643
 The Danish Landsforeningen Gestapofangen, 
an anti-communist former World War II political prisoners’ organization, was the Danish member 
of WVF.
644
 
The International Organization of Journalists was a merger of the interwar International Federation 
of Journalists and the communist-influenced International Federation of Journalists of Allied and 
Free Countries established in London during World War II. IOJ was founded at a conference of 
international journalists in Copenhagen in June 1946. After the communists seized key positions, 
we see the repeated pattern. Non-communist journalists had left and reconstituted the interwar 
federation. Headquarters were first established in London, but in 1947 moved to Prague. The IOJ’ 
declared aim was through the flow of free and true information to help maintain international peace 
and friendship, but in reality the IOJ worked for the restriction of the free flow of words and ideas 
and government control over media.
645
  
The second professional media front was The International Radio and Television Organization 
known by the French abbreviation OIRT, was founded at a 1946 conference in Brussels. Again, 
                                                 
640
 Rose, 151-156; Wittner (1993), 171-175; Petitjean ,  247–270. 
641
 Rose 92-99. 
642
 ГАРФ/Р-9492/1А/79/Зам. пред. ВОКСа А. Караганов зам. мин. юстиции СССР Рубичеву 9.28.1946. 
643
 Rose, 104-108. 
644
 RA/UM.133.D.19/Landsforeningen Gestapofangerne to UM press bureau 2.28.1956. 
645
 Rose, 111-120. 
128 
 
Western participants withdrew to found the European Broadcast Union (the organizers of the 
Eurovision song contest).
646
 
 
A repeated pattern. When we discuss the origins of the first generation of Soviet Cold War front 
organizations a repeated pattern appears. The front organizations were established from 1945-1946 
in the spirit of the grand anti-Nazi alliance of World War II (The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
apparently forgotten). Within a few years the Soviet insistence on controlling the organizations to 
promote their own international purposes and images began to drive off non-communist members. 
The big break-up happened in 1949 in connection with the expulsion of the Yugoslavian 
organizations as a result of the Stalin-Tito break. The Western organizations left the Soviet front 
organizations and founded new counter-organizations. 
As the former British NUS president Frank Copplestone highlighted, the major problem with the 
establishment of the new organizations following World War II was the spirit of camaraderie of the 
Grand Alliance. This meant that key terms such as democratic, progressive, or anti-fascist were 
never defined, and that the pro-Soviet majority could manipulate their definitions and thereby the 
direction of the organizations and that non-communist participants overlooked the dangers for too 
long due to the idealistic belief that these new organizations had to succeed.
647
 
 
MEGA EVENTS 
 
When looking at the international front organizations two kinds of activities stand out. We see a 
flood of publications. Each front organization published various newspapers and journals in 
numerous languages. 
The second major activity was mega events understood as major festivals of congresses organized 
by the international front organizations with large numbers of attendees. As seen in Table 3.A they 
were organized regularly throughout the Cold War. 
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Table 3.A: Congresses and festivals 1945-1987:
648
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International and national preparatory committees. Each time an international congress, 
conference, or festival took place, an international preparatory committee was set up to organize the 
event to give it a non-partisan appearance. The committees had a communist and fellow-traveler 
majority enabling them to control the process and the agenda of the event.
649
 Whether the event 
took place in the USSR or not, the CPSU was kept informed on developments.
650
 National 
preparatory committees were set up by a combination of communist parties and front 
organizations.
651
  
 
DANISH FRONT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
As was the case in numerous other countries national Danish affiliations of the international front 
organizations came into being following the founding of the international organizations. In the 
following we shall identify Danish front organizations, discuss cases where Danish organizations 
disaffiliated with international front organizations, and look at case that completely stands out from 
either of these patterns. 
 
Danish affiliations. The first Danish front organization, founded in November 1948,
652
 was 
Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund (DDK), which originally called itself WIDF Danish 
section until a 1953 name change.
653
 The first chairman was the Social-democrat Agnete Olsen,
654
 
wife of DKSU chairman Albert Olsen. DDK claimed to have 10.000 members in its early years,
655
 
but the archival evidence does not support this claim. By 1955 the society consisted of 51 branches 
with a total membership of 2191 people. Interestingly, the DDK journal Vi Kvinder sold 6470 issues 
in subscription and single copies. Although these figures may seem impressive by Danish standards 
of the time, several factors stand out. Firstly, most of the members lived in the greater Copenhagen 
area and Zealand, where that held 82% of the branches and 83 % of the members were, and 78 % of 
the copies of the journal were sold. Secondly, in Funen and Jutland branches existed only in the 
larger cities. Odense housed 3 branches, but the remaining members in Funen were not organized 
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into branches. In Jutland, the Aalborg and Aarhus branches held more members than the other 3 
juttish branches combined.
656
 
WFDY went through several national “affiliations” in Denmark. The first, in existence during the 
early Cold War, was Den danske DUV Komite
657
 of which next to nothing is known. The first 
chairman was the communist Hans Østergaard
658
 who was later replaced by another communist, 
Birger Christensen.
659
 The scarce source materials also indicate that DUV like other similar 
organizations, had several branches in the greater Copenhagen area,
660
 collective members
661
 as 
well as (skeleton) branches in some provincial cities.
662
 The party affiliation of the chairmen is not 
surprising. The committee seems to have died out, and eventually the role of national WFDY 
affiliate was taken over by DKU.
663
  
Very little is known about the Danish affiliate of IADL.  It seems to have been very communist 
oriented and very small in size.
664
 At one point the chairman was the communist lawyer Christian 
Vilhelm Hagens,
665
 but the driving force was another communist lawyer Carl Madsen and later his 
son, the non-communist Søren Søltoft Madsen.
666
 Carl Madsen’s engagement continued after he 
was excluded from DKP, although Søren Søltoft gradually took over the work.
667
  
In Denmark there was a multitude of organizations of former resistance fighters against the Nazi 
occupation 1940-45 as well as former prisoners of German KZ camps and prisons. Some of them 
such as the Neungammenforeningen (‘The Neungamme Society’) had relationships with an 
international association. An umbrella organization Sammenslutningen af danske fanger fra 
besættelsestiden (‘The Cooperation of Danish Prisoners of the Occupation’) was formed. At some 
unknown point FIR-Denmark was founded as a Danish national affiliation of the international front. 
FIR-Danmark was communist dominated and for a long time relatively small, but it did eventually 
seem to attract other associations as members not the least due to the natural death of many original 
members. Until then, the Danish point of contact with FIR seemed to be Sammenslutningen af 
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Erhvervshæmmede fra Modstandskampen i Danmark (‘The Cooperation of Disabled Persons from 
the Resistance Fight in Denmark’),668 which became part of Udvalget for tidligere fanger og 
modstandsfolk (‘The Committee of Former Prisoners and Resistance Fighters.). As Helge Kierulff 
was one of the active FIR members in Denmark it was housed at the communist travel agency 
Folketurist until the agency went bankrupt. Afterwards it moved to various addresses in the greater 
Copenhagen area.
669
 
The task of establishing a pro-Soviet peace movement in Denmark was placed in the hands of three 
communist; architect Edvard Heiberg, a veteran of similar anti-war and anti-fascist Soviet front 
organizations of the 1930s, Copenhagen mayor Johannes Hansen, and Erna Watson. They formed a 
provisional committee, but had to report to DKP that it suffered from too many communist 
members and too few well-known intellectuals and trade unionists. Finally, following a public 
invitation signed by well-known personalities Fredens Tilhængere was established as the Danish 
affiliate of WPC with 15 local committees in 1950.
670
 Afterwards, several persons declared that 
they had not signed even if their supposed signature appeared on the invitation.
671
 Within six 
months 75 local committees existed.
 672
 In Copenhagen a committee would usually consist of a 
street, a residential area, or a smaller part of the city. Outside of the capital one committee covered 
an entire town.
673
 In some cases local committees split into several sub-committees.
674
 In 1950 the 
Mogens Fog became chairman. Mogens Fog placed great emphasis on Fredens Tilhængere and saw 
it as an opportunity for non-partisan mobilization similar to the resistance movement. At an earlier 
point he stated that communists had to “sprinkle sugar on the pretzels” to win over non-members to 
the cause of movements such as the later Fredens Tilhængere.
675
 
 
The non-joiners. In several cases Danish representatives or organizations originally joined 
international fronts but then opted to leave due to their openly pro-Soviet nature. This was the case 
of the Danish State Radio which left OIRT and later joined EBU.
676
 The Danish Central Trade 
Union, despite initially welcoming the idea of establishing one world trade union, left WFTU to 
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participate in ICFTU.
677
 In some cases such as the latter, communist trade unionist continued on an 
individual basis to participate in the work of the international fronts.
678
  
 
The exception that proves the rule. When studying the Danish organizations that came into 
contact with Soviet front organizations one case stands out and completely breaks with any 
established patterns.  
Foreningen til beskyttelses af Videnskabeligt Arbejde (FBVA)
679
 was founded in November 1943 
with the purpose of improving the economic conditions of scientists in regards to salaries, patent 
rights, and payment for written works and translations. FBVA was divided into 25 sections along 
professional lines from archeology to zoology. The minimum requirement to become member was a 
degree from a Danish university or other institution of higher education. FBVA stands out for a 
very particular reason. On the one hand, throughout its existence it continued its membership of 
WFSW and paid membership fees despite harsh debates over the acknowledged pro-Soviet nature 
of WSFW, on the other hand, it did not promote any of the pro-Soviet positions of WSFW, but 
continuously worked to improve the aforementioned interests of its members, although it was not a 
formal trade union, but rather an interest group. By the early 1960s FBVA development stagnated 
and during the middle of the decade the organization dissolved. The agenda was carried on by 
another interest group without WFSW affiliation. 
 
DKP and the front organizations. DKP followed the line of the “communist peace mythology”. 
To party members, the USSR was the guarantor of world peace whereas the US and NATO were 
the major threats. Leading communists repeatedly stated that the struggle for peace was an 
important part of the struggle for socialism,
680
 that NATO was an instrument for militarization and 
rearmament,
681
 and that the DKP should work to break Denmark away from NATO.
682
 The 
communists, for example party chairman Aksel Larsen, stated this aim publicly.
683
 To reach their 
aim, the communists had to find non-communist partners. Typical examples of partners were the 
first social-democratic Professor, DKSU chairman Albert Olsen and his wife Agnete Olsen, DDK 
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chairman. In 1949 DDK published a pamphlet written by Albert Olsen. Olsen argued that the USA 
was not a real democracy, that the USA would not aid its European alias if they were attacked, he 
dismissed the slightest notion of aggressive Soviet actions (according to Olsen the liberation of 
Eastern Europe was followed by national social reforms to the benefit of the countries’ 
populations), and called Danish authorities’ perception of the USSR hysterical.684 Similarly, his 
successor as DKSU chairman Jørgen Jørgsensen dismissed the mere possibility of any Soviet 
military threat to Denmark.
685
 DKP needed fellow-travelers to establish the non-parliamentarian 
movements that would influence the political decisions makers.  Although they made a huge effort 
to present the non-partisanship of movements such as Fredens Tilhængere,
686
 leading communist 
members like Edvard Heiberg reported on developments in the association at DKP CC meetings 
(Heiberg held a seat), where DDK and DUV developments were also followed closely..
687
 Although 
not always successful, DKP’a strategy was to place a fellow-traveler as chairman and a communist 
as vice-chairman, secretary, or at least in several leading positions where they could stay in overall 
control of a given association. An example of this was the 1950 call to form a Fredens Tilhængere 
local committee in Frederiksberg Muncipality, initiated by the well-known artisan Jørgen Kähler 
and the communist Gotfred Appel.
688
 If we consider the Cold War years overall, two leading 
communists spring to mind in these positions: Peace and solidarity secretary Ingmar Wagner and 
peace secretary Anker Schjerning. They both, so to say, received their salary from DKP to do 
“volunteer work” in numerous associations and could therefor take on time and work consuming 
positions. A reading of various DKSU executive organs’ minutes reveal how Wagner was often the 
only one with a full overview of ongoing activities.
689
 He is described as an articulated and 
pragmatic person with the ability to smooth things over so fellow-travelers also arrived at the pro-
Soviet position.
690
Whereas Wagner especially excelled in friendship and solidarity associations, 
Schjerning worked with the peace movements. Similar, DDK leaders denied DKP influence when 
serious criticism was leveled at various times.
691
 Despite this denial the chairman of the DKP 
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women’s committee, Alvilda Larsen, discussed DDK developments in detail at meetings with 
Soviet representatives.
692
 In further chapters this theme of DKP influence will reoccur. 
 
Well-established and non-established. As with the international organizations it is possible to 
identify a specific pattern. In the Danish case the difference is very much found in the history of the 
organizations and institutions in question. On the one hand we see a number of newly established 
organizations founded as a direct result of the new international front organizations with the 
purpose of influencing Danish public opinion in favor of the pro-Soviet positions. These 
organizations continued to exist in one form or another throughout the Cold War with a strong DKP 
influence. On the other hand we have a number of well-established organizations that entered the 
new organizations out of a general wish for genuine international cooperation within their field. 
However, when they became aware of the true nature and position of the international front 
organizations they withdrew and contributed to the founding of new counter-organizations. Only 
FBVA stands out from this pattern. 
 
FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURE 
 
Above we discussed one of the two legs of the Soviet cultural diplomatic apparatus, “the causes 
leg”. That is the organizations involved in the promotion of Soviet position through peace, youth, 
women, or various professional causes. The second leg was Danish organizations involved in the 
dissemination of Soviet cultural productions to the Danish public, “the culture leg”. 
 
DKSU. Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen (‘The Society for 
Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union’) was not only the largest Danish bilateral 
friendship society during the Cold War
693
 but also the most important Danish practitioner of Soviet 
cultural diplomacy. 
The earliest incarnations were founded in 1921 in the struggle against the Volga famine. In April 
1924 it found its definitive form through the founding of Dansk-Russisk Samvirke (‘Danish-
Russian Cooperation’ It was a very small organization based in Copenhagen. From the early 1930s 
a second Danish-Soviet friendship organization came into existence in the form of Landsforbundet 
                                                 
692
 РГАНИ/5/28/496/72-74/Запись беседы с членом фолькетинга от партии КПД Алвильдой Ларсен 2.21.1957. 
693
 Politiken 7.14.1986. 
136 
 
af Sovjetunionens Venner i Danmark (‘National Union of Friends of the USSR in Denmark’). It had 
numerous local branches, a fairly large membership base, a high level of activity, its own offices, 
and participation in a friendship international. Following the banning of these organizations during 
World War II, they merged into one organization.
694
 At first local branches were founded and 
operated more or less autonomously, but in 1950
695
 a national association was established, and in 
1952
696
 the name changed to The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union. 
Throughout the years DKSU had several non-communist chairmen: Albert Olsen, Jørgen Jørgensen, 
Carl Thomsen, Allan Fridericia, and Hermod Lannung. However, the driving forces were the 
communist vice-chairmen, first Alfred Jensen and later Ingmar Wagner.
697
 According to its 
constitution DKSU worked on a non-partisan basis to disseminate information about all aspects of 
the USSR to the Danish public.
698
 The center-periphery relationship within DKSU was reflected in 
the constitutions that emphasized the supremacy of the center (the executive committee and the 
board of the EC (in 1970s called the steering committee)) over the local branches (their number 
varied throughout the years).
699
 In 1974 a presidium of figureheads was established. The 
constitution paragraphs guiding the work of the presidium were formulated in a way to ensure its 
inability to influence the executive power structure of DKSU.
700
 
 
Movie-rental companies. The other practitioner of cultural dissemination was the commercial 
movie-rental company Dan-Ina Film A/S, established in July 1945 as Victoria Film A/S by DKSU 
chairman Albert Olsen. He became chairman of a board consisting of communists such as Professor 
Stig Veibel, engineer Max Kaplan, Principal Inger Merete Nordentoft, architect Edvard Heiberg, 
and party employed Gelius Lund, and fellow-travelers such as the writer Kjeld Abell. The director 
was Svend Thorsen. The aim of the company was to distribute Soviet films with Danish subtitles.
701
 
After a short time the company was renamed Sovjetfilm A/S
702
 until management settled on Dan-
Ina Film no later than 1949.
703
 In 1949 Svend Thorsen stepped down as director
704
 and was 
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succeeded by Max Kaplan (an old SUV and DKSU activist),and an advisory committee consisting 
of Ib Nørlund, Alfred Jensen and Ingmar Wagner
705
 – three of the most prominent members of 
DKP. Later Helge Scmidt became director.
706
 After Albert Olsen’s death in 1949 Kjeld Abell 
became chairman of the board.
707
 Soviet films and documentaries made up the bulk of Dan-Ina-
Films catalog.
708
 Dan-Ina Film routinely complained that it received too few copies of popular 
movies, that they did not receive information on which new features to expect, and that the prices 
were too high in relation to possible profits.
709
 From the beginning of the early 1950s Dan-Ina also 
rented out non-Soviet movies.
710
 Despite a high activity level Dan-Ina Film suffered financial 
problems.
711
 In 1989 it was turned into a private foundation that continued operations until its 1995 
bankruptcy.
712
 
Folkefilmen, the other half of Dan-Ina Film, was a department of Dan-Ina Film originally called 
Afdelingen for Foreningsfilm (‘The Department for Films for Organizations’)  established to rent 
out primarily 16mm narrow-gauge Soviet documentary and feature films to various organizations, 
clubs, schools, and so on. Organizations renting the movies were not allowed to show them on 
commercial terms, but at closed screenings or in connection with lectures.
713
 Folkefilmen received 
narrow-gauge documentaries from Sovexportfilm,
714
 but as was the case with the features 
complaints were made about high prices for products that could only be rented out to organizations 
at low fees.
715
 At a later point an agreement was made with DKSU, stating that they could show 
new Soviet features licensed by Dan-Ina Film free of charge for their members if Folkefilmen 
received the documentaries given by the USSR to DKSU.
716
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RESISTANCE 
 
A clear opposition to the communist dominated organizations existed from the very beginning. The 
chairwomen of the Danish affiliation of The Women’s International League dismissed Fredens 
Tilhængere due to its one-sided critique of the West and blind faith in the East.
717
 Similarly, 
criticism was raised in various op-eds in the newspaper Politiken.
718
 Erik Seidenfaden compared the 
propaganda to the Nazi propaganda of the previous decade and asked whether everybody had 
forgotten about it already.
719
 Similarly, The National Council of Women refused membership to 
DDK in the 1950s, because the DKP Women’s Committee was already a member.720 
Despite the participation of some social-democrats this party led the strongest struggle against the 
communist front organizations in Denmark. At the time the Social-democrats was not only a 
political party but a way of life with a party, a youth party, control of trade unions, and a 
cooperative movement that could cater for all necessities from cradle to grave.
721
 The competitors 
to the large majority social-democratic movement were the communists. When we compare results 
in the general elections between 1945 and 1957 we see how the two parties struggled over the 
support of the same group of voters.
722
 
In the struggle over the youth movements DSU chairman Per Hækkerup as editor of Rød Ungdom 
(‘Red Youth’) promoted a strong anti-communist line. Following the coup in Czechoslovakia the 
journal title changed to Fri Ungdom (‘Free Youth’). Nina Andersen was in charge of the social-
democratic work among women. In an op-ed she warned that DDK (and WIDF) were dominated by 
communists, only criticized the Western world, but, for example, not the uranium mines in 
Czechoslovakia (operated with POW forced labor), and that those women who joined KDV would 
pull a communist wagon wheel and morally support the ideology and methods in use east of the 
Iron Curtain.
723
 Local party branches were warned about the anti-democratic nature of KDV.
724
 
Albert Olsen died in 1949, and later Agnete Olsen was excluded from the social-democratic party. 
The reason given was that the presidency of KDV was irreconcilable with party membership.
725
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Nina Andersen was added in her campaign against KDV by a civil servant in  the foreign ministry 
who send her various background information and copies of reports from Danish diplomatic 
missions.
726
 This is hardly surprising considering that for the better part of the Cold War the social-
democrats were in government.  
Hans Hedtoft (PM twice between 1947 and 1955) was a staunch anti-communist. In various public 
speeches as party chairman he directly attacked Fredens Tilhængere for barking up the wrong tree 
when claiming that the treat to world peace came from the east and pointed to the ongoing war in 
Korea, Soviet vetoes in UN over Czechoslovakia, Berlin, control over the use of nuclear energy, 
disarmament control, the reelection of UN general secretary Trygve Lie, and the Korean situation as 
examples. He bluntly stated that Fredens Tilhægere operated as an instrument of a foreign 
government’s propaganda campaign.727 
As we can see, at this point in time the social-democratic party and movement held a clear anti-
communist position, even if some backbenchers cooperated with the new front organizations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Following World War II the USSR, the communist world movement, and fellow-travelers used the 
euphoria over victory in the war to create a new network of front organizations not compromised by 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. These new organizations promoted various causes such as women, 
youth, students, or various professional interests with an overall theme of peace. 
On an international level we see an overall repeated pattern; establishment of a new front 
organization, a mass influx of enthusiastic members and organizations, a tight control of the 
executive of the organization by communists and fellow-travelers, the utilization of their position to 
claim support for Soviet foreign policy positions in the name of the organization, followed by 
departure of the democratic members, resulting in the organization of new counter-organizations. 
On a national level various organizations were founded with a strong communist presence as 
national affiliations of the new international front organizations and in other instances already 
existing Danish associations or institutions entered the newly formed international organizations as 
Danish representatives. The mail difference between these two generations of Danish associations 
being that the front organizations stayed on as Danish representatives in the international front 
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organizations, whereas the democratic institutions withdrew and participated in the organization of 
the new counter-organizations. 
The second dimension to the Soviet cultural diplomacy was culture dissemination. In Denmark this 
took place primarily through DKSU. However, a commercial company was very active in the 
distribution of feature and documentary films. 
The communist movement and the various front and friendship associations operated in a very 
harsh climate. Outside the communist and fellow-travelling circles they were met by a strong 
opposition that included an alliance between the central civil administration and the state-bearing 
social-democratic party and its entire movement in youth and women’s circles, trade unions, and so 
on. At the time leading social-democrats held a clear anti-communist and anti-Soviet position. 
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Chapter 4: The first struggle for Peace, 1949-1956 
 
“Numerous people saw in NATO a bulwark for peace, 
but no longer feel confident that it will be able to prevent a war 
 and are at the same time concerned about NATO’s harmful impact  
on the country's standard of living and political independence” 
Statement by Fredens Tilhængere
728
 
 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the activities of the various Danish front organizations including a 
number of coordinated campaigns, DKSU will be discussed separately, and the view of Danish 
authorities on the activities, and the damaging effects of the 1956 Hungarian event will be explored. 
 
THE MANY ACTIVITIES OF DANISH FRONT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Based on the activity level the 1950s were the first golden days of Danish front organizations. 
Danish front organizations had no less than six members of the WPC council.
729
  
Although Danish organizations pursued various causes, whether it be peace causes, women’s 
causes, youth causes, trade unionism and so on, the forms of activities were very similar. Therefore 
we will below discuss the various forms of activities and exemplify them by cases taken from 
various organizations. 
 
Public lectures. Many of the activities centered on dissemination of the written or spoken word. 
The dominant method was public lectures where one or several speakers discussed a theme. For 
example, Fredens Tilhængere (FT) local committees organized a meeting where Professor Stig 
Veibel spoke on international control over atomic energy
730
,  a local DKP branch organized a public 
meeting on KDV with chairman Agnete Olsen as speaker commenting not only on KDV but also 
positive impressions of a journey to the USSR,
731
  and FT organized a meeting with lectures by 
both Danish and international speakers under the heading “Against NATO and rearmament”732 
clearly framing the topics as two sides of the same coin. Speakers could be politicians, artists, 
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intellectuals or other well-known figures supporting WPC.
733
 An important aim of the public 
lectures was to attract listeners who did not belong to the usual communist or fellow-travellers’ 
circles. One such example is the fellow-traveling leading member of FT Elin Appel’s lecture at 
Gentofte Hotel, where she was invited by the social-liberal party. Appel spoke on her impressions 
of the latest WPC congress, the peace will of the Eastern bloc countries and Western 
misinterpretation of their intentions, defended Mao’s revolution in China, and accused President 
Truman of racism.
734
 
In other cases it was more difficult to attract outside listeners. At a March 1949 meeting organized 
by DDK only 16 people turned out for it, including five members of DDK EC.
735
 The organizers 
called for a new meeting two weeks later, but this time only 13 people attended. Even the 
organizers considered the meeting a failure.
736
 
 
Living room meetings. In cases where local branches or committees were too small to organize 
public lectures or conferences private meetings in living rooms at the homes of the members took 
place.
737
 One FT member, captain Andersen, recorded speeches at public lectures and offered to 
play them on his wire-recorder at the living room meetings.
738
 
 
Open air meetings. During the summer public meetings moved outdoors. For example, in July 
1950 FT organized a meeting in Fælledparken (a large green common in Copenhagen) with 
speeches by FT stalwarts Preben Schlanbusch, Peter P. Rohde, and Mogens Fog. They lectured on 
the theme “Is the Korean war the beginning of World War III?”.739 Open air meetings were a 
summer activity, and we do see cases from the fall when meetings had to be cancelled due to poor 
weather.
740
 
 
Conferences. Following the massive coordinated campaigns (see below) the early front 
organizations such as Fredens Tilhængere seem to have lost their drive and the ability to mobilize 
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their members for further campaigns leading many local committees to go into hibernation.
741
 In 
1954, upon receiving a general worldwide approval from WPC,
742
 it was decided to turn FT into an 
actual association with membership fees and so on.
743
 Despite the reorganization, FT was losing 
momentum, and Mogens Fog seriously considered dissolving it. However, they decided to continue 
operations as a more coordination entity.
744
 Instead, Mogens Fog and other FT leaders got involved 
in the organization of Dansk Fredskonference (‘Danish Peace Conference’) 745 depicting both the 
name and primary function of the new association. 
Between 1952 and 1962 DFK organized 17 national and regional conferences.
746
  A typical 
conference was a 1954 conference in Odense with five major speeches covering the usual topics of 
the dangers of West German rearmament, increasing Danish military spending, statements against 
foreign military bases in Denmark, and for German reunification and the inclusion of communist 
China in the UN Security Council.
747
 All were Soviet foreign policy positions. Despite the initial 
broad political composition of DFK,
748
 control over DFK quickly fell into the hands of the 
communists Einar Kruse and future DKP chairman Jørgen Jensen. In several letters, behind the 
back of the national chairman, the fellow-traveler Thomas Christensen, they discussed how best to 
conceal the communist control, so as to not scare off potential members.
749
 
 
Participation in international events. Throughout the years Danish front organizations 
participated in various meetings within the framework of the international front organizations. 
These could be executive meetings, conferences on specific themes, or mega events such as 
congresses and festivals.  
Each time a supposedly independent preparatory committee was set up. In some cases, such as the 
1953 WPC congress in Vienna the committee operated its own office, held meetings to create 
interest, started collections to fund Danish participation, and tried to give the impression of a fresh, 
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non-communist initiative. However, the committee still used paper with the FT letterhead,
750
 
unsurprisingly, since the committee was initiated by FT.
751
 
In other cases, such as in 1952, DDK organized a conference to create interest and select 
participants for an international WIDF conference on children’s upbringing. Several lectures were 
followed by a heated discussion on the possible negative effects of rearmament on social and 
cultural progress, and disagreement over the previously drawn up list of participants in the 
international conference, as too many communists were included, promptly leading to the inclusion 
of a participant who had given a pro-communist statement. In the final selection only one of six 
elected representatives was not a communist or fellow-traveller.
752
 
Danish participation in the mega events (table 3.A.) varied. The 1950 WPC congress had 23 Danish 
participants,
753
 whereas almost 1000 Danes participated in the 1951 youth festival in East Berlin.
754
 
Among other activities they staged a play in Haus derKultur giving the impression of failed 
promises by the Danish government made to the country’s youth of better living conditions, 
education, and the right to vote, substituted for rearmament and militarization.
755
 
 
Table 4.A.: International front organization events in Denmark, 1951-1953:
756
 
 
 
Danish authorities made a clear distinction between communist and non-communist peace 
initiatives and meetings
757
  and in this area closely followed the policy of the NATO Special 
Committee where the British in particular played an active role, circulating numerous reports and 
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policy papers.
758
 Denmark followed the US and UK promoted policy towards international 
communist meetings. In a democratic country the organizations could not be denied the right to 
organize meetings, but participants could be denied visas. This position was taken in case of 
meeting where it was clear that they were camouflaged communist congresses operating as a tool 
for Soviet foreign policy. The reason given was that the holding of the meeting in no way served 
any Danish interests. Danish authorities did not wish to become known as the NATO country open 
to international front organizations thereby increasing the propaganda value of this for the USSR of 
staging the meeting in a NATO country. Four meetings were cancelled in Denmark due to the 
Danish visa policy.
759
 Danish authorities were also influenced by the statement of Swedish Prime 
Minister Tage Erlander who said that the Stockholm appeal had been harmful to Sweden’s 
international reputation and that the appeal should rightly had been called “the Moscow appeal” 
since it did not represent any Swedish interests.
760
 
Denmark was not alone in its negative attitude towards international front organizations. In 1951 
WPC, WIDF, WFTU, WFDY, and IADL were expelled from Paris, accused by the French 
government of fifth column activities. WIDF moved to East Berlin, WFDY to Budapest (except for 
1956 when it was temporarily relocated to Prague), and IADL to Brussels. WPC and WFTU moved 
to Vienna at first, but when the Soviet occupation forces left Austria they were expelled once more 
for conducting activities outside of the interests of the Austrian state. WPC moved to Helsinki, 
WFTU to Prague. WPC even tried for some years to recover lost ground by changing name to The 
International Institute for Peace (IIP) with headquarters in Helsinki. In 1968 it returned to its 
original name, although IIP continued operations (in Vienna in a building owned by a Soviet 
company based in Lichtenstein) as some people, who would not accept a WPC invitation, would 
accept one from IIP.
761
  
The Danish government also had a very negative attitude towards DKSU because the friendship 
society was under the influence of one particular ideology not shared by the majority of the Danish 
population.
762
 In a few cases the press bureau had helped DKSU with information materials on 
Denmark in the hope that this non-communist material would be send to the USSR and thereby 
present Soviet citizens with a different picture of Denmark.
763
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The June 1952 Odense Conference “For a peaceful solution to the German Problem”764 was 
originally supposed to take place in France, but the French authorities strongly opposed it.
765
 The 
venue was changed to Denmark despite Danish authorities’ visa denials to many foreign 
participants (traveling from visa free countries could not be denied) with the aforementioned reason 
given.
766
 The members of the Polish delegation (who were refused visas) had officially been elected 
five days after turning in their visa applications.
767
 The final statement of the conference called for a 
reunited, disarmed Germany.
768
 
The Danish organizers were also dissatisfied with the conference, but this had more to do with the 
chaotic and arrogant behavior of the French WPC representatives and their impolite treatment of the 
female students of the conference venue, an agricultural school. The description give the impression 
of a very chaotic event.
769
 
 
Referendums. Another method to claim popular support for the peace movements was to conduct 
private referendums, such as the 1951 privately organized referendum in the Copenhagen suburb 
Husum. Prior to the referendum several living room meetings had taken place, and all households 
received two explanatory letters in advance as a well as a door to door visit by activists distributing 
ballots. A few days later the activists collected the ballots. Of 404 households in the housing area 
Humlevænget 118 declined, did not answer, or did not return ballots that were filled out. This left 
266 participating households, but 620 filled out ballots (although 162 of these were left completely 
or partially blank).No information exists on the number of edible voters. They were asked three 
questions: 
1: “Do you support protest that could put an end to the rearmament and militarization politics that 
have such a negative influence on the economic situation of the household?” (425 voted yes, 18 no, 
and 3 blank ballots). 
2: “Do you wish for the five great powers, the USA, USSR, UK, Chinese Peoples’ Republic, and 
France to initiate negotiations on a peace pact?” (428 voted yes, 16 no, and 2 blanks). 
3: “In your opinion, should Danish military forces, in the current tense international climate, be 
deployed for combat engagement outside of Danish borders, for example in Korea?” (17 voted yes, 
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427 no, and 1 blank).
770
 A referendum with similar questions and results took place in 
Jægerborgsgade.
771
 
There are several problems with this referendum (even without going into the legal questions of 
organizing it). Firstly, the figures do not in any way tally with the overall figure of ballots. 
Secondly, the questions were extremely biased in the manner they were framed. Thirdly, it is very 
likely that members of the public who disagreed with FT did not participate. The results of the 
“referendum“ are unlikely to present any factual indication of popular opinion among the residents 
at Humlevænget in 1951. 
Nevertheless, the referendum was considered to be a huge success and members were encouraged 
to organize similar referendums in their own neighborhood or workplace. 
 
Publishing activities. Several front organizations published various journals and magazines. 
DDK published Vi Kvinder. A typical 16 page issue in black, white, and red included a short story, 
book reviews, cross word puzzles, articles on children’s upbringing or health problems, but also 
articles on the activities of DDK and other Danish and international front organizations or articles in 
support of the foreign policy of the USSR or other socialist countries.
772
 Clearly, the non-political 
articles were published to draw in a wider readership that would otherwise not come into contact 
with these messages. To some degree DDK succeed in this, as the number of subscribers for many 
years surpassed the number of readers, even if Vi Kvinder could not generate a surplus.
773
 
FT published Kæmp for Freden that was succeeded by Tænk i Tide. The founder of the first paper, 
Bent Laybourn, stated that its purpose was to counter the negative coverage of the peace movement 
in the national press.
774
 The journals constantly suffered financial woes
775
 and the large majority of 
subscribers lived in the Greater Copenhagen area (84 %). Fredericia had as many subscribers as 
Århus and Ålborg put together, and despite its factories and harbor Esbjerg only had three 
subscribers.
776
 This indicates very little impact outside of the largest cities for the messages of the 
pro-Soviet peace movement. 
Local committees in Frederiksberg, Nørrebro, Amager, Vanløse, and Ålborg also published their 
own minor journals, more often than not in duplicated form rather than printed with print runs of 2-
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15,000 issues.
777
 The FT steering committee circulated a special internal newsletter carrying news 
stories that could be and did get reprinted in the local publications.
778
 
 For space restrictions we will not discuss the contents of the journals (the DSKU journal 
Sovjetunionen i Dag vil will serve as an example below in this chapter), but note that the reading 
several volumes of both national and local publications leave us with the impression of a position in 
favor of Soviet politics, defense of its foreign policy, in favor of attacks on NATO, USA, and 
attempts at creating a public protest against the securing of Denmark’s defensive capabilities by 
claiming that the money would be better spent on housing projects or building new schools or 
kindergartens. 
 
COORDINATED CAMPAIGNS 
 
In a number of cases it is possible to identify a cooperation and coordination between campaigns, 
for example a number of simultaneous organized demonstrations against the nuclear bomb 
coordinated between FT, DDK, and DUV.
779
 The following section discuses several examples of 
these coordinated campaigns. 
 
Signature collections. During the 1950s Fredens Tilhængere was the driving force in several 
attempts to promote campaigns initiated by international front organizations. 
The first of these signature collection campaigns related to the Stockholm Peace Appeal adopted at 
the March 1950 WPC committee meeting in Stockholm for an international ban on atomic 
weapons.
780
 Needless to say, the appeal was adopted prior to the USSR having nuclear bombs. FT 
cooperated closely with DDK and DUV (both collective members of FT) during the campaign.
781
 
Collectors used every opportunity to secure signatures, visiting cattle shows or packing signature 
lists in their summer holiday suitcases. 
782
 Local committees formed collection committees, 
subdivided their districts, and designated members to lead the collection activities in the given area. 
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Members were also expected to agitate for signature collections at the work places.
783
 DDK, DKU, 
DUV, and FT organized public meetings to agitate for the signing of the appeal, drove in a horse 
carriage across inner Copenhagen to distribute agitation materials and collect signatures, agitated 
amongst their peers at institutions of higher education,
784
 and even went to beach to ask sunbathers 
to sign. The organizations cooperated in cities all across Denmark.
785
 The DKU journal Fremad 
filled its pages with calls to collect signatures, results from Denmark and other countries, and 
articles presenting the USA and NATO as warmongers. DKU members who collected 10 signatures 
received an autographed picture of Mogens Fog, 50 signatures resulted in a book certificate, and a 
higher number secured the member a special diploma.
786
 
Fredens Tilhængere succeeded in collecting 135,000 signatures on the Stockholm Peace Appeal. 
This roughly matched the number of votes for DKP at the September 1950 general elections.
787
 The 
campaign met considerable resistance from the conservative newspapers Berlingske Tidende and 
Berlingske Aftenavis. They ran a campaign on the covert methods that were used in the campaign, 
warned against its communist origins and propaganda value and printed a coupon that anybody who 
had signed the appeal could submit to the newspaper to withdraw their signature. 14,500 took 
advantage of the opportunity. Danish newspapers of various political observations directed harsh 
criticism against the chairman Mogens Fog.
788
 An attempt was made externally to give the 
impression that the newspaper campaign had no major negative impact on collection by publicly 
making a fuss over how some of the coupons received through Berlingske did not correspond with 
names on the signature lists, were unreadable, more than once came from the same person, and 
some from persons who had never signed
789
 and in the end Fredens Tilhængere declined to receive 
further withdrawals through this channel.
790
 But inwardly DKPrecognized that the Berlingske 
Tidende campaign had hit hard. Inger Merete Nordentoft critically stated that a quicker respond 
against the campaign should have taken place: "We only have so many signatures as our votes. That 
is unsatisfactory ".791 Svend Nielsen concluded in his report to the Central Committee meeting in 
May 1951 that DKP and DKU had promised to collect 150,000 signatures in Stockholm appeal in, 
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but the goal was not reached. 792 Worldwide, 500 million signatures for the Stockholm Appeal were 
collected: 380 million in the USSR, Eastern Bloc countries, and China, while the remaining 120 
million originated from 68 other countries.
793
 
The second signature campaign was formed on the basis of a WPC call for a meeting between the 
five great powers (US, USSR, UK, France, communist China).
794
 Similarly to the Stockholm appeal 
signature campaign, FT activists enthusiastically engaged with the assignment of collecting 
signatures. In some cases they printed and distributed flyers to residents in local neighborhoods.
795
 
Other front organizations such as DDK took part in the campaign.
796
 
However, FT had to acknowledge the difficulties of reaching the goal of 150,000 signatures. It was 
especially difficult to collect signatures outside of the larger cities.
797
 In an attempt to remedy the 
situation FT activists spent two hours in front of every local train station in the greater Copenhagen 
area on one Sunday in March 1952,
798
 but only reached 90 percent of the target figures for collected 
signatures.
799
 A reading of the weekly FT steering committee minutes show how difficult it was to 
keep the momentum of the campaign going, and it took several years to reach the final count of 
160.000 signatures.
800
 
Following this second campaign, the FT steering committee had had their fill of organizing 
signature campaigns.
801
 Instead, DKP had to take on the task (on the “Vienna appeal” with meager 
results.
802
 
 
Accusations of bacteriological warfare in Korea. Between 1951 and 1953 several international 
front organizations launched a campaign against the UN forces in Korea. North Korean and Chinese 
sources claimed in very detailed accounts that US military aircraft in Korea released the microbes 
of plague, cholera, typhus, and other frightful, contagious diseases in violation of the 1925 Geneva 
Convention. WFSW, IADL, and WIDF all sent fact-finding missions to Korea. The title of the 
WIDF report alone shows how they accepted all claims at face value without any critical 
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examination of the alleged evidence. A US call for an International Red Cross mission was 
denied.
803
 
According to a local, duplicated FT journal it was impossible to determine who had attacked whom 
in Korea since neither side respected the 38
th
 parallel.  However, this did not stop the journal from 
accusing the US of warmongery and leading an imperialist crusade against the whole of Southeast 
Asia, especially China.
804
 Simultaneously, FT launched a nationwide campaign of screenings of a 
Chinese film supposedly documenting American war crimes. 
805
 Ida Bachmann and Kate Fleron, 
both participants in the WIDF mission, reporting on the findings of their Korean journey accused 
the American troops of committing war crimes, bombing anything moving, and slaughtering 
civilians. In a direct comparison with the Lidice massacre of World War II they stated that the 
American troops were no better than the Nazis, that Denmark was responsible for the alleged crimes 
as well because Denmark had supported the UN resolution for intervention, and for good measure 
argued that Denmark was in danger of becoming the next Korea due to the rearmament and “re-
nazification” of Germany.806  Overall, Danish front organizations covered the Korean War from 
three perspectives: disbelief in North Korean aggression,  critique of the American led UN 
intervention forces, and accusations of American bacteriological warfare. 
 
Against (Western) German rearmament. The 1950s saw an international Soviet-organized 
campaign against the rearmament of Western Germany (but not Eastern) and incorporation in 
NATO. The main activity was a number of protest conferences
807
 that included Danish 
participation.
808
 As early as 1951 local FT committees wrote letters of protest over the very notion 
of German rearmament to the Danish government.
809
 
Modstandsbevægelsens Initiativkomite mod Tysk Genoprustning  (’The Resistance Movement’s 
Initiative Committee against German rearmament’) was founded in December 1953 with  non-
communist lawyer L. Prytz as chairman, but many communists in leading positions in both FT and 
the Committee. The Committee had two primary functions: the publication of a journal and 
organizing a campaign of signatures against German rearmament. The journal, published 1953-55 
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contained numerous articles claiming a reawakening of Fascism in the governmental structures of 
Western Germany. The military structures of GDR did not receive any attention. The signature 
campaign collected 200,000 signatures demanding a national referendum in Denmark on the 
question of Danish support in NATO of German rearmament.
810
 The Soviet legation supported the 
committee by ordering several subscriptions of its journal and the leading communist member 
Frode Toft discussed it and other activities in meetings with the Soviet legation.
811
 However, the 
journal folded, and the signatures failed to impress the Danish government. 
 
DKSU 
 
As noted in the beginning of this chapter the largest, most important, and most active of the 
involved Danish organizations was the Danish-Soviet Friendship Society. As the largest and most 
active (and longest surviving) participant in Soviet cultural diplomacy DKSU merits its own case 
study. It is possible to identify five main activities.
812
 
 
Sovjetunionen i Dag (SiD). The DKSU journal started in 1947 and folded in 1955, originally it was 
published quarterly, but with volume 2 it became a monthly publication. It is possible to identify 
three recurring themes. 
Firstly, as noted by Bent Jensen, the journal was a show piece for the Soviet way of life with texts 
and pictures of Stalin as the wise leader surrounded by admiring subjects, good-natured Soviet 
soldiers on guard for peace, material abundance, jubilant women in procession, child, gatherings 
that made unanimous decisions, workers who looked into the bright future, female pilots, cultural 
delegations on the Red Square and, as the icing on the cake, a cover with a little girl sewing a flag 
reading "Stalin is the Peace".
813
 
Secondly, SiD promoted Soviet peace propaganda
814
 and included negative descriptions of the 
American nuclear policy program, but positive remarks on the similar Soviet program,
815
 and 
published full text translations of speeches on the peace cause by leading Soviet personalities at 
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home or at various international congresses,
816
 critical remarks on NATO,
817
 accounts of the 
collection of signatures on the Stockholm peace appeal,
818
 or protests to the UN Security Council, 
for example regarding the Korean War.
819
 
Thirdly, theme issues covered Danish delegations’ (positive) impressions of the USSR. As was the 
case with the 1950 cultural delegation, members described how conditions within their professional 
field were better in the USSR than in Denmark; trade union chairman Willy Brauer wrote on the 
conditions at work places, MD Mogens Fog on the health sector, trade union chairman Carlo 
Hermansen on the trade unions, editor Anker Kirkeby on the press, and stage director Evald 
Rasmussen on the theater.
820
 
Initially, members were told that SiD was very popular.
821
 But based on comments made in the 
following years we have to question that statement. As early as 1948 the leading communist Gelius 
Lund complained that SiD did not contain information of interest for the Danish public and left 
readers with an overall dull impression in comparison with the lively and well-edited American Det 
Bedste (Reader’s Digest in Danish translation).822 Following the 1948 communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia book shops
823
 and kiosks
824
 refused to sell SiD. The initial print run of 1200-1400 
copies could not be maintained.
825
 Year by year subscription figures continued to drop.
826
 DSKU 
constantly owed the printer money.
827
 When the journal finally folded in 1955, the vice-chairman 
concluded in a conversation at the Soviet embassy that despite secret Soviet subvention SiD could 
not compete with the embassy’s own FOS.828 After all, Denmark was too small a country for two 
Soviet propaganda journals. 
 
Film screenings. DKSU emphasized screening Soviet films and it was a major public activity, as 
stated in a circular to members Copenhagen in 1953: “Screenings of Soviet films is the best 
agitation for our association".
829
 Alfred Jensen hoped that Soviet films would be a way to 
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effectively compete with American cultural diplomacy.
830
 The majority of screenings took place in 
Copenhagen at various cinemas, or at special film weeks during the Easter holiday and DKSU 
screened all kinds of films from feature films to documentaries, to animated children's films, and 
newsreels.
831
 Outside of Copenhagen screenings were possible thanks to the narrow-gauge movie 
projectors provided as gifts from VOKS.
832
 
DKSU faced several problems regarding this activity. Firstly Dan-Ina Film and Sovexportfilm were 
not keen to lend out new releases free of charge to DKSU.
833
 Secondly, the owners of, for example, 
Copenhagen
834
 or Ålborg
835
 movie theaters were not inclined to rent out their theaters for closed 
screenings for DKSU members. Thirdly, both Alfred Jensen and DKSU Odense chairman Poul 
Jølbæk tried in vain to explain to Soviet representatives that black and white war movies did not 
interest Danish movie goers.
836
 In 1962, following yet another failed Easter movie festival, DKSU 
EC decided to cancel further screenings due to the lack of quality films.
837
 Apparently, the Soviets 
did not heed the warning. 
 
Soviet cultural delegations. Each year a Soviet delegation of artists and intellectuals participated in 
the “Friendship Month” that took place following the annual DKSU congress838 planned in close 
cooperation with VOKS.
839
 Usually, VOKS also took on the expenses.
840
  A typical example of a 
cultural delegation was the 1956 delegation consisting of 8 people (ballet dancers, folklore dancers, 
an accordion player, and a balaika solist).
841
 
In his welcoming address to a 1962 Soviet variety show at Tivoli, DKSU chairman Jørgen 
Jørgensen claimed that the visits by Soviet cultural delegations were extremely popular and 
convinced the Danish spectators of the high level of art and culture in the USSR.
842
 The following 
section discusses two cases of cultural delegations to see if they lived up to this claim. 
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The 1952 cultural included a delegation of six persons and an artist group of five persons. During 
their stay they gave 28 lectures and performances in 8 different cities.
843
 However, the press mostly 
covered the story that members of the delegation refused to participate in a radio broadcast because 
the interpreter had written critical articles on Soviet affairs.
844
 Danish press did praise Soviet 
performances for their artistic merit.
845
  
On the other hand, the 1954 cultural delegation was considered a huge success with participation 
and positive coverage outside of the usual circles, especially due to the participation of the famous 
author Konstantin Simonov.
846
 
Our cases studies show that the propaganda value of the Soviet cultural delegations depended too 
much on coincidence and did not seem to have any lasting value. However, DKSU did learn one 
thing. They constantly asked for artistic performances rather than lectures that had to be translated 
from Russian and therefore bored the audience.
847
 The language barrier discussed in chapter 1 was a 
constants source of problems for creating impact. 
 
Public lectures. Eventually lecture evenings became a more and more important activity. As with 
other activities the majority took place in Copenhagen (in 1954, more activities took place in the 
Copenhagen branch than all of the other branches combined).
848
 Themes varied widely: impressions 
from travels to the USSR, various aspects of Soviet high culture, meetings on Soviet red-letter days, 
whilst Soviet lecturers spoke on various aspects on Soviet cultural, political, and economic life. 
Often, the lectures were followed by screenings of Soviet documentaries, coffee drinking, and 
lotteries.
849
 
 
The many difficulties of DKSU.  If we move beyond the optimistic tones of Jørgen Jørgensen we 
see a very different picture when investigating the possible impact of the many DKSU activities. 
Firstly, membership figures only averaged about 2,000 members.
850
 A few trade union branches and 
private business as collective members artificially accounted for an additional 8,000 members.
851
 
By artificially inflating the membership figure it reached 14,000 members by 1961.
852
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Secondly, as we have seen, the various activities suffered from various chronic problems both in the 
manner of organizing them and in the reception. Interestingly, DKSU seems to have not learnt any 
lessons from this. In 1952 DKSU organized a conference to discuss why their activities were so 
uninteresting to the general public. Following a lengthy discussion and after hearing various 
suggestions it was concluded that they were on the right track and the general public was wrong 
when it could not understand the benefits of closer relations with the USSR. Therefore, operations 
should continue in the same unaltered pattern.
853
   
Thirdly, prominent non-communist members quickly began to leave the DKSU EC. Two early EC 
members had been the Social-democratic chairman Hans Hedtoft and CTU chairman Eiler Jensen, 
which is surprising in regards to their anti-communist position. However, Hans Hedtoft left the EC 
when he became Prime Minister,
 854
 and a few years later Eiler Jensen left as well,
855
 whereas the 
later Copenhagen chief mayor H.P. Sørensen was not reelected due to disagreements over the 
DKSU position on Danish NATO membership,
856
 and the Minister of fisheries Chr. Christensen left 
in 1951.
857
 Outside of the social-democratic circles, director Alf Ussing of the Great Nordic 
Telegraph Company was ordered to leave the EC by his company that would not be seen publicly as 
supporting one or the other side in the international conflict between the superpowers.
858
 Professor 
of English literature C.A. Bodelsen left because he would not support the direction DKSU had 
taken as a Soviet mouth piece.
859
 In other words the politicalul broad coalition of the EC that should 
have served to bring legitimacy to DKSU in the eyes of the general public crumbled as the Cold 
War intensified. 
Fourthly, a reading of the minutes of DKSU congresses provides us with a depressing picture of the 
results of the neglect of learning from past mistakes. At the annual DKSU congresses
860
 Jørgen 
Jørgensen and his successor Carl Thomsen would initially report on how the international situation 
had improved, the general admiration of the scientific, economic, and cultural development had 
risen, and the environment for furthering international relations in general and thereby the working 
conditions for DKSU had strongly improved, leading to an expansion in DKSU relations with other 
parts of society. Visits by Soviet notabilities like major general Korotkov (commander of the Soviet 
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forces that liberated Bornholm), minister of culture Furtseva or cosmonaut Gagarin were used as 
examples of how their visits improved bilateral relations. However, when the chairmen had to 
present the actual level of activities in the year just gone, they could not live up to the optimistic 
overtures. DKSU was not involved with official delegations, no new collective members appeared, 
and movie screenings were coming to a halt. Formerly, the visits by Soviet cultural delegations had 
been free of charge, but during the decade they became very expensive since deficits from 
performances were almost a given. DKSU lost its office space and had severe difficulties in renting 
a new space. DKSU only accounted for one tenth of all Danish tourism to the USSR. Non-
communist members left, and overall membership figures were falling. The general report was 
followed by the less than encouraging news from local delegates on the activity level and impact of 
the local branches. They suffered from small membership basis, dysfunctional and inactive boards, 
lack of funding, and lack of activities. Often, they could not afford to organize events with the 
members of Soviet cultural delegations due to the assurance of a deficit they could not afford to 
carry. Following the establishment of local branches in Bornholm, Elsinore, Esbjerg, Odense, 
Randers, Ålborg, and Århus no new branches came into existence during the period, either because 
of lack of interest or a too heavy communist presence in the initiative. Only DKSU Aalborg 
appeared to be successful, with a language school operating under the Danish evening school 
legislation, well-attended concerts, and a high activity level of public lectures and film screenings. 
The high activity level was even reflected positively in the local press. The one negative aspect was 
that almost only communists were members, prompting Knud Rahbek Schmidt to ask if there were 
no sensible people living in Aalborg except for communists. Finally, when all the misery had been 
brought into the light of day, the communist DKSU vice-chairman Alfred Jensen took the 
opportunity to deliver his annual scolding of those assembled. Local departments were told that 
they were too pessimistic about economy. Not all events would create an economic surplus, but 
they could provide PR value for the local branches. He told the members to stop complaining, roll 
up their sleeves, and otherwise without complaint organize the events with artists and speakers 
(besides the local program), as decided by the national EC. 
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HUNGARY 1956 
Fifthly, Hungary happened. 
 
Hungary 1956 according to the USSR. Following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Soviet cultural 
diplomacy attempted to frame the incident in the Danish public’s mind as a reasonable public 
dissatisfaction in Hungary that had been exploited by reactionary and fascist forces. They had 
aligned themselves with the Imre Nagy government. Therefore a revolutionary workers’ and 
peasants’ government had been established. It had asked the Soviet Union for help to "put an end to 
the scourge of counter-revolutionary elements and protect workers’ and peasants’ power".  The 
Soviet Union had obviously been so kind as to comply immediately with the request.
861
 
Subsequently, emphasis was placed on the Soviet relief effort of food, medical, and building 
material supplies to Hungary.
862
 
 
Popular Danish reactions. However, the general Danish public quickly acquired a much clearer 
and critical impression of the events in Hungary thanks to the media coverage that received more air 
time than the contemporary Suez-crisis. Danish Radio’s journalists Svend Ludvigsen and Villy 
Reunert’s coverage with the sound of gunshots in the background during the daily news broadcast 
had a huge influence. For the first time ever the ban on TV commercials was lifted and three shows 
were aired on both TV and Radio to support a Danish Red Cross collection to send an ambulance to 
Hungary. Several books on the Hungarian events were published. Several newspapers compared the 
struggle of the Hungarians with that of the Danish freedom fighters during the World War II 
occupation (a fundamental national narrative in Denmark) or referenced George Orwell’s 1984. 
Several protest meetings were organized, 6-10,000 people participated in a demonstration in central 
Copenhagen in front of the University of Copenhagen, and five minutes of silence was observed at 
noon on November 8
th
. Riots in Copenhagen led to the smashing of windows at the Soviet embassy 
and the DKP headquarters.
863
 
 
DKP and Hungary. DKP was struck hard by the events. At first the leadership was confused on 
how to react to the Hungarian question and even voiced some critique, prior to the reception of clear 
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instructions from Moscow that events should be condemned as a counterrevolution. More than 3000 
members left DKP. It has been argued that it led to the formation of the splinter party SF and the 
subsequent DKP loss of parliamentary representation in 1960.
864
 Although it should be noted that 
DKP survived the 1957 parliamentary elections. 
 
International front organizations and Hungary. The Soviet international cultural diplomacy 
apparatus was also severely hit by the events. Despite the WPC executive’s refusal to protest 
against the Hungarian events at an extraordinary executive meeting held in Helsinki for the first 
time strong critique of Soviet actions were heard.
865
 Similar critique was heard in WIDF.
866
 In 
Denmark, DDK lost most of its members. Many branches closed, and by 1958 the number of DDK 
branches had dwindled to 17.
867
 
 
DKSU and Hungary. DKSU was also hit by the popular Danish reactions to Hungary. The 
consequences were described in a letter to VOKS: 
 
“On the occasion that the recent events in Hungary and the Soviet Union's intervention  have caused incalculable harm 
to our work for the development of friendly relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union, we feel the urge to 
express the following to you as our partner for many years: 
We deeply regret that the Soviet government has not managed or understood how to avert that the situation in Hungary 
before it became to so critical. We consider the very serious disturbances a strong testimony that the standard of living 
and political conditions had been very unsatisfactory. And although we are convinced that the US and the other 
capitalist governments by their military, economic, and propagandistic measures bear a large share of the blame for the 
discontent, we believe, however, that the Soviet Union cannot be relieved of a heavy responsibility that it has come to 
this. Instead of strengthening the people’s democratic government’s authority by putting them in a position to raise the 
people's standard of living sufficiently fast, the insufficient unilateral motivated and perhaps exaggerated criticism of 
the former leaders has undermined confidence also in their successors and thereby fatally weakened their authority. 
We urge VOKS to use all your power to work to ensure that the Soviet Union – also in its own interest – provides help 
to quickly and undeniably secure an upturn in living standards in the people's democracies and thus to continue the 
liberalization that cannot be peaceful until the necessary financial basis for mobilization exists. 
Unlike many other progressive people in the capitalist countries, we condemn not the Soviet Union's intervention to 
provide tranquility and peace in Hungary. This intervention was possibly needed in the current situation, but we believe 
that a wiser policy on the Soviet government's side could have prevented that such an unfortunate situation arose. We 
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therefore hope that the Soviet government v will take changing its policy towards the people’s democracies in the 
direction of first and foremost effectively contributing to a satisfactory standard of living for the population into very 
serious consideration, since it is our belief that this is an essential condition for provision of international confidence 
and security, without which our work for the development of friendly relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union 
will be in vain”
868
 
 
In other words, the DKSU EC fully supported the Soviet invasion and only regretted that it had led 
to a setback for its ability to operate in Denmark.  
However, not all members supported this position. A planned delegation consisting of the head of 
department in the Ministry of Education Albert Michelsen, director of the university's hereditary 
biological institute, professor of human hereditary biology and eugenics, and member of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Tage Kemp, professor of genetics at the University of Copenhagen. Mogens 
Westergaard, and professor of general pathology at Aarhus University Jørgen Bichel declined to 
travel following the development in the international situation in 1956.
869
 Overall, DKSU had to 
halt all activities for six months. DKSU
870
  
Simultaneously DKSU experienced a drastic fall in membership figures, especially in the EC. 
Several prominent members left due to Hungary. They were Politiken journalist Anker Kirkeby,
871
 
the translator and former chairman Ejnar Thomaasen,
872
 the playwright Kjeld Abell,
873
 stage 
director Sam Besekov,
874
 CEO Knud Korst.
875
 and DKSU secretary, former editor-in-chief of SiD, 
the painter Folmer Bendtsen.
876
 Associated Professor Kolstrup resigned as chairman of DKSU 
Aarhus because he felt Soviet actions in Hungary were inhuman and impossible to defend.
877
 Jørgen 
Jørgensen implored those who left not to hold such a narrow view of the developments in Hungary 
and stated that he would have preferred that they had stayed in DKSU to work for international 
detente and world peace.
878
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Interestingly, many ordinary members stayed faithful to DKSU. In Copenhagen only 42 members 
left, and in Aalborg only one.
879
 DKSU Odense did not experience any resignations at all.
880
  
In a letter to VOKS, chairman Jørgen Jørgensen explained the difficult situation for DKSU, but he 
also expressed hope that the damage would be quickly repaired and promised that DKSU would do 
its best to work for an improvement in relations between Denmark and the Soviet Union.
881
 
VOKS vice-chairman Iakovlev offered VOKS’ understanding and support during the difficulties 
for. Danish newspapers gave VOKS the opportunity to read the false coverage of the recent events. 
VOKS understood the difficult situation of DKSU, but did not doubt that DKSU could overcome 
them and succeed in the grand task of strengthening the friendship and cultural exchanges between 
the peoples of Denmark and the USSR.
882
 
 
Dansk Fredskonference and Hungary. DKSU was not the only Danish participant in the Soviet 
cultural diplomacy apparatus to be damaged by Hungary. The communist MD Einar Kruse, who 
was a driving force in Dansk Fredkonference, received several angry letters and demands to 
condemn the Soviet invasion. He declined and claimed that too little was known of the situation in 
Hungary to have an informed opinion, but in a clear case of whataboutism he stated that he 
considered it unfair to demand such a statement from him when no one demanded similar 
statements of those who were sympathetic towards Great Britain or France regarding the Suez crises 
or their colonial politics.
883
 
However, in the following year Kruse joined the DKP negotiation delegation for meetings with 
CPSU representatives in Moscow. At this meeting he was given the opportunity to state very 
bluntly how the Soviet actions in Hungary had destroyed many years’ hard labor to influence the 
general public in Denmark.
884
 Sadly the minutes taken by Danish delegation members
885
 contain no 
reference to a possible Soviet answer to Kruse’s blunt criticism and deep frustration over the 
setback. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Cold War had two periods of intensified activity level among front and friendship 
organizations. The first of these ended in 1956. 
As we have seen, the various organizations operated in very much the same manner to each other, 
organizing various forms of lectures, events, referendums, and publications that were very similar in 
content. On top of this, both on an international and national level they were able to coordinate a 
number of campaigns involving signature collections, the anti-American campaign of accusations of 
bacteriological warfare in Korea, and the anti-NATO struggle against (West) German rearmament. 
Had these campaigns succeeded they would have supported and strengthened the position of the 
USSR in international politics to a high degree. However they failed, partly because they were 
unable to reach a wide cross-section of the general public, and partly because the Danish authorities 
and the Social-democratic movement strongly opposed the various organizations and their 
activities. 
The events in Hungary severely damaged the Soviet front organizations. Soviet cultural diplomacy 
could not overcome the negative consequences of the actual actions taken in Hungary, because the 
difference between what had been said for many years and what was, in reality, done became too 
great, and the USSR thereby, broke one of the golden rules of conducting cultural diplomacy. 
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Chapter 5: Direct Soviet Activities 
 
“The aim of this bulletin is to provide 
the above mentioned representatives 
with objective facts and materials 
received directly from the USSR 
regarding the political, economic, and 
spiritual life of the Soviet peoples”. 
Mission statement, 1951.
886
 
 
One group of activities must be categorized as cultural diplomacy executed directly by Soviet 
government representatives and state enterprises. These activites include publications, radio 
broadcasts, exhibitions, public lectures, screenings and exchanges under the Danish-Soviet cultural 
agreement. In this chapter we will identify and discuss some examples and whether or not the 
activities had any impact. 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Throughout the Cold War the USSR published a variety of books, booklets, newsletters, and 
journals.  
 
APN. Sovinformbureau/APN was the primary publisher and by 1990 circulated publications in 140 
countries in 45 different languages on Soviet domestic and foreign policy, economy, science, 
culture, art, education, sport, and many other themes.887 In addition, APN provided articles and 
photo materials to external clients, in 1971, for example, APN delivered 59,600 articles and 
109,400 photographs to international clients and published 57 journals and nine newspapers with an 
overall circulation of 2.2 million copies in 54 languages.
888
 According to APN chairman Vlasov, 
between 1967 and 1989 APN annually distributed written materials abroad free of charge that were 
worth 3 million rubles.
889
  
 
Fakta om Sovjetunionen. One of the 30 journals and 6 newspapers with an overall circulation of 
1.5 million copies published by APN in 1964
890
 was the Danish language version titled Fakta om 
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Sovjetunionen  (‘Facts on the Soviet Union’)(FOS). According to the colophon the journal had 
various Danish editors; Erik Horskjær, Poul Hansen, Gelius Lund, Karen Kjærulf Nielsen, and 
Poul-Henning Laursen. The first issue was published in 1951. In 1990 the title was altered to 
Glasnost. This was a very different, more critical journal in line with contemporary Soviet 
politics.
891
 
The page count and publication frequency changed over time. In its earliest incarnation FOS was a 
duplicated 10 page magazine, issued free of charge to anyone who was interested. Later, FOS 
extended to 16 pages in print format and eventually it became a weekly with illustrations and a 
cover printed in color. In 1979 it became a 64 page monthly journal.
892
 All decisions about changes 
in the format and frequency of the journal were taken in Moscow.
893
 FOS was widely distributed.  
Local DKSU branches made sure that local libraries received a copy.
894
 
Since we are dealing with a journal published for 39 years it is impossible to give a detailed 
description of each volume. The first issue contained a translation of the interview with Stalin 
originally published in Pravda in February 1951. In the interview Stalin argued that the USSR was 
a peaceful nation and attacked British PM Attlee who in a speech in the House of Commons said 
that the USSR should remember that the war was over and begin to act accordingly. Stalin 
considered the UK to be an aggressive nation. In the same manner he attacked the UN sanctioned 
intervention forces in the Korean War. The only other article in the first issue was a celebration of 
the Red Army as “the army of peace”.895 This first issue set the standards and tone of the journal for 
its remaining years. Overall, throughout the years the key word of FOS was “quantity”  through a 
stream of production figures about  industrial, economic or cultural consumption, political 
commentary framing the USSR as a peaceful nation and the US n particular as an aggressive nation. 
The journal contained presentations of all the Soviet republics (with quantity as the main argument 
for improvement of living standards and of social development, or the benefits of Soviet power), 
Danish-Soviet relations (including coverage of Khrushchev state visit, national anniversaries, or the 
work of SUDK and DKSU respectively), success stories like Gagarin’s space travel, prize 
competitions (and coverage of the winners travelling to the USSR), claims of Soviet peace politics,  
numerous political commentaries on the international situation, and the publication in full of 
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numerous documents (speeches, interviews, addresses to the Danish governments, and even the 
infamous Bulganin letters to H.C. Hansen). To give a more detailed description of the contents we 
will utilize volume 31 (1981) as a representative example. 
 
Table 5.A: Themes and number of articles in FOS vol. 31 (1981): 
 
Theme Number of articles 
International politics (commentaries) 59 
State and party 23 
Law 4 
Marxist theory 3 
History 16 
Economics 18 
Work places and trade unions 14 
Transportation 3 
Housing and architecture 7 
Education 12 
Social politics 10 
Health care 8 
Citizens and society 17 
Geography 23 
Culture 5 
Literature 6 
The visual arts 8 
Music 2 
Theater and film 5 
Folkloristic art 4 
Religion 3 
Environmental issues 16 
Science and technique 25 
Sports 22 
Hobbies 7 
Danish-Soviet relations 25 
Overall 335 
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It is possible to divide the articles into 25 themes and 5 permanent sections. The latter were news 
from DKSU, advertisements for APN booklets, Radio Moscow broadcasting schedule, news in 
brief, and a cultural revue. 
In Table 5.A. the listings reflect the Soviet prioritization of the material. International politics was 
the major theme particularly in the form of commentaries on the situation in Poland or Afghanistan, 
criticism of NATO and the US, support of international peace movements, and promotion of the 
concept of “the North as a nuclear free zone”. Domestic politics were covered primarily through 
printing of speeches of the 26
th
 party congress and statistics on the development within various 
sectors of society. Many of these articles featured the Lithuanian SSR as the Soviet cultural days 
organized by DKSU in 1981 centered on that republic. In the same manner many sports articles 
covered the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Danish-Soviet contacts covered all aspects of relations 
between the two countries such as presentations of new books for example Carl Scharnberg’s Nina 
Krymova biography. Similarly, new Soviet books on Denmark or translations of Danish literature 
into Russian were mentioned, and the participation of Danish publishing houses at the Moscow 
book fair and new contracts with Soviet publishers were also covered. Other themes covered were 
visits to Denmark for example by a mufti or the participation by representatives of the Moscow 
Patriarchate in an inter-church meeting in Løgumkloster, travels to the USSR made by high school 
students or rail road workers (for example), or commemorations of famous Danes such as the 300
th
 
anniversary of the birth of Vitus Bering. Overall the Soviet journal presented a large and lively 
cultural relationship between the two countries. 
 
Newsletters. Sovinformburau/APN/IAN  published a newsletter of 5-6 pages primarily aimed at 
Danish newspapers and news agencies, although some private persons and libraries also received 
copies. Initially titled Nyheder fra Sovjetunionen (1957-1962) it was later retitled Pressebureauet 
Novostis Bulletin (1962-1966), Novosti presse-nyt (1966-1990), APN-info (1990), and finally Ian-
info (1990-1991). It is beyond the scope and possibilities of this dissertation to conduct a survey of 
the articles in these newsletters and comb through various newspapers to see if any of the stories 
made publication. Here we shall simply note that similar newsletters appeared in other countries 
such as Canada
896
 and that contemporary Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish sources indicate that 
only 1/5 of the articles were used by the national press (mostly by the communists), primarily due to 
                                                 
896
 RA/UM.133.D.21/Legation Ottawa to UM no. 366 6.28.1955. 
167 
 
lack of relevance of the material in regards to the countries in question.
897
 It seems highly plausible 
that the situation was similar in regards to the Danish press. 
 
Booklets. Aside from the journals and newsletters APN published numerous booklets in Danish on 
a number of subjects. The following table includes all identifiable editions. 
 
Table 5.B: Publications per year: 
 
 
The earliest titles were printed as special editions of FOS. They are included in this list since they 
were published in the same format and style as later booklets. Early publications seem to have been 
fairly sporadic, whereas the 1980s was the highpoint of this form of printed cultural diplomacy. The 
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price was very low and seems to have only covered postage. In table 5.C. we have listed the 
booklets according to themes. 
Early publications were printed by the DKP printer Terpo-Tryk in Copenhagen, but gradually, 
although they were still printed in Danish, APN’ own printers in the USSR took over this part of the 
process. 
 
Table 5.C.: Booklet themes: 
 
 
 
Early publications contained speeches by party leaders like Nikita Khrushchev,
898
 Andrei 
Gromyko,
899
 and Leonid Brezhnev,
900
 or published various official party documents from various 
congresses
901
 or drafts of new party laws.
902
 Throughout the years various speeches
903
  and party 
documents
904
 were continually published. 
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As shown in table 5.C. the overwhelming number of publications dealt with various aspects of the 
USSR.
905
 Some were general presentations of the country through long lists of production numbers 
on industrial output, harvest figures and other agricultural production, goods transportation, foreign 
trade, salaries, living costs, apartment sizes, health care, and so on.
906
 Such booklets could be 
published in updated versions,
907
 or give rosy pictures of the USSR regarding a specific year.
908
 
Often they were framed as answering the most commonly asked questions by foreigners regarding 
the USSR.
909
 The numerous figures were intended not only to display the rising development 
figures, but also that living standards were higher and better than in capitalist countries.
910
 Another 
version of this sort of booklets included answers to questions on Soviet society. One such booklet 
was divided into several themed chapters: State, party, and trade unions, planning and employment, 
living standards, science, education, culture and sport, society and civil liberties. The first chapter 
explained both the qualities of living in a socialist society and the finer theoretical points on the 
difference between democratic centralism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, also seen in 
relation to the Soviet constitution. Others explained the value of the one-party system or the 
relationship between state and trade unions. The second chapter answered a wide variety of 
questions from the necessity to build the Baikal-Amur Railway to functions of kolkhozes and 
Sovkhozes, the procedures for producing forecasts on harvest results, the 1980 Olympics, the non-
existing unemployment, and the import relations with capitalist countries. Other answers denied that 
Soviet oil reserves could run dry or that the country could ever plummet into a financial crisis. The 
third chapter emphasized the high living standards in the USSR. The chapter on science answered 
questions both regarding the state planning of science research and environment protection. The 
following chapter highlighted the quality of education, sport, and culture through the frequently 
applied lens of quantitative figures of consumption. The final chapter showcased how civil liberties 
and minority rights were fully protected – in the special understanding of these questions with a 
Marxist-Leninist framework, that is.
911
 Again, several updated editions of the same volume could be 
published, and as such new editions could include new questions within the aforementioned 
themes.
912
 Some booklets dealt very specifically with a geographical area such as the Soviet 
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republic Turkmenia
913
 or Lithuania
914
 to prove that life had improved immensely for the local 
population by becoming part of the USSR. Production figures always formed the backbone of the 
arguments. Similarly, a booklet on the history of Leningrad emphasized higher living standards, 
industrial progress, and mass education in comparison with czarist times. Special emphasis was also 
placed on the sacrifices of the Soviet people regarding World War II and the siege of Leningrad.
915
 
Other booklets within this category dealt with a specific question of Soviet society. One example 
was a richly illustrated booklet on the Soviet education system. The booklet included an unending 
stream of figures on the number of students and schools all the way from kindergarten and pre-
school, through to public and secondary school and technical institutions and universities.
916
 Some 
proclaimed workers’ control over the means of production in the USSR,917 dealt with scientific 
progress
918
, student life,
919
 freedom of religion,
920
 freedom of speech,
921
 food production,
922
 or 
environmental protection.
923
  A 1982 booklet on Soviet living sums up the message in this category 
of booklets. The Soviet society was superior to capitalistic western societies by having a different 
democratic system that guaranteed the right to work, the right to health care, and the right to 
education, as well as socialist guarantees pensions, stable prices, housing, and day care for 
children.
924
 
The advent of Perestroika led to a new category of titles dealing with this theme including a 
presentation of Perestroika as the return to the original ideas coined by Lenin,
925
 an explanation of 
the basic principles of Perestroika by collecting answers given by leading party members at various 
press conferences,
926
 and a summary of Perestroika’s influence on positive changes in Soviet 
foreign and security policy.
927
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Perestroika could also lead to changes in the contents of booklets in the general Soviet category. For 
example, a booklet on informal youth groups in Leningrad including the question of youth 
unemployment 
928
 (both themes would have been unheard of prior to Perestroika
929
) was produced. 
One of the cases where the fixation on official figures becomes most evident is in the booklets 
concerning sport. More than anything they listed various sports, the number of active Soviet 
participants, and a list of medals won in international competitions, especially the Olympics.
930
 In 
one booklet on Soviet participation in Winter Olympics
931
 this kind of listing almost leaves the 
reader with a sense of Soviet bragging. 
Booklets on culture focused on production figures, socialist realism as genre, high art, mass 
participation, and the high cultural level of Soviet citizens.
932
 In one case the publication of a 
collection of Soviet children’s drawings was used to highlight the peaceful nature and intentions of 
the USSR.
933
 
We see a few examples of travel guides. One of them, published in cooperation with Intourist, 
included both classical elements of a travel guide: a short, basic presentation of the USSR, 
recommendations of sights in various cities, popular souvenirs forms of travels (from cruises to 
hunting trips), an account of the Intourist service desks at hotels and a list of phrases, but  also 
detailed descriptions of border and visa regulations, customs regulations, lists of banned goods 
(including any Soviet currency), the mandatory reception by Intourist guides at the border (and 
what to do if they were not there), regulations for photography and filming, including the ban on 
taking photographs from planes, filming, photographing, or drawing military installations, entire 
industrial cities, or anything whatsoever within 25 kilometers of the border.
934
 One of the travelers 
visiting the USSR was the West German peace activist Fritz Immele – the only non-Soviet author in 
the booklet series – who visited Moscow and Leningrad and wrote a glowing report of his 
impressions.
935
 
                                                 
928
 Sergej Nenasjev: Et ståsted i tilværelsen (Et portræt af uformelle ungdomsgrupper i Leningrad) (Moscow, 1990). 
929
 Grigorij Resnitjenko: Sovjetisk ungdom: Spørgsmål og svar (Moscow, 1980). 
A single booklet dealt with youth crime, but emphasized how a special department of the ministry of internal affairs had 
saved numerous children from engaging in a criminal career (Jurij Sjekotjihin: Ung på kant med loven (Mosvow, 1982). 
930
 Boris Khavin: Sport (1988); Vladimir Kirilljuk: Sport (Moscow, 1984); Oleg Spasskij: Under de fem olympiske 
ringe (Moscow, 1983). 
931
 Lev Lebedev: Fen ringe i sneen (vintersport i Sovjetunionen) (Moscow, 1987). 
932
 Gavriil Petrosjan: Kultur (Moscow, 1983); Kulturgoderne er folkets eje (Moscow, 1983). 
933
 Irina Bulekova: Verden set med børns øjne (Moscow, 1983). 
934
 Mihail Ananjev: Turist i Sovjetunionen: Råd og vink for udlændinge (Copenhagen, 1966). 
935
 Fritz Immele: Hvad jeg så i Moskva og Leningrad (Copenhagen, 1984). 
172 
 
Regarding Soviet foreign policy it is possible both to identify general works
936
 claiming the 
peaceful and cooperative nature and intentions of Soviet international relations and booklets dealing 
with specific themes. 
Naturally some existed to defend certain politics, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 
(explained as Soviet armed forces saving a grateful Czechoslovakian people from the evils of a 
counterrevolution).
937
 Others emphasized particular Soviet interests such as the respect of 
international borders, both those of the USSR
938
 and on an international scale.
939
 
A special sub-category within the genre of foreign policy was the booklets dealing with Soviet 
peace politics. They showcased the proclaimed image of the USSR as a peaceful nation by 
collecting Brezhnev speeches
940
 or published positive stories on Soviet active participation in 
disarmament and security conferences such as the 1975 Helsinki conference,
941
 as well as the 
following conference within the framework of the Helsinki accords,
942
 but also presented the 
difference between the Soviet peace policy and the aggressive US/NATO policy, both in regards to 
claims of illegal US buildup of chemical weapons
943
 and in campaigns against the implementation 
of the NATO double track decision.
944
 The deployment of SS-20s was explained as a necessary act 
of defense, whereas the American deployment was accused of being aggressive and the negotiation 
proposal as unfair.
945
 At one point APN published a translation of a booklet originally published by 
the publishing house of the Soviet Ministry of Defense that sought to document (through large 
amounts of figures) that the US was an aggressive player in world politics and as such the threat to 
world peace.
946
 Several publications attempted to convey this message by collecting various Soviet 
peace or disarmament proposals.
947
 
                                                 
936
 Vadim Sagladin: Omstilling og humanisering af de internationale relationer (Moscow, 1989); Sovjetunionens 
udenrigspolitik: Spørgsmål og svar (Moscow, 1984). 
937
 Svar på spørgsmål om Tjekkoslovakiet (Copenhagen, 1968). 
938
 Om den sovjetisk-kinesiske grænse: Erklæring fra den sovjetiske regering 13. juni 1969 (Copenhagen, 1969). 
939
 Stepan Molodtsov: Fred langs grænserne (Copenhagen, 1964); Ro om landegrænserne: Henvendelse fra 
Sovjetunionens statsminister N.S. Hrustjov til stats- og regeringschefer i hele verden (Copenhagen,1964). 
940
 L.I. Bresjnev: Stands rustningskapløbet!  Forebyg atomkrig! Begynd nedrustning!(Copenhagen, 1978). 
941
 K. Jurjev: Fredens vej – fornuftens vej (Copenhagen, 1976). 
942
 Jurij Kasjlev: Europa: 5 år efter Helsingfors-konferencen (Moscow, 1980); Ibid., I Helsinki-konferencens ånd: 10 år 
efter den fælleseuropæiske konference (Moscow, 1985).  
943
 Kemiske våben: Et gaskammer for menneskeheden: Dokumenter og kommentarer (Moscow, 1984). 
944
 Fjodor Burlatskij: Fred: Utopi eller realitet? (Moscow, 1982); Leonid Fjodorov: Hvorfor kaprustningen fortsætter 
(Moscow, 1983); Gennadij Gerasimov: Krig og fred i atomalderen (Moscow, 1982). 
945
 V.N. Popov: Europas selvmord? (Moscow, 1983). 
946
 Hvorfra trues freden? (Copenhagen, 1982). 
947
 Det sovjetiske program for styrkelse af freden og sikkerheden i Europa (Moscow, 1983); Sikkerhedspolitik ved 
korsvejen (Copenhagen, 1983); Sovjetunionens vigtigste nedrustningsforslag (Moscow, 1983). 
173 
 
A recurring Soviet propaganda slogan was the North (a term covering Scandinavia and nearby 
territories) as a nuclear free zone.
948
 During the 1980s peace campaigns against the NATO double 
track decision APN published booklets that framed protester against the NATO double track 
decision in a positive light.
949
 
Another theme dealt with various sides of the communist movement. One booklet gave an overview 
of the history of socialism,
950
 whereas another explained the basic theories of communism,
951
 or 
called for unity in the world communist movement – under the leadership of CPSU.952 Among the 
booklets framed in positive tones several described COMECON emphasizing the mutually 
beneficial sides of the organization.
953
 Booklets dealing with Maoism gave very negative 
assessments and argued that it deviated from the “correct” Soviet understanding of Marxism-
Leninism.
954
  
The Warsaw Pact was the theme of several booklets highlighting the military alliance as defensive 
and a force for world peace.
955
 
Several themes were covered within the field of history.  One series commemorated Lenin, 
especially in the year of the centennial of his birth, both by publishing official speeches on his 
importance,
956
 and a collection of memoirs from people who had met Lenin.
957
A recurring theme 
was the Soviet participation in World War II. In one case a former solider wrote about his memoirs 
of participating in the Soviet conquest of Berlin,
958
 another collected various Soviet texts on the 
reasons for the Soviet liberation of Bornholm.
959
 The Soviets also emphasized their country’s 
peaceful intentions by referring to their losses in the war.
960
 One of the booklets included in this 
World War II genre was a very unflattering biography of Hitler.
961
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In the same vein one booklet collected several newspaper articles that claimed to document the 
supposedly revanchist currents in West Germany, especially among former officers of the Nazi 
armies now serving in NATO.
962
 Another booklet criticized the acts of terror of Rote Arme Fraktion 
and other similar organizations in Western Europe based on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the 
means of mass mobilization of the people, declined any backing of such organizations, but claimed 
Chinese backing of them, and also found space to attack the alleged state terrorism of CIA in the 
third world.
963
 
Aside from these publications, booklets in English and Norwegian on subjects similar to those 
above were available to Danish readers.
964
  
In addition, the publishing houses Tiden and Sputnik (the DKSU book shop) published Danish 
language books provided by Progress.
965
 Examples are collections of speeches by Yuri Andropov 
(following his ascension to general secretary), a book on the history of Comintern, or a publication 
on behalf of the international front Generals for Peace and Disarmament.
966
 The Soviets also tried to 
influence the view of the USSR in textbooks for learning Russian as a foreign language by 
launching the publisher Russkii Iazyk.
967
 
 
BROADCASTING 
 
During the Cold War Radio Moscow operated a worldwide program for international broadcasts in 
foreign languages on a variety of short-wave and medium-wave frequencies.
968
 Between 1960 and 
1980 the weekly hours of broadcasting rose from 1046 to 2760.
969
 Danish broadcasts did not take 
up much of that time, and Denmark was mostly mentioned, for example in commentaries on the 
visit of Soviet cultural delegations
970
 or criticism of the Nordic Council during its meeting in 
Copenhagen.
971
 However, broadcasts in Russian were hindered by the language barrier, and for this 
reason we shall focus on the broadcasts in Danish. 
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Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in Danish. In 1943 Radio Moscow initiated two daily 15 minute 
broadcasts in Danish.
972
 Later they evolved into three daily broadcasts of 30 minutes each. 
Programming included several musical shows, various broadcasts on the economic, technical, and 
cultural development of the USSR, sport news, Q&A sessions, specialized programs on stamp 
collection or the workers’ movement, and a musical request program. Part of the schedule was 
made up of reruns.
973
  
Programming followed a weekly schedule of three daily broadcasts (17:00-17:30, 18:00-18:30, 
21:00-21:30). Monday’s programs covered all developments in the USSR, Tuesday’s programs 
carried news on scientific and technical developments and social and economic progress, a program 
on the development in other socialist countries was run on Wednesdays, whereas the second show 
of the day included the popular Letter Box with listeners’ questions, Thursday’s early programming 
targeted younger listeners, followed by a program with biographies of famous Soviet citizens, and  
the late program was a feature on music. Friday’s early broadcast rotated among other programs for 
stamp collectors, news from SUDK, or targeted either trade unionists or female listeners. Saturday’s 
broadcasting both reran the “letter box” and a feature on art and culture. Sunday included the 
program “Glimpses of the Soviet Union”, a feature on recent events in Moscow, and, the final 
Sunday of a month, the musical request program. Participants in Danish delegations visiting the 
USSR participated in some programs, and listeners were encouraged to send in questions for the 
Q&A show, suggestions for new programs, and requests for the musical request show.
974
 
By the 1970s, broadcasting decreased to twice a day for half an hour each time (18:00-18:30 and 
19:30-20:00) sent simultaneously on several frequencies. One daily program followed a schedule of 
news, comments on current events, and “Soviet panorama” on Soviet developments and summaries 
of speeches by Soviet politicians, cultural workers, scientists, other Soviet citizens, and participants 
in visiting delegations. From here the program varied, although regular features were news on 
scientific and technical developments, the letter box, Glimpse of the Soviet Union, musical features 
(both classical and folklore), and specified features for radio armatures, on the activities of SUDK, 
or “The Soviet Union through Danish eyes”.975 By the mid -1980s broadcasting had been collected 
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into a one hour daily broadcast in the evening (21:00-22:00) although this did not alter the contents 
of the broadcasts.
976
 
 Political commentary was, as we have seen, used in coordinated campaigns. One of these was the 
campaign against Denmark joining in the European Economic Recovery Program and later NATO, 
and at the time Radio Moscow broadcasted a number of very strongly worded attacks on the Danish 
government’s and especially the Danish Social-democratic party’s intention to join the American 
imperialists in a military alliance that a majority of the population, or so it was claimed, opposed.
977
 
Even when that battle had been lost commentators continued to claim that NATO membership was 
a bad choice for Denmark. For example, it was claimed that the reason for the high unemployment 
rate among Danish tobacco workers was the high consumption taxes to provide means for “war 
preparations”, in this case the building of new hangars.978 In another case, in a special broadcast to 
commemorate the anniversary of the Occupation of 1940 American NATO troops in Denmark were 
framed as the new Wehrmacht.
979
 
In a typical “letter box” broadcast in Mach 1966 the Q&A session answered question on income 
taxes and indoor ice skating rings (among other things). Between answers music was played, and 
the program ended with a quiz where listeners had to write in stating their opinion on the most 
important results of the 23
rd
 CPSU congress, their knowledge of the Luna-9 and Luna-10 space 
stations, and answer which Soviet cosmonauts had visited Denmark.
980
 
 
SCREENINGS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in 1962 DKSU decided to stop organizing screenings of Soviet movies 
in Danish due to a lack of interest among Danish viewers and a lack of quality movies. 
 
Soviet movie weeks. Therefore, the Soviet representation began to initiate screenings of Soviet 
movies for the Danish public. The 1975 movie week was at the in Grand Theatre in Copenhagen is 
a representative example of the form that they took. Four different Soviet feature films were 
screened for seven days with five daily showings.
981
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In addition to the movie weeks, those who were interested could borrow movies from the collection 
of the Soviet embassy.
982
 
 
EXHIBITIONS AND PUBLIC LECTURES 
 
Movies aside, inside Denmark the most direct forms of contact between official Soviet 
representatives and the Danish public were visual presentations through exhibitions or oral 
presentations through public lectures. In some cases they were combined. 
 
Exhibitions. The Soviets organized both large and smaller touring exhibitions. The largest and 
most famous is the industrial exhibition hold at Forum in Copenhagen between June 25
th
-July 11
th
 
1954. The exhibited items included consumer goods, food stuffs and machines with an view to 
increase Danish-Soviet trade relations.
983
 20 years later The State Committee for Technology and 
Science organized an exhibition of Soviet products and simultaneously organized a string of public 
lectures.
984
  
Smaller touring exhibitions often consisted of children’s drawings. In 1971 an exhibition of Soviet 
children’s drawings was held at the public library in Nyborg.985 In 1973 another exhibition of 
children’s drawing on a world tour made a stop in Denmark, where they were exhibited in public 
libraries in Aarhus, Hvidovre, Odense, and (supposedly) in Sønderborg.
986
 The same year saw the 
opening of a photo exhibition in Rønne commemorating the 50
th
 anniversary of the establishment of 
the USSR.
987
 In 1978 another Soviet photo exhibition opened in Horsens.
988
 The Soviet ambassador 
participated in the openings of some exhibitions. At the opening of the aforementioned photo 
exhibition in Odense ambassador Yegorychev used the opportunity to promote Soviet peace 
politics.
989
 
 
Public lectures. In addition to the exhibitions, Soviet diplomats traveled the lecture trail. In 
February and March 1963, attaché S.  Zhuralev gave 21 lectures in as many Jutland cities at public 
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schools, high schools, and seminars on the theme “Cultural developments in the USSR” to a 
combined audience 2350 persons, organized by the private impresario ARTE The lecture also 
included the screening of two documentaries and more than 7000 pieces of information materials 
were handed out. The lectures were followed by questions from the audience, usually not on the 
topic of the lecture, but on whatever themes regarding the USSR were currently under discussion in 
Danish media. Zhuralev concluded that the general level of knowledge among members of the 
Danish public on the USSR was very low. He concluded that the lecture tour had been a success 
because the embassy had reached a new audience that had formerly not been reached by the 
information service of the Soviet embassy.
990
 Local DKSU branches also took advantage of the 
offer of a lecturer from the Soviet Embassy. In 1979 DKSU Ålborg invited a lecturer to speak on 
“Soviet foreign and security policies”991 and the following year first secretary Komisarov answered 
the question “Does the USSR pose a threat to world peace?”.992 The next year DKSU Ålborg 
invited an embassy representative to participate in the Soviet cultural days (to be discussed in 
Chapter 7) including the opening of an exhibition at Hobro Library. At the opening ceremony of the 
exhibition he talked about the importance of Soviet-Danish cultural relations and offered the library 
a gift of photo albums on life in the USSR. Over the following days DKP Ålborg and DKSU 
Ålborg invited him to speak on the Soviet position on the NATO double track decision.
993
  
 
EXCHANGES 
 
Several Danish-Soviet activities do not fall within any of the categories in this or other chapters. 
The year 1956 is a very good example of this. In addition to all of the various forms of cultural 
diplomacy activities discussed in this dissertation 1956 was the year of a soccer match in Moscow 
and a match in Copenhagen, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikoian spoke at the Student Society’s 
building, Prime and Foreign Minister H.C. Hansen visited the USSR in March, and in May a 
Danish parliamentary delegation visited the USSR with the parliament chairman Gustav Pedersen 
as head of delegation. Moreover, the first group of Soviet tourist since the start of the Cold War 
visited Denmark, Soviet athletes participated in an international meeting in Copenhagen, the Soviet 
navy visited Copenhagen and docked at Langelinie and the Danish frigates Esbern Snare and 
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Valdemar Sejr paid a visit to Leningrad, a bilateral agreement on emergency rescue in The Baltic 
Sea was signed, the route Leningrad-Helsinki-Stockholm-Copenhagen-London operated by the 
Soviet passenger ship Viacheslav Molotov opened, Aeroflot opened the route Moscow-Riga-
Copenhagen with two weekly departures (SAS flew out of Stockholm), and a two-year trade 
agreement was signed.
994
 
Likewise, in 1973 a group of Danish children played chess with peers in a cultural palace in 
Moscow. They received the invitation through the Danish Chess Association, and the Soviet 
children paid a similar visit to Denmark.
 995
 
More activities began to take place within the framework of the bilateral state cultural agreements, 
despite Danish reluctance to engage in formal agreements finding them unnecessary and too costly. 
Prior to the Danish-Soviet agreement, Denmark had only signed cultural agreements with Italy (in 
order to establish a cultural institute in Rome) and Belgium (to accommodate an old Belgian desire 
in the light of Belgian dissatisfaction with Danish non-participation in the 1958 Brussels World 
Fair).
996
 Denmark wished for a pure framework agreement with emphasis on state controlled 
student exchanges and privately controlled cultural events.
997
 When deciding to enter into a cultural 
agreement with the USSR, Denmark closely coordinated with its NATO partners in the special 
NATO Working Group for East-West Cultural Contacts, established on British initiative in 1960 
with the purpose of holding an annual meeting to coordinate, discuss and exchange experiences on 
cultural contacts with the Eastern Bloc.
998
 When Denmark finally signed a cultural agreement in 
1962 this also took place in adherence with the common opinion in the working group that the 
cultural exchange programs could also be utilized for influencing on Soviet intellectuals or keep the 
cultural exchange programs out of the grasp of communist dominated organizations.
999
 When the 
national librarian tried to further an exchange of librarians under the cultural agreement by stating 
that DKSU was an another option he was told that Denmark was a country with freedom of 
assembly, but that the Foreign Ministry wished for exchanges to take place within the framework of 
the official cultural agreement, not through some sectarian movement.
1000
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Denmark succeeded in closely adhering to the above line. Concerts by the Leningrad Philharmonics 
or soloists, ballet or dance performances by the Bolshoi Theater or dance troupes, and staging of the 
Obratsov Puppet Theater were organized by private impresarios. In addition, Soviet performers 
were invited to the annual Royal Danish Ballet and Opera Festival, a soviet guest composer was 
invited by the Danish Composers’ Association, an exhibition of photos of Moscow was organized 
in Copenhagen City Hall, reciprocal film weeks were organized, cooperation between Denmark and 
Soviet Russian language teachers started, various exchanges among clergy, youth, architects, actor 
students took place, and school textbooks were exchanged as well. Only the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia put a temporary hold on the exchange programs.
1001
 During the early 1970s the 
exchange programs developed even further with a 1970 agreement on exchanges of programs 
between Gosteleradio and Danish Broadcasting Union,
1002
 a 1971 agreement between the Niels 
Bohr Institute and The Soviet Academy of Sciences,
1003
 and the emphasis on scientific cooperation 
was emphasized in the new bi-annual programs on the developing of the cultural agreement signed 
in the 1970s and prioritized these exchanges over the advancement of artistic guest performances or 
exchanges between  youth, sports, and cultural NGOs.
1004
 
The focal point of the cultural agreement was the student exchange program. Denmark prioritized 
the establishment of Russian language classes in high school and tried to send as many young 
students of Russian studies as possible to the USSR to increase the skill level of future teachers.
1005
 
The student exchange program came into action as early as the academic year 1959/60 with 2 
scholarships each for the academic years 1959/60, 1960/61, 1961/62.
1006
 
As seen in Table 5.D the program grew throughout the 1960s with more scholarships and the 
addition of opportunities for researchers (which was the primary interest of the Soviets who gave 
scholarships solely for researchers).  Whereas Denmark almost exclusively sent students and 
scholars from within the humanities (all students and four out of six scholars in 1970/71), the 
Soviets primarily send scholars of natural sciences.  Four out of five students in 1971/72 studied  
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Table 5.D: Danish-Soviet student and researcher scholarship exchange programs 1962-1972:
1007
 
 
 
 
within the field of natural sciences. This primary interest of the Soviet side is confirmed in a report 
by the Niels Bohr Institute  for theoretical physics that listed 40 visiting Soviet scholars between 
1957 and 1970.
1008
 
One former Soviet visiting scholar who visited in the1980s has explained that he entered a special 
exchange program for young scholars (under the age of 35 and with a PhD degree) within the field 
of natural sciences. A call was published at his institution and he had to fill out an application and 
write a project description. Following the sorting several applicants were invited to Moscow to pass 
a Q&A session in front of a panel with 20 members primarily based on the academic merits of their 
suggested project. Following a second sorting the successful applicant had to pass an English test 
(following a brush-up crash course) and a test on their knowledge of the recipient country. Then, the 
Danish side had to approve the applicants. If approved the applicants had a briefing on how to 
behave themselves and were handed an emergency phone number to the Soviet embassy. The 
family had to stay behind. Upon returning home he had to fill out a report on the results of the 
scholarship, participate in an oral debriefing, and pass an AIDS test.
1009
  
In addition to the official exchange program DKSU received 2-3 Soviet funded scholarships to be 
awarded to students of Russian studies at Danish universities each. In 1961 DKSU could award one 
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10 month scholarship,
1010
 which evolved to two
1011
 and later three.
1012
  DKSU was also charged 
with awarding Soviet funded scholarships to summer schools in the USSR for foreign teachers of 
Russian as a foreign language.
1013
 A Danish participant described the summer school. The 
participants were divided into groups based on their proficiency in Russian. The course followed a 
strict schedule of daily oral exercises, a lecture, excursions, homework, and a minimum of four 
visits to the theater. Sundays and Mondays were kept free for full-day excursions.
1014
   
DKP and DKU sent party members for schooling for shorter or longer periods (14 days to a full 
year) in the USSR
1015
 and other socialist countries each year, but this falls beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. DKP’s cultural committee had additional scholarships for scholars who were party 
members and wished to continue their studies in the USSR.
1016
  
Beginning in 1957, as part of the Danish-Soviet cultural agreement Soviet guest lecturers worked at 
the Slavic Studies Centers of Danish Universities teaching languages classes.
1017
 Their salary was 
paid by the Danish side.
1018
 The Russian guest lecturers evolved into four positions, two at the 
University of Copenhagen and one at Aarhus and Odense University respectively.
1019
 
 
RECEPTION 
 
In this chapter various forms of direct Soviet state activities towards the Danish public have been 
discussed. The final part of the chapter will discuss how the public perceived these activities. 
 
Critical listeners. If we are to believe internal reports Radio Moscow listeners were highly satisfied 
with the quality of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts.1020 But the many examples of criticism voiced by 
Danish listeners
1021
 present another picture.  
DKP chairman Aksel Larsen put Christian Frahm in charge of listening to and reporting on the 
Danish broadcasts of Radio Moscow. Frahm sharply criticized the poor sound quality of the 
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broadcasts. Additionally he criticized the impossibility of following world news solely by listening 
to Radio Moscow, the poor language skills of some of the speakers, and the clear tone of boredom 
in their voices when they read the texts. Overall, he found the news shows tedious and lengthy. The 
responses in the radio letter box program where Danish listeners could ask questions about the 
USSR were often rather nebulous, and the propaganda was so crude that it hindered rather than 
promoted Soviet views.
1022
 This was not the first letter of its kind where Aksel Larsen forwarded or 
cited Frahm’s comments. In 1954 he had forwarded identical criticism of the poor quality of both 
the contents and sound.
1023
 But despite promises to improve both,
1024
 nothing happened. In the 
1960s listener Ole Friis also complained about the technical difficulties,
1025
 and the press service of 
the Danish Foreign Ministry also found it troublesome to monitor and transcribe broadcasts because 
their listener could not hear everything said due to the poor sound quality.
1026
 
 
Critical readers. At various points, the Danish readership voiced dissatisfaction with the lack of 
quality of articles in FOS. According to the criticism it did not contain information of value or 
interest to Danish readers because the editorial line did not reflect the interests of Danish readers, 
but Soviet interests. It was suggested that the journal should be edited by Danes.
1027
 
DKSU members were not alone in voicing this critique. A journalist wrote that FOS should be 
renamed "Facts on the Soviet Paradise" and after referencing the latest issue about happy Soviet 
children swimming, sledding, making dolls, and cutting Christmas garlands, the invention of 
growth hormones that would make the Soviet chickens as fat as those in America or Australia, and 
the result of the national Soviet acrobatics championships concluded:  
 
"The Soviet propaganda magazines are perhaps not much worse than the corresponding publications from the western 
democratic states, and obviously it must be the propagandists own problem that they mainly write for the paper baskets. 
But it would certainly be a lot more interesting, if they also sometimes pointed out that not all conditions in the great 
Soviet Union are so idyllic".
1028
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In 1988 the director of the APN office in Copenhagen, Sergei Serebriakov, stated that FOS had a 
circulation of 11,000 copies, but only 4000 paying subscribers. He promised that in the future FOS 
would reflect the interests of Danish readers.
1029
 The following year, in connection with the change 
of name to Glasnost, he stated that a survey of readers had shown that only 1/4 of the readers were 
women and that very few young people read the journal. The journal was under strong economic 
pressure and in desperate need of more subscribers to survive after it lost its automatic deficit 
guarantee from Moscow.
1030
 In 1991 the journal folded. This indicates that although Danes were 
listed as editors the editorial line was in reality decided by APN in Moscow and implemented by the 
director of the APN office in Copenhagen, and that the Soviet officials ignored the complaints by 
the Danish readership year after year and as such were unable to attract interest outside the circle of 
the usual suspects. 
 
Critical viewers. Another point of Danish criticism considered the screenings of Soviet films. In 
1954 DKP and DKSU vice-chairman Alfred Jensen bluntly stated that Soviet war movies did not 
interest Danish movie goers, partly because they lacked Danish dubbing or, at least, subtitles, partly 
because Danish viewers were uninterested in Soviet black and white war movies.
1031
 DKSU 
repeated these complaints on several occasions in the presence of the VOKS representative in 
Denmark
1032
 Interestingly, the Icelandic-Soviet Friendship Society apparently avoided war movies 
if possible.
1033
 As we have seen in chapter 4, in the end DKSU dropped screenings of Soviet films. 
Once again, DKSU was not alone in its critique. In 1958 a journalist attended a screening organized 
by the Soviet embassy of two documentaries, the first on Sputnik and the second on the 40
th
 
anniversary of October. The journalist concluded about the latter that the showcasing of raw force 
through images of marching soldiers in the Red Square parade completely eroded the repeated 
message of the Soviet cultural diplomacy on the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy.
1034
 
 
The angry minister of culture and the smiling starman. During the Cold War Denmark received 
prominent Soviet visitors on numerous occasions. To conclude this section on reception of direct 
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Soviet cultural diplomacy we shall therefore discuss two examples of such visits, one successful 
and one unsuccessful and discuss the reasons for their success or failure. 
 
Furtseva 1961. In 1961 the Soviet minister of cultural affairs Yekaterina Furtseva visited Denmark 
on her way to Iceland. In Denmark she was invited by DKSU to speak at a meeting in the Students 
Society’s building in Copenhagen. Even newspapers other than Land og Folk had great expectations 
of the visit and she was described in flattering tones.
1035
  When she visited Prime Minister Viggo 
Kampmann newspaper reports stated that she had charmed him.
1036
 She was the guest of honour at a 
dinner given by minister of culture Julius Bomholt.
1037
 Her finest moment came when receiving the 
Bodil award on behalf of Soviet film director Grigorii Chukhrais for best European movie.
1038
 
However, all of this changed when she gave her lecture. At first things went well. Furtseva spoke 
mainly on the Soviet help to Denmark in defeating German fascism and the liberation of the island 
of Bornholm, her admiration for famous Danish artists, and the high level of Soviet cultural life 
(measured in quantitative figures).
1039
 However, after her lecture a student dared to ask her why 
Boris Pasternak’s Nobel Prize winning book Doctor Zhivago had not been published in the USSR 
so the Soviet public could read it and make up their own minds about on the book. Furtseva lost her 
temper and answered: “Why do you think that you are smarter than the Soviet people? If a Soviet 
citizen slanders his own country who can blame us for not exactly clapping our hands?” She also 
claimed that Pasternak had been allowed to live in peace and that he had been given 100,000 
roubles so he could live well, but he had decided to sit behind a high fence so he could not see what 
took place in the country. 
This performance from the minister destroyed the positive image in the Danish press completely. 
Formerly, the newspapers had praised her in high tones but now they thought that she had given 
away her true face as one of the evil rulers of the evil Soviet Empire. This negative framing reached 
numerous national and local newspapers.
1040
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Alas, the memory of the press is short. When Furtseva visited Denmark in 1964 things went more 
quietly and the trip included visits to the H.C. Andersen Museum
1041
 and questions on her opinion 
on the upcoming state visit of Khrushchev to Denmark.
1042
 During her third and final visit in 1971 
she was flatteringly referred to as Catherine the Third, the empress of Soviet cultural life.
1043
 
 
Gagarin 1962. One part of a systemic conflict consists of a struggle over international prestige. The 
space race was one of the battle fields in this struggle. The USSR scored the early victories thanks 
to the October 1957 launch of Sputnik and by sending the first man into space in 1961.
1044
 The man 
of the hour to secure this cultural diplomatic victory was the cosmonaut Yurii Gagarin, and 
following his flight into space he was send on a worldwide PR tour.
1045
 
In September 1962 Gagarin’s world tour brought him to Denmark as DKSU’s guest1046 –much to 
the frustration of the Danish foreign ministry which for political reasons avoided contacts with 
DKSU.
1047
 The frustrations grew even greater when it became known that DKSU had succeeded in 
securing Gagarin an audience with the king.
1048
 In the end the ministry had to host an official dinner 
for Gagarin.
1049
 
During his stay Gagarin visited the Carlsberg breweries, the B&W shipyards, an observatory, 
several exhibitions, and participated in DKSU’s congress, a public meeting, and a DKU 
meeting.
1050
 
Nina Krymova of Radio Moscow fame was in Denmark during Gagarin’s visit and later stated that 
it had been an enormous success with massive cheering crowds in the streets and that the visit had 
done much to improve the Danish-Soviet relationship.
1051
 
For once, a Soviet cultural diplomat did not exaggerate. Danish newspapers overflowed with 
positive coverage of the visit and the way he conducted himself, especially during a TV 
interview.
1052
 The popular celebration of Gagarin was repeated when he insisted on visiting Odense 
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outside of the regular program. He was driven in triumph through streets full of cheering crowds, 
visited the H.C. Andersen Museum (the purpose for the sojourn to Odense), and was received at 
city hall.
1053
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The propaganda value of Furtseva’s 1961 visit to Denmark was lost due to one angry reaction to 
one innocent question (by the standards of any democratic country) because Furtseva’s reaction 
confirmed an already widely spread image of Soviet leaders, whereas Gagarin’s visit was a success, 
not only because of the admiration for his accomplishment, but also because of his ability to engage 
with wide circles of the Danish public. This goes to show that the way Soviet representatives acted 
hugely influenced the possibility of changing the “us-them” discourse of the general non-
communist public. 
Based on the examples not only of these two visits but of the entire variety of cultural diplomacy 
efforts directly executed by Soviet state representatives in Denmark, we have to question the effect. 
Danish recipients continuously over a long period of time voiced the same complaints many times, 
and the reason they had to repeat them was that the Soviet cultural diplomats did not pay attention 
to the complaints, but carried on regardless. It seems to have been more important to carry out the 
Soviet planned programs to the letter than to tailor the cultural diplomacy to the Danish market. 
This made it very difficult to attract Danish interest to the messages of the Soviet state. 
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Chapter 6: The hum-drum years, 1957-1974 
 
"I am not satisfied with our activities. 
 Usually they are a bore and our facilities are disgusting. 
 They do not attract new members or young people ". 
Stig Surland
1054
 
 
 
In this chapter we shall discuss the 1956-1958 reform of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus 
and whether or not in had any influence or lasting effect, how the perception of the USSR following 
the events in Hungary in 1956 and 1958 influenced cultural contacts, and why fellow-travellers 
choose to remain members of the Danish front and friendship organizations, the activities of these 
organizations, and their possible impact.  
 
REFORM? 
 
Prior to the Hungarian events of 1956 the Soviet leadership had initiated a reform of the cultural 
diplomacy apparatus with the purpose of broadening contacts and increasing the activity level 
amongst both Soviet participants and foreigners. As the developments were set in motion prior to 
1956 this revival was supposed to be realized at the most difficult moment for the possibility of a 
positive reception during the Cold War. One of the most important events to promote this change in 
Soviet cultural diplomacy policy was the 1957 Moscow youth festival.
1055
 
 
Identifying the sore spot. In the mid-1950s, a string of critical reports made it clear that the system 
was failing. One report stated that the Soviet apparatus, in contrast to the American, was too 
decentralized and uncoordinated. It identified the need for an overall coordinating organization for 
radio broadcasts, book and pamphlet publication, and export of films with a ministerial mandate.1056  
Another report stated that under the current system the various organizations did not keep each 
other informed of their efforts in various countries, and that TASS in particular should improve on 
the exchange of information with other organizations, as this lack of information made activities 
ineffective. It also pointed to the need for an overall coordinated effort and an overall master plan, 
preferably through the creation of a new governmental body with an overall coordinating functions. 
The quality of political work, the contents of print media and distribution needed improvement 
                                                 
1054
 ABA/DKSU/34/DKSU Copenhagen Congress minutes 1.26.1963. 
1055
 Gilburd, 362-401. 
1056
 РГАНИ/5/28/383/1-5/Председатель Совинформбюро П. Поздеев Д.Т. Шепилову 1.10.1956. 
189 
 
through a reduction of quantity and a new emphasis on quality. Radio broadcasts to foreign 
countries needed to play a greater role, and the technical quality had to improve. More press 
conferences for foreign journalists were needed.  
There was also a need for well-argued books on political questions for publication abroad. 1057 
A third report, intended for the CC, included six concrete proposals for necessary improvement. As 
such it tells something about what was not functioning. TASS needed to improve business relations 
with foreign wire services. A journalists’ association should be established. All written materials 
published abroad should be scrutinized. It should be possible to set up collective publishing houses 
in cooperation with foreign publishers abroad for the publication of political literature and fiction in 
foreign languages. Regular press conferences with Western correspondents should be organized to 
tell about living conditions in the Soviet Union. Counterpropaganda operations abroad should be 
improved. 1058 
Reports by colonel P. Mazur written directly to Suslov
1059
 and Bulganin
1060
 argued that 
 
the world 
had changed since the founding of VOKS, but since VOKS had been unable to adapt to the 
changing world its organization and methods were now obsolete. Based on this line of argument, 
the reports suggested a number of needed changes in the organizations and operation of 
international friendship and cultural relations. These were: Organize a new association for 
friendship with foreign peoples, reorganize VOKS to be in correspondence with the current needs in 
a new world, create a periodical press of the friendship associations, create an international 
friendship prize, establish a friendship palace in Moscow, make active use of the friendship 
association in the propaganda for Soviet progress, the idea of peace, and peaceful coexistence, and 
to utilize the friendship association for the international education of the Soviet working class and 
for mass education in foreign languages. The reports were forwarded to VOKS to be incorporated 
into the work-in-progress on its reorganization.
1061
   
The question made it into the upper CPSU circles. Boris Ponomarev wrote a report based on the 
results of the findings of an ad-hoc CC commission and forwarded it to Molotov. Again, the need 
for the creation of a single national body for the coordination of foreign propaganda and cultural 
relations was highlighted. The body should not only manage and coordinate the propaganda work of 
the respective ministries and agencies, but also the operational organization, planning and 
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execution, which would allow for a much more focused effort with associated reduction of resource 
wastage. 1062 
On this basis a draft regulation from the Central Committee "About methods for improving the 
Soviet propaganda against foreign countries" was prepared. The numerous surviving copies in the 
archives suggest that it was circulated for comments.1063 
Based on these works a new report entitled "Some observations on the organization of propaganda 
abroad" concluded that experience showed that propaganda worked best if the target group had 
been identified and it operated within in a frame that in a coordinated form utilized all modern mass 
media; radio, press, film, tourism, exchange of cultural delegations, etc. The solution would be the 
creation of a powerful, centralized, yet very flexible mechanism that worked in strict accordance 
with CC instructions, but without constantly having to seek permission for routine activities when 
coordinating radio broadcasts, the publication of written materials by TASS, the exchange of 
cultural and scientific delegations and tourist groups, film business and the operation of libraries..  
The body would also be held accountable for the results. It was emphasized that the committee 
could not function effectively unless supplied with sufficient resources, although no concrete 
amount was mentioned.1064 
The reports are very interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, recommendations repeatedly 
identified the sore spots of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus and describe an inflexible and 
uncoordinated apparatus where the individually participating organizations had very strict, 
hierarchical lines of command, but did not know what other similar organizations were doing in the 
same geographical space as themselves. Secondly, one can glean from the reports that the principle 
of adopting cultural diplomacy to the circumstances of the receiving country had ultimately not 
been followed. 
Another interesting feature of the reports is the absence of considerations of the consequences of the 
actual Soviet actions, such as the crushing of the uprising in Hungary, on the potential impact of 
Soviet cultural diplomacy and its efficiency. For example, the drawn-up plan for Soviet radio 
propaganda aimed at influencing the outcome of the Danish general election in 1957 in favor of 
DKP consisted of the familiar themes of development rates, Soviet peace versus the aggressiveness 
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of NATO and the United States, and the ever existing friendship between Denmark and the Soviet 
Union, but made no mention whatsoever of the negative reactions to the Hungarian events.
1065
 
Finally, we have to note that despite the reshuffling, it does not appear that there were any 
substantial changes in the methods used in the planning and implementation of cultural diplomacy 
towards Denmark, or that the system had been made more flexible, quite the contrary. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, some parts of the apparatus (VOKS/SSOD) had been given new acronyms, and new 
bodies such as GKKS and the Soviet bilateral friendship societies were added to the already 
overflowing pool. The primary result was a power struggle between the party apparatus and the 
government apparatus with the new coordinating entity on the losing side.
1066
  
The attempt at reconstruction of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus leave us with the intriguing 
impression that although some Soviet observers were able to pinpoint exactly what was 
malfunctioning in the Soviet cultural diplomacy, the system and its activities were continued and 
carried on more or less on the same track until the very end of the USSR. in the mid-1960s the same 
systemic errors as earlier could be identified.
1067
 
 
HUNGARY 1958 
 
As a result of the Soviet suppression of the uprising in Hungary the Danish Sports Federation (DIF) 
introduced a blockade on sports relations with Soviet and Hungarian athletes in 1956.
1068
 The ban 
was lifted in January 1958 due to an international swim meeting being held in Denmark. DIF was 
concerned about whether the Soviets were prepared to resume sports relations, but the Soviet side 
expressed its preparedness
 1069 
and sports relations became a focal point for Soviet cultural 
diplomacy towards Denmark for a short period. 
 
Danish-Soviet sports relations. Knud Lundberg was among the Danish sports commentators, who 
expressed considerable joy when the sports blockade ended. He was aware that the USSR might 
exploit victories in their propaganda, but on the other hand it could be important for the possible 
Soviet democratization that Soviet athletes were allowed to see foreign countries regardless of their 
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political beliefs, allowing them to see the Western world, so they could go home and tell others that 
Danish children had clothes to wear, and despite capitalism were not completely different from 
Soviet children. One should not underestimate the importance of sport to objective information, so 
it was one of few opportunities to stamp the propaganda as lies. For these reasons he considered it 
worth resetting the relations.
 1070
 
Planned exchanges for 1958 included football, table tennis, cycling, handball, tennis, swimming, 
and boxing matches.
1071
 
In May the Soviet soccer team Zenith from Leningrad visited Denmark and played several matches. 
Various Danish teams were invited to play Zenith in Leningrad, but the invitation came too late, and 
one Danish club did not want to travel to the USSR due to the tense international situation.
1072
 
Soviet table tennis players participated in an international meeting,
 1073 and boxers in an international meeting in 
Aarhus,1074
 while Danish swimmers competed in a meeting with Soviet swimmers in Leningrad.
 1075
 
However, a handball match
1076
 and a tennis match
1077
 were canceled with reference to the tense 
international situation. Six Soviet cyclists did not show up for a race in Sorgenfri, officially because 
they had become ill. The angered race organizers considered seeking financial compensation. The 
press covered the absence in critical tones.
 1078 
 
As we shall see, their sudden illness was a direct result of the tense international situation. 
 
A friendship of broken windows. On November 4
th
 1956 Imre Nagy and members of his 
government sought refuge in the Yugoslavian embassy in Budapest, and on 10 November 10
th
 
Yugoslavia granted Nagy asylum. Following long negotiations the Soviets managed to convince the 
Yugoslavians that Nagy would not be prosecuted, and the Embassy agreed to let Nagy and former 
government members travel to Romania. As soon as they had left the embassy, they were arrested. 
The Hungarian Kadar government appointed Nagy as the person responsible for the "counter-
revolution" of 1956 and, for good measure, added a charge of treason. In February 1958 court 
proceedings finally started, but the Soviets put them on hold due to the impending Soviet-American 
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summit and a desire not to aggravate relations with Yugoslavia further. The case was not resumed 
until June 13th, and on June 16
th
, Nagy and several others were sentenced to capital punishment. 
The sentences were promptly carried out.
1079
 
The executions caused outrage in the West and also in Denmark.
 1080
  The flag flew at half pole at 
many private and public buildings - with the exception of state institutions, but including 
Copenhagen, Frederiksberg and several surrounding municipalities’ town halls. The Social-
democrats and the Conservative party played a particularly active role in organizing this when news 
of the executions became known.
 1081
 The Danish Association of World Federalists, The UN 
Association, and The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom called for the Danish 
government to condemn the executions.
1082
 The non-communist press condemned the executions as 
political murders.
1083
  Demonstrations took place in Copenhagen, one of them in front of the DKP 
building organized by DSU with a few hundred participants with red banners chanting “Free 
Hungary”. The police cleared the street and stone throwing demonstrators were immediately 
arrested. Speeches were given and a resolution condemning the sentences adopted before the 
demonstration quietly disbanded.
 1084
A completely different atmosphere prevailed at the 
demonstration Hungarian students in Copenhagen (a group of about 50) organized in front of the 
Soviet Embassy. Initially the demonstrators attempted unsuccessfully to deliver a letter of protest. 
Then the situation escalated. The few Hungarian students soon turned into a bigger crowd (about 30 
Hungarian students, some 100 Danish, and a few hundred spectators). Bonfires were lit in the street, 
cries in Russian demanded that the Russians leave Hungary, and stones were thrown at the 
embassy, smashing several windows. Riot police were called in to protect the embassy and clear the 
street. Later in the evening protesters with a Hungarian flag wrapped in mourning crepe marched to 
the Hungarian embassy in Hellerup. However, the police were prepared for their arrival and after 
the protesters had sung the Hungarian national anthem the street was cleared.
1085
 Danish newspaper 
condemned the smashing of windows in the Soviet embassy.
1086
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The Soviets reacted harshly. TASS issued a statement that a band of hooligans protected by Danish 
police had attacked the embassy shouting insults and throwing rocks. The statement also criticized 
Danish authorities for not sufficiently protecting the embassy.
1087
 
Foreign minister Gromyko summoned the Danish ambassador in Moscow, Alexis Mørch to protest, 
a protests note was sent to the Danish foreign ministry, the Danish foreign ministry officially 
apologized and promised to have the windows replaced, charge d’affaires Fedor Mikhailov 
demanded a meeting with the foreign ministry’s director Niels Svenningsen, but never showed 
up.
1088
 
Only the communist daily Land og Folk supported the Soviet view of hooliganism, that justice had 
been served for the good of the Hungarian people, and that Danish police had not interfered during 
the window smashing because only communists had been hurt.
1089
 The non-communist press 
ridiculed the latter accusation.
1090
 
The USSR found another way to demonstrate its discontent. On June 21
st
 a so-called spontaneous 
demonstration was organized outside the Danish Embassy in Moscow with the participation of 200-
300 workers and employees of factories and companies in Moscow, as it was stated in a TASS 
telegram. The demonstrators threw inkwells and eggs at the embassy, so that all of the windows of 
the Danish Embassy building were smashed. The protesters wrote "Down with the imperialist war 
provocateurs", "Down with the imperialist lackeys", and "Long live the Hungarian government" on 
the embassy wall. The protesters carried slogans such as "Shame on the Danish NATO lackeys", 
"Down with the fascists" and "Down with NATO". According to Radio Moscow the demonstration 
was the "Soviet peoples’ resolute protest against the shameful provocations in Copenhagen". Only 
when all of the windows had been shattered did mounted police disband the demonstration that 
lasted approximately three hours. When the protesters arrived in front of the embassy, ambassador 
Mørch telephoned the Soviet foreign ministry, but he was told that Gromyko could not be disturbed 
because of an ongoing conference with the king of Nepal, who was on an official visit. When 
Mørch spoke on the telephone with chief of protocol F.F. Molochkov, he claimed not to know of 
any demonstration in front of the Danish Embassy. Alexis Mørch formally protested to the Soviet 
chief of protocol over the riots in front of the Danish Embassy. He expressed his regrets but pointed 
out that it had been young people and that they were angry after hearing what had happened at the 
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Soviet embassy in Copenhagen. Molochkov offered to replace all damaged equipment.
1091
 In 
Denmark, Prime and Foreign minister H.C. Hansen summoned charge d'affaires Mikhailov to 
convey his serious regret over what happened in Moscow and its expectation that the Soviet 
authorities would take appropriate steps to ensure that such events would not reoccur in the 
future.
1092
 
In an editorial, Dagens Nyheder hit the nail on the head: 
 
"Politics can sometimes be a strange thing. Soviet Russian politics are the strangest one can imagine. At the moment it 
seems to be under the formula an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and a window for a window / ... / “Demonstrators 
appeared, even without having seen them we almost dare to say: In good order and with the right ideological setting, in 
front of the Danish embassy in Moscow, shouted what they should, and smashed the windows that should be smashed / 
... / Now, all that remains is for the  Danish side to send a protest note to Moscow. There is an easy task. You take, as it 
says in the cooking book terminology, the Soviet note of the day before yesterday and everywhere that speaks of 
‘hostile and insulting exclamations about the Soviet Union’ shall be inserted in place of the Soviet Union the word 
‘Denmark’, and wherever it talks about ‘provocations against the Soviet embassy’ it is to be replaced with ‘the Danish 
Embassy.’ What remains is simply to count the broken windows after parity and mutually agree on glazier costs, as well 
as a silent astonishment over applied Soviet diplomacy".
1093
 
 
Politiken pursued a similar line: 
 
“Window for window when friendship must be kept, seems to have been the parole that yesterday in Moscow moved 
young protesters, the type probably no better or worse than those in Copenhagen, to give the Danish embassy raw 
realism. It is a form of diplomatic dialogue you hate to see carried on”.1094 
 
The outcry of the general public following the events in Hungary in 1956 and 1958 are very telling 
examples how the Soviet attempts to alter the Danish popular perception of the USSR through 
cultural diplomacy in the form of high culture or sport failed. Ordinary Danes were quite capable of 
seeing through the magic mirror and based on the actual actions taken form an informed opinion on 
the true color and meaning of the USSR and Soviet power. As such the Soviets themselves more 
than anybody else undermined the possible effectiveness of their cultural diplomacy. 
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It is small wonder the cyclists became “ill”, as an internal Soviet document indicates, out of fear of 
anti-Soviet sentiments following the critical Danish reaction to the executions.
1095
 
 
SOLDERING ON 
 
In 1956 the 6
th
 IADL congress gathered in Brussels (including undisclosed Danish participation). 
One of the items on the agenda was a commission to discuss questions on penal procedures. Among 
the topics discussed in the commission were breaches in legal rights “in certain socialist countries”. 
However, the commission concluded that these breaches had been very few, that satisfactory 
promises of improvement were made, and that there were cases outside the socialist bloc that it 
would much more important to discuss and condemn.
1096
 This pattern repeated itself elsewhere. 
 
Danish front organizations after Hungary 1956.As seen in Chapter 4, Jørgen Jørgensen and a 
still smaller circle of fellow-travelers in DKSU continued to cooperate with the communists. 
Similar DDK continued to exist. Following a long and heated debate the large majority of FBVA 
members decided to continue WFSW membership, despite acknowledging its communist nature. 
However, Professor Søren Holm left FBVA in protest, stating that he would not cooperate with 
communists who supported the Hungarian events, and that there was no scientific freedom in the 
Eastern Blok countries.
1097
  
At a 1957 national committee meeting of Dansk Fredskonference the fellow-traveling members, 
including the chairman Thomas Christensen, who had not left DFK because of Hungary, all voiced 
their full confidence in their communist partners. They wanted to look forward and leave the past 
behind.
1098
 To these fellow-travelers protesting against Danish-German military cooperation and the 
possible stationing of foreign troops in Denmark during peace time were more important than 
protesting the Soviet invasion of Hungary.
1099
 Fredens Tilhængere dissolved in 1959,
1100
 at that 
time DFK had already taken over the position of Danish WPC affiliate, 
1101
although the leading 
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communists members tried to ensure that this information was not made public as it would disturb 
what the communists thought was a general perception in the Danish public of DFK as a non-
aligned peace movement.
1102
 To further this image Dansk Fredskomite (‘Danish Peace Committee’) 
was established to act as the official Danish WPC affiliate
1103
 and among other tasks organize 
Danish participation at WPC congresses.
1104
  DFK turned its attention towards publishing NATO 
critical pamphlets promoting classic accusations of NATO’s aggressive intentions and the need for 
Danish disaffiliation.
1105
  
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
A reading of the available sources indicates that many of the activities organized by Danish front 
and friendship organizations continued unchanged from earlier years. We shall not repeat them 
here. However, we also see some new kinds of activities. 
 
Exhibitions. During the 1960s and 1970s DKSU placed more and more emphasis on exhibitions. 
Exhibitions of arts and crafts
1106
 or stamps
1107
 did also take place earlier, but not with the same 
frequency and usually only at the DKSU own offices.  
By 1962 this had evolved into 7 exhibitions throughout the year at the DKSU offices. The themes 
were children’s books and drawings, Lomonosov, Pushkin, space travel Gagarin, Herzen, and a 
second exhibition of children’s drawings.1108 The following year saw six various exhibitions. 
Gradually the exhibitions moved to other venues such as municipal institutions and libraries, mostly 
of children’s drawings and Soviet record covers.1109 Even the ice skating ring in Hvidovre hosted an 
exhibition.
1110
 Gradually DKSU built up a number of exhibitions of photos and posters that 
circulated among various schools, libraries, theaters, and similar institutions.
1111
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Open letters. Another new initiative that came into prominence was the writing of open letters to 
the parliament and government. DDK in particular sent an endless stream of open letters protesting 
Danish-German military cooperation, Danish NATO membership, NATO exercises, acquisition of 
new arms for the Danish military, the Vietnam War, and American nuclear testing (but not 
Soviet).
1112
 
The letters do not seem to have had any effect on Danish parliamentarians or ministers. Only in a 
single case is it possible to document a response, when a civil servant in the ministry of defense 
disdainfully replied that DDK had misunderstood some factual issues associated with an ongoing 
NATO exercise in Denmark.
1113
 
 
Solidarity movements. One of the reasons for the slow-down in the activities of the front 
organizations was a general change at the time towards international solidarity work. Two of the 
major movements focused on Vietnam and Chile. There are a number of similarities between them; 
DKP members played a leading role in forming them, they were mass movements, they were anti-
American, and the organized events were similar to those of the front organizations (however, with 
an emphasis on demonstrations). Furthermore, when splits erupted within the movements over 
discussions on whether to form a large popular front type movement or narrow left-wing activist 
type, Ingmar Wagner played a leading role in forcing splintering that secured the establishments of 
new solidarity movements (Vietnam 69 and Komiteen Salvador Allende) of the popular front type, 
but effectively under DKP control.
1114
 The solidarity movement attracted many who presumably 
otherwise would have joined the classic front organizations.  
 
OFFICIAL ANTI-COMMUNISM 
 
The trend of a strong anti-communist policy among the Social-democratic movement and Danish 
authorities continued to exists during the period of this chapter. The following section presents two 
examples and one that does not follow the established pattern. 
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Exclusion. In 1959 the chairman of the Danish Preparatory Committee for the coming 1960 youth 
festival in Vienna was excluded from the Social-democratic youth party. The DSU leadership 
explained that it was considered impossible to be a member of DSU and at the same time cooperate 
with the communist network of front organizations.
1115
 
 
Warning. In an attempt to discourage Danish youth from participating in the (later cancelled) youth 
festival that was supposed to take place in Algier, the Danish foreign ministry wrote to DUF to 
warn them about the unsanitary conditions in the Algerian capital that could endanger the health 
and welfare of Danish participants. The communist nature of the festival was not directly given as 
the reason for the warning, but can be read between the lines of the letter.
1116
  
 
A break with policy. One example breaks with the established pattern. In 1960 WIDF, and 
officially DDK, wished to conduct a congress in Denmark. Initially, Danish authorities as usual 
stated that the holding of the meeting in no way served any Danish interests and that participants 
could not be expected to receive visas.  However, the Danish authorities changed their position and 
issued visas. The reason given was that the congress should celebrate the 50
th
 anniversary of The 
International Women’s Day (March 8th) that was organized by an international women’s congress in 
Copenhagen in 1910. 700-800 women participated in the congress.
1117
 
 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
Despite the new initiatives the front and friendship organizations suffered from lack of innovation. 
The same kind of events with the same topics and the same framing took place over and over again. 
This led to a decline in the membership figures and activity level.  
 
DKSU pessimism. DSKU chairman Carl Thomsen drew similar conclusions following a 1964 tour 
to the provincial branches of DKSU. Some branches had as few as 20-30 members, and in DKSU 
Odense the membership figures had been halved to 150 members. DKSU Århus only had about 50 
active members, and everywhere, with the possible exception of DKSU Ålborg, the activity level 
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was very low. Nonetheless he encouraged them to carry on without any suggestions on how to 
improve the situation.
1118
 
The reason for this lack of advice might be found in the minutes of the local congress of DKSU 
Copenhagen. During the debate, it was concluded that it was difficult to attract interest to travels or 
lectures organized by DKSU, that no advisements of activities took place, that DKSU suffered from 
lack of funding, that the locations were insufficient, that the youth showed no interest in the 
activities, and that it had proved impossible to attract famous people who wanted to engage in the 
activities of DKSU on an executive level, either for lack of time or interest.
1119
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
If the early 1950s could be seen as a high point with regard to the activity level and membership 
figures, the decade following the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary should be regarded as a low 
point. 
Although it does not seem as if the Soviets themselves understood this, the invasion of Hungary 
caused major problems for the initiated structural reform from the very beginning and at the same 
time it is very difficult to see the reform as something that improved the existing system in reality. 
The various reports pinpointed the weaknesses of the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus, but this 
only led to a few name changes and the addition of yet another layer of bureaucracy, whereas the 
activities, slogans, and foreign partners continued without alteration to the very end of the existence 
of the USSR. 
Outside the USSR, the Hungarian events of 1956 and 1958 had an enormous influence on the 
willingness to engage in cultural contacts or participate in the activities of the front organizations or 
the friendship association. 
At the same time both the Social-democratic movement and the Danish authorities continuously 
strove to counteract Soviet cultural diplomacy in Denmark. 
Although we do see some new initiatives, the combination of the reasons stated above and a lack of 
ability to innovate the product, or re-frame it, meant that narrower and narrower circles of Danish 
participants attempted to keep the various organizations going, and public interest, even among the 
usual fellow-traveling circles, waned. 
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Chapter 7: The Second Peace Struggle, 1974-1985 
 
“You have shown that culture is 
the sharpest weapon of the USSR”. 
Ingmar Wagner
1120
 
 
If a Danish historian wants to stir up a hornet’s nest they simply have to state that they wish to 
discuss the peace campaigns of the 1980s. The question is a highly politicized and strongly debated 
topic due to the 23 footnotes that an alternative parliamentarian majority made the Danish 
government place so-called “footnotes” in NATO communiqués which, as some historians argue, 
cast serious doubts on Danish loyalty to the NATO alliance.  Nonetheless the 1980s peace 
movements, DKSU, public open air festivals run by the DKP newspaper, and some case studies of 
individual activities will be the major topics of this chapter. 
 
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS 
 
Based on the 1956 experiences following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, following the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, DKSU halted all public activity. However, much to the 
surprise of DKSU veterans, this time only one member left the EC, and only 22 ordinary members 
exited, and 43 new members even joined DKSU at the time.
1121
 During the 1970s membership 
continued to rise as a new, younger generation entered the association.
1122
 
 
Early signs. One of the major changes resulting in the unexpected membership increase was an 
overall change in the perception of the USSR, especially in the new, non-Soviet communist left that 
perceived  the USSR in a somewhat positive manner or, at least, as better than the USA.
1123
  
An early example of this tendency is the WFDY organized 1961 world youth conference in 
Moscow. Along the usual lines of pro-Soviet final communiqués on peaceful coexistence, 
disarmament, and anti-colonialism they also suggested increased cultural cooperation among the 
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global youth. Unlike earlier events DKU was joined by the socialist dominated organizations Clarte, 
Unge Pædagoger (‘Young Pedagogues’), and LLO.1124 
In 1968 the journal Ramparts exposed the CIA financing of the international anti-communist 
organizations the Congress for Cultural Freedom. This was followed by the exposes of other similar 
anti-communist organizations such as ISC, IUSY, and WAY
1125
 leading to a strong anti-American 
denunciation in the Danish non-Soviet communist left press.
1126
 
 
The new world view of the Social-democratic movement. More importantly, the Social-
democratic movement began to change its view of the USSR and international politics. One of the 
indications was the strong DSU (and non-Soviet communist left) involvement in the national 
preparatory committee for the 1973 East Berlin world youth festival – and generally positive 
participation in the festival itself.
 1127
 As we have seen, a decade earlier such engagements led to 
exclusion. 
As we shall discuss further, the Social-democrat controlled trade unions became more and more 
involved in the Soviet-influenced peace movements supporting Soviet peace initiatives and 
presenting positive perceptions of the USSR.
1128
 This was a long way from the staunch anti-
communist stance of the Social-democratic movement of earlier decades. 
  
Stronger engagement in the cultural aggreements. Danish authorities were also changing their 
position on Soviet cultural diplomacy in a more positive direction. Following the 1968 events in 
Czechoslovakian Denmark put all activities within the cultural agreement on hold.
1129
 However, by 
1970 Denmark complied with Soviet wishes to further develop the state exchange program.
1130
 By 
the mid-1970s the civil servant in charge of the program in the Danish foreign ministry publicly 
noted his satisfaction with the cultural side of the program, despite the Soviet side taking too long to 
answer requests and engage in the stipulated activities.
1131
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New life to an old front organization. Thanks to the overall positive perspective of the new left 
old front organizations were revitalized. By the end of the 1970s DDK experienced a revival with 
new local branches being founded or reestablished across Denmark, even the Copenhagen branch 
was reestablished as an independent entity,
1132
 and the previously low membership numbers rose to 
about 800 members.
1133
 This also led to a reorganization of the executive organs. 
 
Figure 7.1.: DDK organizational structures in the 1980s
1134
 
 
 
The new higher activity level and local branches across Denmark (by 1981 there were 10 local 
branches
1135
) led to a reorganization of the executive and planning procedures. The congress 
defined the strategy and the main lines of activities. The national committee decided on and planned 
how to implement the strategy. The various committees of the board of the national committee were 
responsible for the practical implementation. Five committees existed. FRESCO was responsible 
for international information dissemination, the committee for the women’s cause in Denmark was 
in charge of contacts with the local branches, the editorial committee edited the DDK journal Vi 
Kvinder, the press committee publicly promoted the position of DDK on various themes, and the 
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organizational committee functioned as a service organ for the secretariat.
1136
 A reading of the DDK 
archival sources of the 1980s gives the impression of an increased activity level, nationally, and 
especially locally. Major areas of activity were the journal, the peace cause, solidarity campaigns 
(especially solidarity with the populations in South American military dictatorships), and organizing 
meetings to commemorate International Women’s Day (March 8th).    
 
PEACE MOVEMENTS 
 
By the end of the 1970s and 1980s a new cause was brought forward by Soviets: the struggle 
against the NATO double-track decision made in 1979 to place108 Perhing II intermedieate range 
missiles and 462 Tomahawk cruise missiles (572 overall) in Western Europe, if the USSR did not 
stop the accumulaton of new SS-20 nuclear missiles in Eastern Bloc countries. In 1978, President 
Carter suspended the building of the neutron bomb. Although the decision was not made for that 
reason, the Soviets saw it as the result of their international campaign against the bomb and 
concluded that since it could be done once, it should be possible to repeat the success in regards to 
the NATO deployment. This led to the creation of numerous new fronts in a campaign against the 
NATO missiles (also known as “the second peace struggle”). The fact that SS-20 missiles continued 
to be deployed, whereas NATO had given the Soviet leadership four years to reconsider before 
beginning its own deployment, was not problematized by the campaigners, in accordance with the 
Soviet tactics of playing “the peace card” to gain military advances against its military opponents. 
 
The second generation communist international front organizations. To secure an international 
framework for the campaign against NATO a second generation of communist Cold War front 
organizations came into existence. The first of these was the International Trade Union Committee 
for Peace and Disarmament (“the Dublin Committee”), founded in 1979 at the world congress of 
trade unions as an ad-hoc group to study the socio-economic consequences of disarmament. Due to 
the lack of non-communist interest it was reorganized at the People’s World Parliament held in 
1980 in Sofia (organized by WPC). The final name of the committee was decided at a conference in 
Dublin. The leading figures represented other fronts. The committee included a Danish 
representative and in November 1982 organized a meeting in Copenhagen.
1137
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The most successful of the second generation fronts was arguably International Physicians for the 
Prevention of Nuclear War, founded in 1980 by the American cardiologist Bernard Lown. Lown 
explains in his memoirs that he very much wanted to gain contact with a Soviet counterpart and at 
conference was lucky enough (by chance he believes) to run into to Yevgenii Chazov, who was not 
just any Soviet cardiologist, but the personal physician of Leonid Brezhnev and  appointed Soviet 
minister of health in 1987. Together they founded IPPNW and in 1985 the organization was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
1138
 
In a number of cases, on both an international and a national level, we see a trend to organize front 
organizations by stating a professional group and adding “for Peace”. 
This was the case with Journalists for Peace (founded 1981) which complied with the Soviet policy 
of utilizing mass media for the promotion of Soviet views. The organizational structure was fairly 
loose and included liaison meetings for example in Copenhagen in October 1986.
1139
 
Unlike most other fronts Generals for Peace was never supposed to be a mass movement. The group 
was formed in 1981 by eight retired high ranking NATO officers in connection with the publication 
of the book Generals for Peace (Cologne, 1981). The group claimed that the greatest threat to world 
peace was NATO’s nuclear politics, and at a press conference at The Hague in November 1981 they 
demanded that NATO should halt the arms race and the nuclear confrontation. No mention was 
made of the Soviet SS-20 missiles.
1140
  
Following the 1983 world parliament in Prague a loosely connected group of educators was formed 
with organizational support from the communist international teachers’ union. The organization was 
officially founded at a 1985 conference held in Cologne. In 1986 a conference on the main themes 
of the organization (educating for peace, disarmament, and international understanding) took place 
in Copenhagen. One of the leading figures was the Danish teacher Johnny Baltzersen who was 
closely connected with the Danish affiliate of WPC.
1141
 Baltzersen has later confirmed his leading 
role in establishing Teachers for Peace although he denies its connections with the world 
communist movement.
1142
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International Health Workers for Peace organized in connection with the 7
th
 IPPNW conference 
held in June 1987 in Moscow. It has been questioned how many of the representative actually 
represented any national organization and how many came of their own accord.
1143
 
 
Second generation Danish front organizations. Denmark also saw a second generation of peace 
movements. There were two kinds. Firstly, some centered on a professional group and added “for 
Peace” or a similar term to the profession. Examples are Lærere for Fred (‘Teachers for Peace’), 
Journalister for Fred (‘Journalists for Peace’), Danske læger mod Kernevåben (‘Danish Doctors 
against Nuclear Arms’).1144 Secondly, numerous local peace organizations named for a region or, 
more often, city followed by the “for Peace” or “Peace Committee” came into existence.1145 
 
SAK. Having for many years played a still less important role DFK dissolved in 1972
1146
leaving 
WPC without a Danish affiliate. In 1973 Ib Nørlund and Ingmar Wagner, leading DKP members, 
tasked Anker Schjerning
1147
 with forming a new Danish peace movement in connection with the 
upcoming WPC congress in Moscow. During the congress, at a series of meetings in Schjerning’s 
hotel room of the Danish participants it was agreed to establish Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og 
Sikkerhed (‘The Liason Committee for Peace and Security’). Officially SAK was founded on 
February 25
th
 1974.
1148
 Although open to all, lists of memberships indicate that primarily collective 
members (communist controlled or otherwise left-leaning trade unions or their branches, other front 
organizations, and DKP and DKU)
1149
 joined SAK, and as such, membership circles in the early 
years primarily consisted of well-known faces within Soviet influenced circles. Formally, the 
highest executive of SAK was the National Committee. A Presidium existed, but only as figure 
heads to argue the non-partisan nature. The National Committee seldom met, and the actual work 
was carried out by a seven persons steering committee that included Schjerning.
1150
 In the 
beginning SAK led a quiet life, and not until the 1977 signature campaign against the US neutron 
bomb plans did it pick up the pace. In December 1977 SAK handed in 105,000 signatures to the 
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Danish foreign minister.
1151
 The campaign not only increased public awareness and membership 
figures, but also resulted in new local branches. For example, a branch was established in Northern 
Jutland in September 1979 based on an initiative taken by local communist dominated trade unions 
with participation of various political parties and various local branches of well-known front 
organizations.
1152
 During 1977 Ingmar Wagner, DKP peace and solidarity secretary and DKSU 
vice-chairman, organized for SAK to take over the vacated DKSU offices in Reventlowsgade 
following DKSU’ move to “the friendship house” (see below). Wagner and the DKP chairman 
secured the necessary 100,000 kroner funding from GDR, and Anker Schjerning convinced a 
number of individuals to officially donate 500 kroner each based on a promise of having the amount 
refunded from the GDR funding.
1153
 Later DKP approved that the DKP member Johnny Baltzersen 
was hired in a paid position as SAK secretary.
1154
 SAK did not move into the new Peace Center 
alone. Other front organizations such as DDK also rented offices in the building.
1155
 
 
The strong anti-americanism and anti-NATO position. Although the Soviet invasion in 1979 
made some members leave SAK,
1156
 and led to the founding of the non-Soviet communist NtA,
1157
 
it is possible to identify a strong anti-NATO position in the publications of various peace 
organizations (that might not all have been Soviet influenced) such as Danske dyrlæger mod 
kernevåben (‘Danish Veterinarians against Nuclear Arms’), Danske læger mod kernevåben 
(‘Danish Physicians against Nuclear Arms’) , Fagbevægelsen for Fred (‘Trade Union for Peace’), 
Gymnasielærere for Fred (‘High School Teachers for Peace’), Journalister for Fred (‘Journalists for 
Peace’), Kunstnere for Fred (‘Artists for Peace’), Lærere for Fred (‘Teachers for Peace’) 
Sundhedsarbejdere for Fred (Health Care Workers for Peace’). A reading of these publications 
show that the NATO decision was framed negatively as an aggression, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) was similarly negatively described, whereas the Soviet initiative of promoting the 
North as a nuclear-free zone was supported along with the congresses of various front 
organizations. Furthermore, reports on delegation trips contained the usual rosy pictures of the 
socio-economic development in the USSR and the Soviet will to peace, even voiced critique of any 
negative coverage of the “Whiskey on the rocks” incident when a Soviet u-boat stranded off the 
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Swedish coast line.
1158
 In other words, there was a strongly voiced critique of the NATO position, 
but not the Soviet escalation of the arms race. One of the most active peace organizations was 
Lærere for Fred, with the communist Johnny Baltzersen as a central figure. LfF held numerous 
meetings, conferences, and published many publications and teaching materials in an attempt to 
promote the Soviet line of thought in the curriculum of Danish public schools.
1159
 
Landsforeningen “Stop Atomrakketterne” (‘The National Association Stop the Nuclear Rockets’) 
was one of the most active organizations in the anti-deployment campaign and one of the best 
examples of a front organization covering for another front organization (SAK). LSA very clearly 
stated its mission as moving the Danish government to not supporting the deployment of 572 
NATO missiles
1160
 and doing this by means of public pressure.
1161
 Approximately 60 of the above 
mentioned categories of peace organizations and some trade unions joined LSA,
1162
 but like in 
similar organizations a narrow circle ran operations through various committees,
1163
 and had a DKU 
member, Hans Henrik Kjølby,
1164
 in the only paid position as secretary. According to LSA the 
deployment of SS-20s should not be seen as arms buildup since the intermediate rockets situated in 
Europe could not reach American targets.
1165
 The fact that it was a new weapons system deployed 
prior to the NATO decision was also disregarded in LSA’ pro-Soviet position. 
 
DKP and the third generation Danish peace movements. By 1983 DKP CC concluded that it 
held a very strong position within the peace movements, especially among the many new regional 
or city level peace movements and the second generation movements identified above. DKP CC 
concluded that many joined despite the leading role played by DKP in a willingness to join forces 
against the double track decision.
1166
 Anker Schjerning, as chairman of both the DKP peace (also 
included key members of SAK and Fagbevægelsen for Fred) and the solidarity committee, in the 
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1980s became the key figure in the DKP’s control over the various peace movements. Many local 
communists were very active in keeping the local movements up and running.
1167
 
 
The Social-demoractic positon. As noted by Bent Jensen, the main difference between the first 
and second generations of Soviet-influenced peace movements was the altered position of the 
Social-democratic movement towards a positive view on the Soviet peace overtures and willingness 
to cooperate closely with the communist front organizations.
1168
  As early as 1977 the largest 
(Social-democratic led) trade union SiD stated its full support of the collection of signatures for the 
campaign against the US neutron bomb plans.
1169
 The main SiD-financed peace outlet was 
Fagbevægelsen for Fred, founded following a 1981 congress in Aalborg and cooperating with many 
of the various “professions for Peace” groups.1170 One of the most active of these was 
Buschauffører for Fred (‘Bus drivers for Peace’) which clearly stated their overall aim as the 
struggle against the NATO missiles.
1171
 In 1984 the SiD chairman Hardy Hansen and international 
secretary Claus Jensen, both Social-democrats, presented SiD’s new peace program against nuclear 
arms, SDI, and the stationing of foreign troops in Denmark.
1172
 The program made Danish NATO 
membership impossible. Together with the communists Frank Aaen and Carl Scharnberg, Claus 
Jensen promoted the new program at a conference in Sønderborg.
1173
  
Spokesman on political affairs Lasse Budtz was one of the main figures in altering the Social-
democratic position when the party came into opposition in the 1980s. In numerous articles he 
attacked NATO and the double track decision.
1174
 In government, his party had supported this very 
policy. Although some MPs protested this new policy line, a majority, including party leader and 
former Prime Minister Anker Jørgersen, supported the new line.
1175
 As Prime Minister Poul 
Schlütter noted in a 1983 public debate with Anker Jørgensen: “I understand that Anker Jørgensen 
thinks that the government should take all those precautions that he did not take in all the many 
years he had the chance”.1176 
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This altered Social-democratic stand was a very far cry from the earlier documented anti-
communist position of the party, trade unions, youth organization, and women’s department of the 
1940s and 1950s. 
In Danish historiography the reasons for the change in the Social-democratic position has been the 
theme of a very heated debate. Non-Russian speaking Danish historians, as for example Rasmus 
Mariager, argue that the Social-democratic alteration of its NATO position was inspired solely by 
the influence of West-German Ostpolitik and the policy developed within the Socialist International 
and Scandilux.
1177
 A much more including approach is found in the conclusions on the Social-
democatic change made by Bent Jensen. Jensen fully acknowledges the influence of SI and 
Scandilux but points to several other sources of influence, including the new left, the new 
generation influenced by the new left coming into power in the Social-democratic party, and, most 
importantly, the massive Soviet campaign seeking influence on key members of the Social-
democratic movement.
1178
 In this respect it is very important to note that the high ranking CPSU 
member in charge of establishing Soviet contacts with Western Social-democratic parties and 
attempting to create influence on them has confirmed that this was a major priority of CPSU at the 
time.
1179
 Therefore, when discussing the role of and possible sources of influence on the Social-
democratic party, the Soviet angle should not be so easily dismissed as some non-Russian speaking 
historians do. 
 
DKP surprised by Social-democratic position. The change in position of the Social-democrats 
took DKP very much by surprise. DKP was unsure how deep and complete this new position was 
(had the Social-democrats actually given up their pro-NATO position?), and, if so, what 
possibilities it would then provide for the DKP-led peace movements for expanding the anti-NATO 
campaign beyond the question of missile deployment.
1180
  
 
Peace activities of the 1970s-1980s. It is possible to identify four main areas of activities of the 
Soviet influenced peace movement; publishing (as discussed above), signature collections, peace 
demonstrations, and peace conferences. 
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The most “famous” signature collections are those organized by Arne Herløv Petersen and paid for 
the Soviets.
1181
 
LSA initiated the campaign “Stop the nuclear rockets – life must go on” that included a signature 
collection. LSA made much of the numerous non-communist cultural workers who signed the 
appeal by printing various folders listing their names.
1182
  
LSA was not the only ones to organize signature campaigns against the NATO missile deployment, 
for example, 12,000 citizens of the Ledøje-Smørum municipality signed an appeal,
1183
 and in 1982 
Hjørring for Fred collected 539 signatures on the above mentioned LSA appeal.
1184
 
The first major demonstrations against NATO missile deployment took place in major cities across 
the country on December 4
th
 1982. The demonstrations were framed as a major genuinely popular 
protest against NATO missiles.
1185
 Only NtA dared to also criticize the SS-20s, much to the dismay 
of other demonstrations almost leading some peace demonstrators into fist fights in the streets.
1186
 
Demonstrations also took place outside of the greater Copenhagen area. In Hjørring, for example, 
the local Hjørring for Fred organization organized a 24 hours demonstration against NATO 
deployment,
1187
 whereas in Århus, DKU organized an open air festival, “Rock against the Rockets”, 
with the participation of major mainstream rock bands. The event newspaper strongly criticized 
NATO missile deployment and US politics in Central America, but no mention was made of SS-20s 
or Afghanistan.
1188
 In October 1984 a five minute work stoppage was observed, supported by the 
Danish (Social-democratic led) central trade union.
1189
 Another creative way of organizing peace 
demonstrations were for example a kite festival for peace at Amager.
1190
 Among the more 
spectacular demonstrations were the long-distance peace marches, such as the 1981 Copenhagen-
Paris march officially organized by the non-communist, but pro-Soviet Kvinder for Fred (‘Women 
for Peace’), but it is well-documented today that DKP and SAK took care of the organizational 
preparations.
1191
 SAK also organized Danish participation in protests demonstration against 
president Reagan during his 1982 visit to Bonn.
1192
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In 1981 the local Odense Fredskomite organized a very typical conference. The major agendas were 
to discuss how to organize a campaign for the North as a nuclear free zone, and how Danish peace 
movements could contribute to the international campaign against the NATO double track 
decision.
1193
 Another typical conference was organized by SAK to critically discuss Danish defense 
and security politics.
1194
 Occasionally, international experts participated as speakers.
1195
 
As in earlier decades we see examples of coordinated campaigns including a mixture of the above 
mentioned activities. Such examples are the 1986 “All Nuclear Weapons Away” campaign,1196 or 
the 1987 “Nuclear Free Now” campaign.1197 
 
The 1986 Copenhagen World Peace Congress.  In many ways the 1986 peace congress in 
Copenhagen was the culmination point of the 1980’s peace movements in Denmark. 
Although formally organized by an international preparatory committee – led by DKSU chairman 
Hermod Lannung
1198
 – DKP closely monitored the process and held meetings with the WPC 
chairman, the actual organizers of the congress.
1199
 DKP played a role in securing funding for 
congress and influenced the decisions on hiring communist members as staff.
1200
 DKP was not 
alone in its support. Among others the Social-democratic led trade unions also supported the 
congress as an important event in the struggle against the US Strategic Defense Initiative.
1201
 The 
congress had 3000 participants, including 500 Danes, and was covered by 254 Danish and 
international journalists.
1202
 
The congress took place October 15
th
-19
th
 1986. It consisted of a mixture of plenary meetings and 
meetings in various sub-committees discussing topics such as peace and justice, disarmament, or 
human rights. In addition the congress provided a networking opportunity for various organizations 
interested in women’s rights, youth politics, or other topics.1203 Despite the large participation 
figures, non-communist organizations and parties withdrew prior to the opening to the political bias 
of the congress agenda that did not open for critical discussions of human rights’ violations in 
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Soviet Europe or the Soviet war in Afghanistan. In the end the congress became infamous for the 
TV transmitted forceful removal of critical speakers from the plenum podium and subsequent fist 
fights.
1204
  
Internally DKP concluded that the congress had been very successful and would form the basis for 
new peace campaigns.
1205
 DKP chairman Jørgen Jensen and Anker Schjerning travelled to Moscow 
to receive instructions on how to best utilize the congress in the future work.
1206
 
However, externally there was much frustration over the negative consequences of the unruly 
events of the congress making headline news. 175 Danish delegates complained to the Radio 
Council of the Danish Broadcast Union that this had made the coverage part of a negative political 
campaign against the congress.
1207
 Based among other things on a written answer from the news 
department covering the conference the general director rejected this and other complaints, arguing 
that there had been a reasonable coverage allowing both participants and critics to have their say, 
and that it was not the department's fault that it had come to violent clashes at the conference and 
based on ordinary journalistic principles such events during the congress should be covered.
1208
 
 
Conclusions. When comparing the first and second generation of Soviet-influenced peace 
movements we see two major differences. The first is an increased activity level. The second is the 
wider circles of participation by non-communists, including the Social-democratic movement, 
securing the Soviet influenced peace movements a much larger audience.  
However when the characteristics of the main participants are closely scrutinized we see that the 
large majority of activists were younger female students. Only 1 percentage of the general Danish 
population had participated in any of the peace activities identified about and opinion polls 
continuously documented that a majority of Danes supported a full Danish NATO membership. 
Therefore, what secured the success of the second generation Soviet-influenced peace movement 
was the fact that the Social-democrats, for the various reasons discussed above, changed position 
and as such made an alternative majority on security politics in Parliament possible.
1209
 
As such, it is possible to conclude that despite the higher activity level and the wider circles of 
political orientation of the participants the Soviet-influenced peace movements were unable to turn 
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a wider circle of contacts in the general public into a stronger political public pressure on the 
political decision makers, partly because the majority of the general public did not buy into the 
messages, and partly because the conservative-liberal government stood its ground. 
 
SOVIET CULTURAL DAYS AND OTHER DKSU ACTIVITES 
 
Table 7.A: DKSU (Copenhagen) activities 1970-1977
1210
: 
 
 
* Only covers 9.1.-12.1.1971 
** Greater Copenhagen area only. But this was the main activity of the All-Danish DKSU (1970 covers the entire 
country, but not activities by the local branches).  
*** Second half of 1972 only. 
**** Excluding a friendship week. 
***** The movie club closed this year due to technical difficulties. DKSU ran another movie club for employees of the 
Danish Broadcast Union. 
 
The 1970s saw an increase not only in DKSU membership figures, but also in the activity level. 
Table 7.A. indicates the activity level in DKSU Copenhagen. The surviving archival sources 
indicate that the activities of DKSU and DKSU Copenhagen often melted together and throughout 
the Cold War the activity level in Copenhagen exceeded that of all the other branches combined, 
especially because the Soviet delegations, guests, artists, and tourists arrived in Copenhagen, and 
therefore always gave lectures, performed, or participated in press conferences in Copenhagen, but 
seldom in all the cities of local DKSU branches. This was also the case with other organizations 
involved in Soviet cultural diplomacy. For example in 1975, DKSU almost weekly organized a 
public lecture, movie screening, concert or similar activity in the greater Copenhagen area.
 1211
 As 
the DKSU archives also focus on the activities in the Danish capital region it is more difficult to 
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discuss the activity level in the local branches. However the scattered materials leave the impression 
of a general activity level of roughly one activity per month (with the exception of the summer 
months), usually in the form of a public lecture (travel experiences, cultural topics, or Soviet guest 
lecturers are the most common themes), movie screenings, or participation in local cultural events. 
Occasionally exhibitions, for example of Soviet books, were organized.
1212
 
 
Public lectures. The most frequent activity of DKSU continued to be the lectures. In the 1972 fall 
season DKSU Copenhagen organized weekly lectures in their offices in Reventlowsgade. Danish 
lectures often spoke on impressions from travels to the USSR or cultural topics such as Soviet 
ballet. Each season saw a number of Soviet visitors as guest speakers. This particular season 
included, for example, the vice-chairman of the Soviet Women’s Committee T. Frunze speaking on 
the position of women in Soviet society, army general Bartov on Soviet security policy, and SSOD 
vice-chairman Palshak on the work of spreading knowledge about Denmark in the USSR.
1213
 
 
Impresario. From 1969 and especially towards the end of the 1970s DKSU operated as impresario 
for various Soviet groups of singers and dancers of folkloristic arts, so-called “amateur groups”1214. 
The earliest folkloristic groups to tour Denmark in this manner in 1969 were the Ukrainian group 
Yunost, the Moldavian group Prietnia, and the Russian group Siverko.
1215
 For example, Yunost 
toured Denmark for two weeks and gave 11 shows.
1216
 The 1970 tour by the group Sadko also 
resulted in strong turnouts and even recordings for screenings on the single Danish TV channel.
1217
 
The DKSU chairman rightly called the amateur groups one of the most important presentations of 
Soviet culture to a Danish audience.
1218
 The success led DKSU to engage in the impresario business 
on an even more commercial level inviting professional groups from the Bolshoi Theatre the 
Obratsov Puppet Theater, and even a circus troupes to the old entertainment fair, Dyrehavsbakken, 
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in Copenhagen in cooperation with Goszirk.
 1219
 The main Soviet business partner for organizing 
the tours was Goskoncert.
1220
 
 
Cultural days. Another important new activity of the 1970s was the cultural days consisting of 
various cultural performances, usually of folkloristic vein, lectures, exhibitions, and the publication 
of a special cultural days newspaper with information (usually with a strong emphasis on 
production figures) on the given republic, and the program of the cultural days. In 1984 former 
DKSU chairman Allan Fridericia interviewed DKSU vice-chairman Ingmar Wagner for an article in 
the Communist daily Land og Folk regarding the cultural days. Wagner named them the most 
important cultural assignment of DKSU.
1221
 
 
Table 7.B: Cultural Days 1974-1990:
1222
 
 
The Azerbaijan cultural days of 1974 consisted of a group of 40 artists of the Azerbaijan State 
Ensemble,
1223
 an official delegation including public lecturers,
1224
  exhibitions of Azerbaijan 
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handicrafts, graphics, and children’s drawings respectively,1225 and a special newspaper on 
Azerbaijan SSR was produced.
1226
 
During a 13 day tour the state ensemble gave 11 shows.
1227
 DKSU sold the shows to private 
organizers (multi-halls, local theater associations, or sport clubs) or rented a venue (for example 
Falconer Center in the greater Copenhagen area).
1228
 The exhibitions, especially those in various 
libraries, established a general pattern of the exhibitions expanding the event into several 
months.
1229
 The local press in Denmark was very engaged in the concerts, devoting long articles to 
them,
1230
 and usually printed very flattering reviews that also indicated that large audiences attended 
the shows.
1231
 The national press, although positive, only carried reviews if shows were organized 
in the greater Copenhagen area.
1232
 DKSU concluded in a similar positive manner that the cultural 
days had been a success, with large turnouts at local events in cities where DKSU usually had no 
activities or influence on public opinion. Only the preparation could be improved, especially if the 
Soviet partners would not be so slow in answering questions and forwarding information.
1233
 
The 1975 Kazakhstan cultural days took place in a similar way in regard to the late arrival of 
exhibition items and information,
1234
 the well-attended tour of Denmark of a state ensemble 
performing in a folkloristic show,
1235
 the tour of a delegation of public lecturers,
1236
 and the 
favorable promotions and reviews in the local press of both the show and exhibitions
1237
 – with the 
exclusion of Elsinore, where the floor of the multi-hall had been too slippery for dancing.
1238
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A pattern was quickly established. In the year prior to the cultural days of a given republic, a DKSU 
delegation traveled to the USSR to negotiate with the republican-level branch of SSOD regarding 
wishes for artists and exhibitions.
1239
 The following spring, a delegation from that local branch 
visited DKSU to conclude the final negotiations on the contents.
1240
 The artists performed in 
various multi-halls, schools, and local theater scenes. The organizers paid DKSU 10,000-15,000 
kroners per show.
1241
 During the Lithuanian cultural days in 1981 DKSU received exhibitions of 
photos of architecture, wooden handicrafts, amber jewelry, children’s books, children’s’ drawings, 
and tapestries.
1242
 The exhibitions arrived by ship.
1243
 The exhibitions were showcased in 
Copenhagen first,
1244
 and then toured the rest of Denmark. At the official opening of the exhibition 
at the art museum in Aarhus the cultural minister of the Lithuanian SSR was present as well as the 
Soviet ambassador.
1245
 The new, favorable view of Danish authorities on Danish-Soviet cultural 
relations resulted in the Danish cultural minister Niels Matthiasen on several occasions officially 
opened the cultural days. In his speeches Matthiasen emphasized the importance of cultural 
exchange in strengthening the bilateral relations.
1246
 The DKSU collection of newspaper cuttings
1247
 
indicates the a continued favorable public opinion on the shows, exhibitions, and attendance. 
 
The Friendship House.
1248
 On May 6
th
 1975 the CPSU CC Secretariat approved the purchase of a 
building in Copenhagen to establish a Soviet cultural center in the Danish capital.
1249
  The Soviets 
purchased a building close to the city hall square in inner Copenhagen, but due to the poor condition 
of the building it took several years to conclude the repairs, fully paid by the Soviet state. As 
documented in Chapter 2, the USSR at this time considerably increased the economic subvention of 
DKSU.  
In 1977, when the house finally opened its doors to the public, DKSU signed a lease agreement 
stipulating that DKSU rented the house without having to pay any rent with the purpose to work for 
the strengthening of the friendly social, economic, and cultural relationship between the 
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countries.
1250
 The Friendship House contained the book store Sputnik in the basement, the movie 
theater Kino Kosmos, rooms for receptions and lectures, and later the Gallery ØstiVest on the first 
floor, concert hall and meeting rooms on the second floor, library and offices at the third floor, and 
class rooms and an apartment for the manger on the fourth floor. 
Kino Kosmos quickly had to abandon running on a commercial basis. The hired staff was let go, 
and volunteers operated the equipment during the weekly screenings of older Soviet and other 
socialist feature movies and documentaries. DKSU organized numerous concerts of Russian 
classical music performed by Danish and Soviet artists. The bookshop sold Soviet books, journals, 
records, and souvenirs. The gallery exhibited and sold works by younger Soviet artists. A Soviet 
language teacher, salary paid by SSOD, was one of the evening school teachers of Russian. In 1980 
there were 12 classes operated under the Danish adult evening school law. The library had a 
collection of 8-9,000 volumes, mostly in Russian, but also in English, German, and French. In 
addition the library received a large number of Soviet journals and slide shows. In 1989 the library 
was reorganized as an information center. Thanks to a new satellite dish, the evening news program 
Vremia was taped and saved for 30 days. The main activity was public lectures. Each week saw 1-2 
lectures during the season (September-May). Recurring themes among Danish speakers were, as in 
earlier times, travel experiences and various aspects of Soviet cultural or socio-economic life. 
Recurring themes among Soviet speakers were Soviet cultural life, socio-economic developments in 
the Union Republics and the Soviet peace will. DKSU annually commemorated various red-letter 
days such as the Day of the Red Army or Lenin’s birthday. In some cases, the activities were 
organized in cooperation with other like-minded organizations such as DDK or other friendship 
associations. 
 
Conclusions. Although the level of activity rose, the level of active participation of the members 
did not follow. In March 1973 Ingmar Wagner wrote to the author Hans Edvard Teglers to thank 
him for the lecture he had given and to excuse the low number of listeners. Wagner explained that a 
weekly program of 1-2 activities more than covered the level of interest in information about the 
USSR in the greater Copenhagen area and that the great number of events meant that DKSU was 
not able to prepare for them probably.
1251
 More often than not no more than a handful of listeners 
turned up for the lectures.
1252
 As seen, Kino Kosmos abandoned running on commercial terms. In 
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the local branches the level activity continued to vary greatly from branch to branch and from year 
to year.
1253
 By 1967, work in the local branches had almost come to a complete stop. Only the 
performance of a cultural ensemble from Tomsk had stirred them to action. DKSU Bornholm stated 
that they could not organize public lectures with Soviet guest lecturers because their technical level 
of the lectures was too high for ordinary people to understand.
1254
  In 1969 DKSU Randers 
chairman S.A. Nielsen complained that it was impossible to organize anything without funding. He 
suggested that the central EC should organize lecture tours in the provincial cities, since the local 
branches were unable to organize anything of their own accord. National chairman Allan Fridericia 
declined to do this.
1255
 A few years later the DKSU Aarhus chairman complained about the low 
turnout at shows of Soviet ensembles, such as Sadko that had recently visited.
1256
 
Ingmar Wagner, who had taken over Alfred Jensen’s role of communist whip in DKSU, complained 
about the lack of activity in the various local branches.
1257
 Wagner also complained about the Soviet 
guest lecturers because they did not understand how to give lectures in an interesting manner but 
simply listed unending strings of production figures.
1258
 Several local branches (for example in 
Frederikshavn, Silkeborg, Slagelse, and Brøndby) had to close after promising starts, while attempts 
at reestablishing the Elsinore branch failed.
1259
 Even the most active and successful branch in 
Aalborg had crumbled, only to be reanimated at a later point.
1260
 
In relation to the general public the failing recognition of DKSU was exemplified in 1976 when it 
was decided that the DKSU secretary should contact the popular TV host Otto Leisner regarding a 
show aired on October 23
rd
 and demand that DKSU should be mentioned in the broadcasts of 
performances of Soviet ensembles they had promoted.
1261
 
As such, the biggest success story of DKSU was the cultural days that reached a wide audience in 
public circles and areas of Denmark that DKSU usually did not come into contact with and received 
favorable notice in the local press. 
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LAND OG FOLK FESTIVALS 
  
In the years 1976-1989 DKP organized an annual open air festival under the name of the newspaper 
Land og Folk in the large public garden, Fælledparken.
1262
 According to the DKP leadership the 
criterion for success were that the festivals became a major Copenhagen event and presented an 
accurate picture of DKP activities through speeches, screenings, exhibitions, music, and theater. 
The whole event was framed within a setting of folkloristic art, food, and drink. DKU and Komm.S. 
organized their own part of the festival, foreign communist parties sent delegations and performers, 
and the various friendship and solidarity organizations had the opportunity to sell goods for the 
benefit of their economy and attract new members. 
 
Table 7.C: Land og Folk Festivals’ accounts1263 
 
 
                                                 
1262
 Where nothing else is mentioned the part of the chapter is based on Katrine Madsbjerg, ”Land og Folk Festival 
1976-1989”, Arbejdermuseet & Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv Årbog 2009, 108-122; Madsbjerg (thesis). 
1263
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letter8-.15.1985; OS/1/Ole Sohn’s personal handwritten notes from DKP CC meeting 4.13.1984; 2/Folkepressen’s 
accounts 1987.  
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These organizations jumped at the chance to participate and for many of them, the festival became 
one of the most important activities of the year, including from a financial perspective.
1264
 
By 1978 the festival had become routine with a director, Sven Broe, in charge of the overall 
planning of the annual event. Together with representatives of the DKP executive and various peace 
and solidarity committees he formed the central leadership of the preparation for each year’s 
festival. 
In 1980 the CPSU CC secretariat approved a request and decided to help DKP with the successful 
realization of the festival by sending a 15 person delegation for 15 days to the festival. The 
delegation included cosmonauts, the ID representative Vladimir Savko,  a photo exhibition on the 
exploration of space, and handcraft items worth 4,000 rubles to be sold for the benefit of DKP at the 
festival.
1265
 
Although the festivals did not break even, this was not the most important issue from a DKP point 
of view. DKP even operated with an expected deficit each year of 300,000 kroner. Of greater 
importance was the annual participation of between 100,000 and 250,000 persons, far exceeding 
DKP membership figures. Even newspapers critical of the communists had to acknowledge the 
organizational capabilities of the party. 
The festival grounds consisted of a village setting of sales booths, bars, and stages for artistic 
performances, political debates and speeches. Popular Danish artists and bands played at the 
festival. Each year the USSR sent a famous chess player who played with anyone who was 
interested. This and the musical performances, rather than the political messages DKP tried to sell 
during the festival, were the most popular parts of the festival among the audience. 
  
Conclusions. Overall, it is possible to conclude that the Land og Folk festivals show how DKP was 
able to create one of the major cultural events during the summer in Copenhagen. However, the 
general public seemed to have been attracted by the cultural events themselves and did not become 
supportive of the communist or Soviet political positions by participating in this manifestation of 
cultural diplomacy. 
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INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES 
 
So far in this dissertation, we have primarily discussed mass activities. However, as noted in chapter 
1, some activities were carried out outside the usual structural frameworks. In the following we 
discuss some examples. 
 
Unknown Neighbors. In 1977 the DKSU EC member Erik Vagn Jensen published the only 
textbook written in Danish intended for primary school students on the Soviet Baltic republics, 
based on a trip to the three Soviet republics.  The initiative for both the book and the preliminary 
study trip was taken by Erik Vagn Jensen on his own accord, but the case also shows how the 
Soviet apparatus nursed such individual foreign initiatives to their fruitful completion. 
Although the author supported Soviet positions, there are no indications that he received any 
financial support from the Soviets.
1266
 Instead both APN and SSOD promised Ingmar Wagner to 
support Erik Vagn Jensen in any way possible, provide him with the necessary picture materials,
 1267
 
and a guide during his stay.
1268
 DKSU played a central role in his preparations by forwarding lists to 
their Soviet partners of what he wished to see during his trip and ordered his tickets,
1269
 advised 
SSOD, the republic SODs, and SUDK of his wishes and travel plans,
1270
 and secured him special 
permission to bring a tape recorder into the USSR.
1271
 The Soviet representation in Denmark told 
DKSU to contact them if any problems arose that they themselves could not solve.
1272
 
In the textbook Erik Vagn Jensen declined to conclude on whether the republics had become Soviet, 
but otherwise he followed the official Soviet line of describing the inter-war Baltic states as fascist, 
and elections in the current republics as democratic (despite the one candidate system), because the 
politicians he had met apparently seemed friendly and democratic. According to Erik Vagn Jensen 
Estonia was an agricultural wonderland. The collectivization had been voluntary and the resistance 
movement against the Soviet occupation was consequently put down as nazi collaborators and 
nationalists. Elsewhere he exemplified the great progress and increased welfare through production 
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figures and in this manner sought to document that positive developments had happened thanks to 
Soviet power.
1273
 
In his book he did not thank the Soviet institutions for their help, but this was done deliberately as it 
would otherwise have hampered the possible impact of the book and hindered its dissemination 
which he wanted to be as broadly as possible. 
 
American Pictures. One of the most, if not the most, successful individual campaigns was 
Amerikanske Billeder (‘American Pictures’) by the photographer Jakob Holdt. In his book (first 
edition published in Danish in 1977) Holdt presented a bleak picture of poverty among African-
Americans and racism in the USA. The book was an enormous hit. In Denmark the book has been 
published in 13 editions (with 87,000 copies sold). By 2010 his multimedia show based on the book 
had been shown more than 5000 times across Denmark. For ten years it was shown at a 
Copenhagen movie theater. Photos from the show have been exhibited at the prestigious Danish 
galleries Louisiana and Aros. Holdt has been awarded a lifelong subsidy from the Danish fiscal 
budget. The book and multimedia show also made it to the USA, where the book sold more than 3.5 
million copies. The translation into German version was done by the convicted East German spy 
Jörg Meyer from his cell in a Danish prison. The show also made its way to England. Jakob Holdt 
has on several occasions confirmed that he came into contact with the KGB in 1976, prior to the 
publication of the first edition, that he received money from the KGB, and that there was KGB 
subvention of the dissemination the book and multimedia show in various Western countries. 
Because his project undercut the human rights campaign initiated by President Jimmy Carter, KGB 
considered Holdt a huge asset and listed him as an agent under the code name Prist.
1274
 Due to this 
the case of ‘American Pictures’ must be considered one of the most successful cases of individual 
activities. However, in 2015 Jakob Holdt had to admit that ‘American Pictures’ contained untrue 
information and that he had not been present at all the events described in the book. This led the 
gallery Louisiana to withdraw Holdt’s pictures from their exhibition and other printed materials.1275 
 
The Ole Friis case.
1276
 As a young person still in school Ole Friis happened upon Radio Moscow’s 
Danish broadcasts. He engaged in a long correspondence with Radio Moscow’s Danish desk, who 
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225 
 
worked very hard to keep the dialogue going by answering all of his letters.
1277
 They asked him to 
send in questions for the letter box,
1278
 sent him questionnaires
1279
, asked him to participate in 
listeners’ competitions,1280 wrote to tell him even if he did not win,1281 and then sent him 
consolations prizes  anyway,
1282
 and asked him to comment on the contents of the broadcasts.
1283
 
Over several years, Radio Moscow nurtured their relationship with him. They sent him pictures of 
sports stars,
1284
 tapes with a course in Russian
1285
 and book parcels
1286
 free of charge, they answered 
his questions in the letter box broadcasts
1287
 and even made sure to write to him in advance when 
they would be answered
1288
 and then to mail him copies of the transcripts including the answers to 
his questions should he have missed the show.
1289
 Finally, they invited him for a two week stay in 
Moscow as their guest, free of charge (except for the travel costs to the Soviet border) Though he 
was never a member of DKP he became chairman of DKSU Aalborg and in this capacity wrote 
letters to the editor that got published in various local Aalborg newspapers. In his comments he 
defended Soviet foreign policy such as the invasion of Afghanistan and supported the campaigns for 
the North as a Nuclear Free Zone and the campaign against the NATO double track decision.
1290
  
In the end, Ole Friis left DKSU and broke off all contacts with the Soviet fellow-traveling circles 
and his Soviet contacts, because he felt that Soviet agencies tried to recruit him by offering to pay 
him to write various articles, and this made him very suspicious of the intentions of his Soviet 
contacts. However, his story is still one of very few examples of success for the Soviet state- 
directed cultural diplomacy that it has been possible to identify. They “cultivated” a Dane who was 
not a DKP member and through a very long period of continued contact he became a member of the 
largest and most important of the mass organizations supporting the USSR in Demark and even 
publicly supported Soviet positions in his local area. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
In agreement with Ole Friis his papers will be turned over to an archival institution upon the completion of this 
dissertation. 
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Ole Friis’ story also tells us how difficult it was for Soviets to achieve their goals through means of 
cultural diplomacy. Every time, a lot of hard work – and presumably funds – went into winning just 
one person over, if the stream of letters and gifts are any indication of the normal level of contact. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we have discussed three important venues of Soviet cultural diplomacy roughly 
covering 1974-1985; the second peace struggle, DKSU, and the Land og Folk Festivals. In addition 
we have discussed a number of examples of the individual activities. 
The overall impressions of the higher level of activities are that the mass-oriented activities were 
able to reach a much wider and more positive audience than earlier both, within the general public 
and within certain political circles such as the Social-democrats. The higher turnout became the 
major success of the discussed organizations, but they were unable to reach the final aim of turning 
the popular interest into a larger public pressure on the political decision makers. Therefore, the 
case studies of individual activities, despite the high financial costs as documented in the Ole Friis 
case, leave us with the impression that these activities were more influential as regards specific 
issues such as the Baltic States or alleged human rights violations in the US.  
Based on this, it could be argued that the Soviet ratio of value for money would have been higher 
had more efforts been placed not on running narrow-circle organizations, but on promoting issues 
through well-known individuals. 
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Chapter 8: Delegations and tourism 
 
“If you want to know about the world today 
 it is no use to go to familiar holiday destinations  
 like Mallorca, Rhodes and so on”. 
Eva Hansen
1291
 
 
Two forms of travels took place during the Cold War. The first was participation in delegations, the 
second tourism. What they had in common was a group travel only policy of Soviet authorities and 
the idea that every trip should contain something beyond leisure.  
In this chapter we will discuss both forms of travel including incoming Soviet delegations and 
tourism, and discuss both the experiences of the travelers and their dissemination of the experience 
upon returning home. 
Due to the lack of surviving archival sources it is very difficult to establish any general overview of 
the traveling. Of all the Danish businesses involved only DKSU have partly surviving files. 
Therefore, we shall primarily discuss cases relating to DKSU. DKSU shared the Soviet authorities’ 
position on the role of delegations and tourism.  Traveling was not only a business activity, but also 
an activity of political and cultural importance.
 1292
  
 
DELEGATIONS 
 
The main difference between delegations and tourist groups was that members of delegations were 
invited and that they only had to cover travel costs to the Soviet border from where the hosts 
covered all expenses.
1293
 
Delegations were invited through various channels. CPSU and DKP had their own agreements on 
party delegations visiting the USSR. For example, a 1988 delegation traveled to study the role of 
CPSU during Glasnost.
1294
 In other cases delegations, such as the 1952 youth delegation, were 
invited directly by Soviet public organizations.
1295
 However, most delegations were invited by 
VOKS, officially through DKSU. VOKS was very thorough when deciding upon whom to invite, 
often to the severe dissatisfaction of DKSU who did not feel that they had any say on the candidates 
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whom they were officially inviting, that DKSU’ recommendations were not given the proper 
attention, and that DKSU received the directives on the invitees too late to secure their actual 
participation.
1296
 
The following shall discuss three case studies of delegations. They were all invited by VOKS 
through DKSU. The first is a very typical example. The second is a very atypical example. The 
third is an example of the more business-like delegations of later years. 
 
The small-holder farmers’ delegation. The 1953 small-holder farmers’ delegation consisted of 14 
members. Since the Soviets insisted on inviting the delegation in August, in the middle of the 
harvest season, very few small-holder farmers had the opportunity to participate. The participants 
represented various small-holder farmers’ organizations, or worked in professions such as 
plantation ownership or crop consultant that made it possible for them to travel. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets insisted on calling it the small-holder farmers’ delegation.1297 Six delegation members 
belonged to DKP, including delegation leader Villy Fuglsang
1298
 (MP) and his wife Elna Fuglsang. 
The rest were either members of or belonged to the circles of the social-liberal party.
1299
 Due to its 
traditionally pacifist and NATO critical position the social-liberal party was of great interest for 
Soviet influence campaigns. 
Although DKSU officially invited the delegation, the decision to invite the delegation was initiated 
by VOKS and the Ministry of agriculture with CKPSU CC approval.
1300
 In line with the techniques 
of hospitality (discussed in Chapter 1) the Soviet hosts presented an extensive program for each 
day, a cultural program for the evenings, and long journeys
1301
 that was amended during 
negotiations following the arrival to the USSR.
1302
 
Between August 9
th
 and 28
th
 the delegation traveled from Leningrad (where they had been 
sightseeing and participating in a culture program in the evenings) to Moscow and the Moscow 
Region (where activities included visiting an agricultural academy including a tour of an 
experimental tomato fields, various collective farms, as well as the cultural and sightseeing 
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program), to the Ukrainian SSR calling at the greater Kiev and Kharkov areas (where they visited 
collective farms, state farms, and exhibitions of agricultural machinery, culminating with a party in 
the culture house in the village of Mathusii), and finally to Kostroma, 300 km northeast of Moscow 
(where they visited cattle breeding stations and other collective and state farms).
1303
 
Two days after the delegation's departure one party official from the Department of contacts abroad 
produced a report directly to Mihail Suslov, who was party secretary with special responsibility for 
ideological issues. The evaluation was very positive. The delegation members had shown great 
interest, especially in livestock, milk benefits, the organization of work, and material conditions for 
collective farmers and state farm workers. Participants had subsequently expressed their satisfaction 
with the Soviet planning system and its implementation. They expressed that the trip would help to 
strengthen both the mutual relations as well as the cultural and commercial relations between the 
Danish and Soviet peoples. The report also highlighted some problems. At first, the social-liberal 
delegation members had been careful not to publicly express their views on the state of agriculture 
in the Soviet Union, and Thomas Christensen
1304
 had said that representatives from a Danish social-
democratic newspaper had tried to dissuade him from participating in the trip. The delegation had to 
wait at the train station in Kiev for two hours because Intourist had forgotten they were coming, and 
for the same reason they had to live in a train coach for a day and a half due to a lack of available 
hotel rooms. In the offices of the Voroshilov collective farm there had been no pictures of the 
Soviet leader. Some of the female members of the delegation had insisted on photographing poorly 
dressed people and asking critical questions. However, delegation leader Villy Fuglsang had on 
several occasions succeeded in persuading other members of the delegation to reevaluate their 
impressions, and nine members of the delegation commented positively on the journey and their 
impressions in a Danish language broadcast for Radio Moscow.
1305
 
This report is a very typical example of the kind of reports drawn up on all delegations visiting the 
USSR. Typically they start by reporting something positive, then they point to some problems 
before ending once again on a positive note. The joint VOKS and ministry of agriculture report was 
framed in the same manner, and also pointed to the same positive and negative aspects of the visit. 
It ended by stating that it was very likely that the participants would report truthfully about the 
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USSR upon returning home.
1306
 In Soviet “newspeak” truthfully meant “positively”. Later in this 
chapter we shall discuss whether this wish was fulfilled, so for now we shall only conclude that the 
tour fell within the framework of how the Soviet techniques of hospitality usually operated. 
 
The journalists’ delegation. In the same year, a Soviet legation attaché compiled a list of 
journalists that might be invited to participate in a delegation. In each case a short resume of the 
person in questions was drawn up and the attaché sought to consider whether, if chosen, the person 
in question would report “loyally” on the experience.1307 “Loyally” being yet another Soviet 
“newspeak” term for “positively”.  When the delegation finally did go in 1955 it was a very atypical 
delegation, firstly, because they were invited by TASS,
1308
 secondly, because they refused to be 
considered a delegation,
1309
 and, thirdly, because they rejected the entire original program
1310
 
suggested by TASS. The delegation of seven newspaper editors substituted a weekend in Kiev, 
Sochi, and Stalingrad with a journey to a state farm in “the virgin lands”. It was a very dramatic 
excursion. Following the 14 hour flight to the airstrip in Kokchetav the delegation drove for six 
hours by jeep, only to get lost in the dead of night and be forced to light an emergency bonfire on 
the steppe. Fortunately, the bonfire was seen by state farm employees who came to the rescue.
1311
 
Less dramatically, the delegation also attended the Kremlin banquet in honor of Konrad Adenauer’s 
state visit,
1312
 and, more interestingly, they visited “Krjukowo” a Potemkin GULag camp used for 
impressing foreign visitors with the qualities of the Soviet penal system. This was similar to the 
Bolsjevo camp that had been in operation with this purpose since the 1930s.
1313
 Impressions of the 
camp will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The multi-hall and theater directors’ delegation. Eventually, many delegations evolved to have a 
more businesslike purpose. One of these business delegations was the 1975 delegation of directors 
of multi-purpose halls and theaters, with Ingmar Wagner as head of the delegation and with the 
purpose of familiarizing themselves with Soviet cultural life and considering how to strengthen the 
Danish-Soviet cultural relations and possibilities for cooperation on a greater scale – for example, 
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by inviting ballet troupes, folklore ensembles, or music ensembles for a commercial purpose.
1314
 
Therefore, the delegation members, besides enjoying evenings at various theatres, ballets, operas, 
were engaged in negotiations with representatives of Goszirk, Goskoncert, the ministry of culture 
and so on. The overall conclusions of the delegation was that although the negotiations did not end 
in any concrete contracts the trip had been very fruitful and positive, not the least thanks to the 
Soviet hospitality and Ingmar Wagner’s many excellent connections in the USSR.1315 
 
TOURISM 
 
Each of the three Soviet travel agencies, Intourist, Centrotourist, and Sputnik, cooperated with 
various Danish business connections.  
Intourist primarily operated in cooperation with Danish commercial travel agencies.
1316
 One of 
them was Folketurist,
1317
 whereas Sputnik’s primary business partner in Denmark became 
Fremadrejser, although this did not hinder their relationships with commercial agencies.
1318
 
Although it had offered travels to the USSR from an earlier point, DKSU opened a specific travel 
department as part of its operations in 1973.
1319
 DKSU did have commercial ties to Intourist but 
was dissatisfied both with the prices
1320
 and Intourist’s lack interest in the wishes of the traveling 
grops wishes for the professional content in the tour.
1321
 Instead, DKSU cooperated closely with 
Centrotourist, which could deliver on the professional content by arranging visits at factories, 
institutions, trade unions and whatever specific or specialized interests a group might have or wish 
for regarding meetings or destinations.
1322
 In 1992 the DKSU travel company became an 
independent company under the name Eurasia Rejser ApS.
1323
 DKSU was the single shareholder 
and this was done with the explicit purpose of avoiding a situation similar to that of the Swedish-
Soviet Society, where the financial collapse of the travel department pulled the entire friendship 
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society down with it. Later, the former national secretary and the former treasurer took over Eurasia 
free of charge. Eurasia finally closed its doors in 1995.
1324
 
DKSU also offered travels through Sputnik, but never large numbers. Therefore Sputnik sought 
other business partners in Denmark. Aside from a few commercial agencies close contacts were 
establish with the DKU travel agency Fremadrejser.
1325
 
Additionally, Aeroflot operated a sales office in Copenhagen (known today as Alt Rejser),
1326
 but 
next to nothing is known of their activities. DKSU and Aeroflot were very competitive towards 
each other, despite the substantial number of flight tickets DKSU ordered from Aeroflot.
1327
 
 
Danish tourists. Based on the above, Danish travelers had the opportunity to choose between a 
fairly large number of agencies when traveling to the USSR. Sadly, no Danish sources have 
survived to give us any indication of their number, favorite destinations, price levels, and so on. 
This lack of sources includes Folketurist and HANSA Folketurist, although we know that 
Folketurist
1328
 organized both tourist travels and specialized groups with a particular professional 
interest to various destinations, including the USSR. It is reasonable to assume that HANSA offered 
similar services. Fremadrejser organized travels for the Danish and Norwegian communist parties, 
their local branches, youth organizations, students’ organizations, various NGOs such as 
Folkebevægelsen mod EF (‘The Popular Movement against EEC’) or Nej til Atomvåben, Next Stop 
Sovjet, front organizations such as SAK, friendship associations, and solidarity committees,  
numerous high schools, youth schools, youth clubs, institutions of education, five rock groups and a 
youth orchestra, other travel agencies, and many sports clubs, including a group of carrier pigeon 
breeders competing in the World Championships in Katowice.
1329
 
As noted in Chapter 1, it took close to a decade for the Soviets to rebuild their tourism infrastructure 
and abandon their isolationist position. Following this we see an influx in the figures of tourism to 
the USSR.
1330
 In the opinion of the Soviet authorities, foreign travelers should be offered trips that 
were a mixture of educational and leisure activities, where relaxation was alternated with a 
comprehensive program of visits to companies, collective farms, film screenings, and lectures 
composed in such a manner that tourists developed a positive understanding of the socialist system, 
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Soviet foreign policy, and counteracted the damages wrought by the bourgeois propaganda in the 
tourists’ home countries. For the same reason Soviet guides were schooled in the answers to the 
most frequently asked questions, and CPSU approved guidelines for lines of argument when faced 
with critical issues. In the case of particularly critical guests the security services were to step in and 
subsequent travel restrictions were to be enforced, so critical tourists did not come to spoil the 
image of the USSR for other visitors. In 1969, the Intourist office in Lithuanian SSR was instructed 
to recount the magnificent progress in Lithuania since the socialist revolution’s victory in 1940, and 
in 1972 they were ordered to be active propagandists of the Soviet reality and life, and they were 
handed lists of tendentious issues and how they could detect foreign agents among the tourists.
1331
 
As such KGB played a very active role in relation to foreign tourism and Soviet guides. KGB 
scrutinized
1332
 guides before they were approved to work with foreigners, tapped hotels, restaurants, 
and cafes visited by foreigners,
1333
and constantly called for improvements in the counter-
intelligence operations among tourists.
1334
 
While the Soviets continued to build new hotels one possibility of increasing the tourism influx was 
to let the tourists arrive by ship and stay onboard the ship during the stay, with excursion programs 
on land. A group of French tourists utilized this possibility in 1955.
1335
 In the same year DKSU 
organized its first tourist trip to the USSR following World War II and also made use of the 
possibility to stay onboard a ship and go ashore for excursions. In October The Dania called at Riga 
and Leningrad.
1336
 The tourists visited factories, schools, kindergartens, rest homes, museums, and 
cultural houses. Among the highlights were tours of the State Hermitage and evenings in various 
theaters.
1337
 
Although the trip f resulted in a financial deficit,
1338
 it was considered a success by DKSU. 
Therefore, they organized two trips the following year; to the first Danish-Soviet soccer match in 
May 1956 in Moscow,
1339
 and a “theater trip” in the fall,1340 both in in cooperation with Politiken.  
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Table 8.A: DKSU tourist groups.
1341 
 
*January-July only 
**February-December only. 
***February-August only. 
**** 1983-1986 
***** January-October only 
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The theater trips were very popular among DKSU members and consisted of a combination of 
seeing the sights and spending the evenings at the theater, ballet or opera.
1342
 
As seen in table 8.A., in the early years the trips were few and primarily organized for members of 
DKSU. One such trip was a 1967 summer vacation in Kirgizian SSR with vice-chairman Alfred 
Jensen as tour leader.
1343
 The tour made headlines in the local newspaper where the visit was 
framed as foreign support of the USSR and admiration of the progress made in the cultural and 
financial life.
1344
 Although the trips were very popular among members
1345
 and for this reason 
oversubscribed
1346
 we do see some years where no trips took place. There were several reasons for 
this. The 1958 summer trip was canceled due to lack of registrations and several cancellations as a 
result of the Soviet Union's latest attack on Hungary,
1347
 or because the Scandinavian state owned 
airline SAS challenged the price policy of Aeroflot.
1348
 Table 8.A. suffers from a lack of surviving 
sources, but what we do see is an expansion of activities that includes new customers among non-
members, resulting in the establishment of an actual travel department with several employees and a 
semi dependence on the income from travel sales. In around 1970 DKSU began selling package 
travels to the USSR for schools, trade unions, and work place clubs.
1349
 9 out of 14 travels were 
sold to external travel groups, and one new year’s group was organized in cooperation with 
Folketurist.
1350
 The vast majority of business was conducted with Centrotourist, but DKSU 
cooperated with Sputnik on summer language classes and friendly matches between youth sport 
clubs.
1351
 Overall, the travel department offered a number of prearranged tours to major cities like 
Moscow or Leningrad, and round trips visiting several cities such as the Central Asian tour calling 
at Moscow, Fergana, Tashkent, and Samarkand before returning to Moscow. Most of these package 
tours were open to the general public, but some trips were prearranged for special interest groups 
such as hospitals 
 professionals (who participated in activities such as visiting hospitals, sanatoriums, polyclinics, and 
trade unions in Moscow and Piatigorsk), teachers (who visited a 10-year school, kindergartens, 
pioneer palaces, and trade unions in Moscow and Smolensk), or women only tours (calling at 
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Moscow, Tashkent, and Samarkand to study the status of women in Soviet society). But all groups 
consisting of at least seven persons could order customized tours covering their special interests at 
60 various destinations in the USSR.
1352
 In the late 1980s business expanded with bus trips to 
Prague and Rostock.
1353
 Programmed tours included a Danish tour leader, a Danish speaking Soviet 
local guide/interpreter, comfortable modern means of transportation (airplane or buses), daily tours, 
and a visa.
1354
 The various groups appointed one of the participants (often the initiator) as tour 
leader with responsibility for presenting the proper papers and negotiating with the local Soviet 
guides. The latter was often a frustrating experience since the Soviets often made changes to the 
pre-approved schedule much to the frustration of the Danish travelers.
1355
  
The most complete set of data of travels to the USSR are the files of the DKSU travel department 
between 1986 and 1990, consisting of filled out order forms, copies of the vouchers to be presented 
to the Soviet travel agency representatives, and various letters. At the time most of the 
communication with Centrotourist took place via telefax and this made communication much more 
flexible and efficient than in the earliest years. The material gives us a very good impression of the 
customers. First and foremost there were many high schools and other educational institutions 
going on study trips, another large group consisted of work place clubs and trade unions, various 
associations also made use of DKSU,  and in some cases private couples wanted to celebrate their 
silver anniversary during a holiday in the Soviet Union. 
Thanks to the nature of the associations and its relations in the USSR DKSU could often secure 
visas with very short notice, or arrange for special program points. The latter was the case in 1986 
when the National Theatre School went on a study trip to Moscow and Leningrad. The specially 
organized program included a city tour, visits to the Kremlin, Lenin Mausoleum, Bakhrushin 
Theater Museum, State Theater School, Central Children's Theater, behind the scenes of an 
ordinary theater, and possibly a circus school in Moscow. The trip to Leningrad included a city tour 
and visits to The State Hermitage, Lenin Museum, Pavlotsk Theatrical Institute, and a meeting with 
a costume maker and scenery painter at the the Kirov Theatre, as well as a meeting with students of 
Danish language studies at the university.
1356
 When a group of DKP members visited Leningrad 
Centrotourist was asked to organize a tour of the Leningrad shipyards, and meetings with a local 
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party branch, a pioneer camp, and an evening in a culture house.
1357
 When another group from DKP 
traveled to Moscow, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Tashkent, Samarkand, Frunze, Dushanbe, and back to 
Moscow the journey included visits to a party department, a newsprint, a watch factory, a collective 
farm for wine making, a collective farm, a nursery, a collective cotton farm, a pioneer camp, a 
carpet factory and an evening at the circus.
1358
 A 1986 language course in Volgograd included four 
hours of Russian language classes five days a week as well as lectures on Soviet culture, politics, 
history, and literature, various excursions, meetings with Soviet youth, a stay at a Soviet college, 
and a leisure program. There was a Danish tour leader and a Soviet guide/interpreter.
1359
 When the 
public school Tjørnelyskolen in Greve travelled to Leningrad, DKSU sold them a package tour and 
through the local SUDK branch helped organize concerts for the school’s band at institutions of 
higher education and smaller concert houses.
1360
 Similarly, when the orchestra of the Copenhagen 
postal service visited Moscow and Leningrad DKSU helped them with the necessary contacts to 
stage three concerts.
1361
 When Finland played Denmark in a soccer match in Helsinki, DKSU 
organized a tour that included a “stay of culture” in Leningrad.1362 A lecturer at Aarhus University 
praised the high quality of the program, when he and a group of students visited central research 
institutes of social sciences, local administration institutions, the Danish Embassy and a Danish 
journalist. The cultural highlight was an evening in the newly restored Bolshoi Theatre with a 
performance of Swan Lake, though the lecturer had to acknowledge that he probably should have 
explained the storyline prior to making a group of political science students watch classical Russian 
ballet.
1363
  
It has not been possible to identify detailed descriptions of tour programs in the surviving DKSU 
records. However, a detailed plan from a commercial operator of the, generally speaking, popular 
and “classic” tour among Danish tourists to both Leningrad and Moscow has survived. The trip 
lasted seven days and included a return flight, a Danish speaking guide, and all meals. The first stop 
was Leningrad with sightseeing including the Peter and Paul Fortress and the State Hermitage, as 
well as an evening at the Kirov Opera. In Moscow the program was also divided between 
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sightseeing including the Pushkin Museum, various political-economic exhibitions, the Red Square 
and the Kremlin and evening at the circus and Bolshoi Theatre.
1364
 
 
Incoming delegations and tourism. During October and November 1955 a delegation of Soviet 
school teachers traveled Denmark and visited several schools and other educational institutions.
1365
 
During the early Cold War delegations were the only form of Soviet travel to Denmark, and the 
above mentioned delegation is a very representative example of such a delegation (the cultural 
delegations were discussed in chapter 4). 
During the mid-1950s Soviet authorities opened for larger scale Soviet tourism abroad.
1366
 
Incoming Soviet tourism to Denmark was primarily handled by commercial travel agencies such as 
Folketurist,
1367
 but at various times Fremadrejser (especially Sputnik gropus)
1368
and DKSU
1369
 
operated tour services for Soviet tourists onboard Soviet cruise ships calling at Copenhagen. In 
some cases Folketurist and DKSU cooperated in the form of public lectures by members of Soviet 
tourist groups or friendship evenings at the DKSU premises.
1370
 In other cases, tourism was mixed 
with peace propaganda. In April 1979 the Mikhail Kalinin called at Copenhagen as part of a so-
called peace cruise to various Baltic Sea ports. Following a press conference for the 300 passengers 
who were all members of local branches of the Soviet peace committee, they all went on a 
sightseeing tour in Northern Zealand that included both Kronborg and The Thorvaldsen 
Museum.
1371
 At a similar visit in 1973 some of the passengers onboard the “peace cruise” (they 
were to attend a peace conference in Oslo during the cruise) performed Russian folkloristic singing 
and dancing at the DKSU premises.
1372
 
A 1988 6 day Fremadrejser program for Soviet tourists included visits to the Workers’ Museum, a 
movie theater, sightseeing in Copenhagen including a visit to Tuborg, a tour of Northern Zealand 
including the Lousiana art museum and Kronborg Castle, tours of The National Museum and The 
Royal Porcelain Factory, a trip to Roskilde including the cathedral, political meetings with DKSU 
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and the Next Stop movement, and a night of partying at a disco. The tourists stayed at a youth 
hostel and during their stay they were accompanied by a Russian speaking guide.
1373
 
 
DISSEMINATION 
 
The final question to consider in this chapter is the question of dissemination. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, dissemination could take place in oral or written form. A reading of the archival 
collections gives the impression that many delegation participants were very active upon returning 
home. This is, for example, suggested by the attendance figures on public lectures given by 
members of the 1950 cultural delegation (although, the round numbers do seem somewhat 
artificial).
1374
 
 
The lecture trail. However, what is important about the 1950 report is the variety of venues for 
public lectures. They included not only “the usual suspects” such the DKP and DKSU branches but 
also trade unions, professional interest organizations, and the numerous non-political open lecture 
societies. This was also the case with the participants of the small-holder farmers’ delegation. By 
April 1954 the delegation participants had given 284 public lectures in total.
1375
 Most of them had 
taken place in non-communist circles, especially within the circles of the social-liberal party 
movement.
1376
 For example, one participant had given public lectures in numerous small-holder 
farmer’s local associations, social-liberal party branches, and popular high schools across Western 
Funen and Central Jutland.
1377
 
However, we still have to answer the most difficult question – whether the lectures influenced the 
listeners. The only study of its kind, based on a reading of the coverage of these public lectures (by 
delegation participants and tourists) in the non-communist local press in the 1950s, concludes that 
the listeners mostly perceived the speakers and their impressions of life and the development of the 
socialist society in the USSR as curious or downright exotic in a time before traveling abroad 
became a more common activity.
1378
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Communist and non-communist press. As was the case with oral dissemination, written 
dissemination sought outlets outside communist circles. David Hejgaard of Land og Folk who 
participated in the small-holder farmer’s delegation wrote articles for the communist newspaper1379 
just as his colleague Leif Gundel, who participated in another delegation a few months earlier, 
wrote about the Volga-Don Canal in the DKP Christmas annual.
1380
 In the same manner Villy 
Fuglsang wrote a glowing appraisal for Soviet collective farming for the DKP theoretical journal 
Tiden
1381
 and the delegation members produced a collective presentation of the experience for the 
DKSU journal.
1382
 
However, it was more important to publish among non-communist circles, or the participants would 
only be preaching to the choir. One example of this is the above quoted tourist Eva Hansen, who 
wrote an op-ed for her local newspaper in order to convince readers that the non-communist press’ 
coverage was false and that, in reality, the USSR was a powerful and democratic society that was 
developing rapidly (argument by production figures) and that Danes should go there themselves to 
alter their perception of the USSR.
1383
  
Regarding the delegation of small-holder farmers the most interesting case is the articles written for 
non-communist journals by Thomas Christensen. He managed to place articles in 
Husmandshjemmet (the journal of the small-holder farmer’s national association), Pacifisten (the 
journal of the Danish affiliation of War Resisters' International), and Ungdom og Idræt (the journal 
of the Danish Gymnastics Associations). Thomas Christensen's article in Husmandshjemmet 
followed Soviet propaganda themes closely. Collective farmers were satisfied because material 
living conditions had evolved considerably since czarist times and the collectivization had happened 
by voluntary association. All farmers were, like the rest of Soviet society, a peace-loving people 
who desired nothing but friendly relations with the surrounding world.
1384
 The article might as well 
have been printed in FOS. The article in Pacifisten was framed in the same manner. It was 
emphasized that there were no real differences of the living conditions and interests between Danish 
and Soviet peasants. Once again the Soviet will to live in peace was emphasized and he also 
repeated the claim of completely voluntary participation in the collectivization process.
1385
 Thomas 
Christensen published several articles in Ungdom og Idræt. This gave him space for more extensive 
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descriptions of the impressions from Leningrad and Moscow (in highly positive terms). The author 
seemed impressed by the subway, art museums, and the then relatively new MGU building. In this 
context, he argued that queues outside shops in the capital were not due to production shortages, but 
too few shops. Furthermore, he argued, again, that the collectivization process had been completely 
voluntary, that state farms were model farms, and that the quality of the farms was much higher 
than the small dark peasant sheds of czarist Russia. Finally, he claimed that the all-encompassing 
propaganda of the Soviet state towards its own population was just normal public education 
activities and that the USSR had genuine gender equality (exemplified by female construction 
workers and female police officers regulating the traffic). According to Thomas Christensen, it 
would be "both wise and useful" if people showed greater open-mindedness towards, understanding 
of, and confidence in the Soviet Union.
1386
 
Two important points come to mind when reading Christensen’s articles. Firstly, the techniques of 
hospitality seem to have worked, although he must be considered to have traveled with a 
predisposed positive view of the USSR. Secondly, his articles succeed in reaching a circle of 
readers normally not exposed to communist views. 
This was also the case with the impressions of the members of the journalists’ delegatoin of the 
Krjukovo “Potemkin village” labor camp. As expected the communist paper only mentions the visit 
in passing in a positive manner.
1387
 More importantly other participants also had positive views. 
This included the otherwise staunch anti-communist Erik Seidenfarden of Information.
1388
 This led 
to a strongly worded critique by Margrethe Buber-Neumann, one of very few people to survive both 
Stalin’s and Hitler’s KZ camps, who compared his impressions with the” Potemkin village” 
sceneries in Ravensbrücke, established to fool international press.
1389
 Erik Seidenfarden half-
heartedly tried to defend himself by stating that one camp could not be said to represent the entire 
prison system.
1390
 His double standards did not serve him credit. Similarly, based on this singular 
visit Einar Skov of Politiken claimed that Soviet prisoners experienced a freedom and self-
governance that Danish inmates could only dream of and he dismissed the entire idea that inmates 
should be counted by the millions.
1391
 Furthermore, both Næsselund Hansen of the Ritzau news 
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agency
1392
 and Knud Madsen of Fyns Tidende
1393
 believed the fairy tale and conveyed this message 
to their readers. Only Terkel M. Terkelsen of Berlingske Tidende
1394
 and Peder Tabor of 
Socialdekmokraten
1395
 managed to keep a clear head. 
 
The Danish press and the Soviet guests. The question of how members of Soviet delegations and 
tourist groups might have disseminated their experience upon returning home falls beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. However, we do know something of the perception of the Soviet guests in 
Danish print media. When the first groups of Soviet tourists began to arrive in the late 1950s it was 
almost a sensation, to the degree that the tourists almost felt that they were being stalked by the 
Danish press.
1396
 However, this interest quickly faded, and stories on Soviet visitors focused on the 
unfairness of their negative perception of Denmark, for example, in the case of a 1963 youth 
delegation that found Denmark to be an uncultured and unmoral capitalist nation.
1397
 This example 
shows how articles on the Soviet representatives sought to confirm the already established position 
on the USSR already established in Danish non-communist media. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter we have discussed delegations and tourism. Through several examples we have seen 
how delegations followed a fairly specific pattern. Often, members were selected on the basis of 
how they were expected to be willing to disseminate their experience upon returning home, and it 
was hoped this would be in a positive manner. This was only somewhat the case. As the case of the 
delegation of journalist show, participants could be somewhat moved, but mostly they held on to 
their predisposed view. 
In contrast to the delegations, tourism has a much more fluid character and it is not possible to 
conclude on the experiences of the travelers. However, it is possible to note that both the Soviet 
tourism agencies and DKSU placed great emphasis on tourism as a means for promoting the USSR 
and project an image of socialism as the superior form of society. 
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It is very difficult to conclude anything definitive based on the available sources. Some travelers 
were clearly very positive prior to traveling and sought to confirmation of this position. However, 
we have to ask if the many repeated problems with poor guides, changes to the schedule, and the 
experience of Soviet reality actually changed the position of the travelers in a positive direction. 
The various references in newspapers to public lectures by returning travelers and the few surviving 
sources on this question in the DKSU files indicate that the travel experience had very little chance 
of influencing or altering the already existing deep frames of the travelers. This conclusion is more 
important than the usual Soviet emphasis on the quantity of travelers of both delegations and 
tourists groups. 
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Chapter 9: The Glasnost Years, 1985-1991 
 
“Putting Glasnost to the test”. 
Next Stop Soviet slogan.
1398
 
 
The final years of the Cold War correspond with the years of Mikhail Gorbachev and his policy of 
perestroika and glasnost. It is possible to interpret these years in two different ways. The first is that 
the supposed changes in Soviet policies, including its foreign policy created a new energy and 
positive interest in the USSR. The second is to perceive his policies as leading to a collapse, and 
that this collapse included the cultural diplomacy sphere and apparatus. 
In this chapter we will start from the position that the old apparatus showed serious signs of fatigue, 
but that time also created new opportunities. However, in the end the USSR collapsed, and although 
it is important to bear in mind that the actors at the time had no way of foreseeing this the chapter 
will end on the note of the ramifications of the collapse for the various parts of cultural diplomacy 
apparatus, both internationally and in a Danish context. 
 
DKSU 
 
During the mid-1980s DKSU business continued as usual, as discussed in Chapter 7, in regards to 
the high level of activity in the friendship house, the lower level of activities in the local branches, 
and the cultural months. 
For example, the 1986 cultural days centered on the Estonian SSR. In connection with the cultural 
days an Estonian cultural group toured Denmark. The group consisted of 35 people. 11 were folk 
musicians, and there were 4 vocalists, 8 dancers, 4 jazz musicians, 1 piano soloist, and 1 opera 
soloist. The group gave 26 shows with an overall audience of 5,500 persons performing in 
Copenhagen, Slagelse, Horsens, Åle, Vejle, Silkeborg, Them, Assens, Svendborg, Voldum, Århus, 
Frederikshavn, Svogerslev, and Roskilde. They performed in sport centers, schools, high schools, 
public institutions, music halls, theaters (including Musikhuset (‘The Concert Hall’ in Århus), and 
jazz clubs. Across the country they met with local political dignitaries and local members of DKSU 
and co-organizing associations, primarily folk dancers.
1399
 Additionally 3,110 cultural days 
newspapers and 820 posters were distributed to schools, adult evening schools, theaters, and local 
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DKSU branches. In Copenhagen alone 210 posters were distributed to libraries, collective members 
of DKSU, lecture societies, and schools.
1400
 The Estonian SSR organized cultural days in 3-4 other 
countries and in Denmark, simultaneously.
1401
  
However, by 1988 every Soviet republic had been represented in the cultural days.
1402
 DKSU had to 
decide whether to continue hosting cultural days or try something new. There was a great 
unwillingness to continue, partly because the public had lost interest in the folklorist 
presentations,
1403
 partly because by starting over DKSU would have to begin anew with Azerbaijan 
SSR, and DKSU did not want to be perceived as picking sides in the Azerbaijan-Arminian conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nevertheless the Azerbaijan cultural days took place and much to the 
relief of DKSU no one accused them of picking sides in what DKSU considered to be an internal 
Soviet question.
1404
 However, the 1990 Latvian cultural days ended in scandal when a Latvian rock 
group refused to perform at the Land og Folk Festival.
1405
 Cultural days with the usual broader 
program were altogether canceled.
1406
 Public lectures also lost their appeal. Although the high 
frequency of public lectures organized by DKSU Copenhagen continued,
1407
 fewer and fewer 
people showed up. Often they could be counted on one or two hands.
1408
 A 1990 panel with 
participation of seven peace movements had and audience of just 14 persons,
1409
 and only eight 
persons showed up for a lecture on the Soviet legal system.
1410
 
 
THE PEACE MOVEMENT 
 
The sudden 1987 Soviet acceptance of the double track decision took the wind out of the peace 
movements.
1411
 This was also the case with SAK, although it tried to find a new purpose such as 
environmental questions and the protection of the rain forest.
1412
 The leading (and employed by 
SAK) communist member of SAK Johnny Baltzersen complained to DKP peace secretary Anker 
Schjerning that SAK lacked funding (including for his continued employment) despite DKP writing 
                                                 
1400
 ABA/DKSU/3/Undated statistics. 
1401
 ABA/DKSU/3/DKSU EC minutes 1.31.1987. 
1402
 Pedersen et. al., 17. 
1403
 ABA/DKSU/5/Minutes of meeting with SSOD 12.12.1988; 105/EC minutes 1.16.1988; 1.1.1989. 
1404
 ABA/DKSU/105/EC minutes 11.18.1989. 
1405
 ABA/DKSU/105/EC minutes 9.29.1990 
1406
 ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC minutes 8.9.1990. 
1407
 ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenhagen EC Minutes 212.1991. 
1408
 Glasnost 1991:13, 2-3. 
1409
 ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copnehagen EC minutes 10.25.1990. 
1410
 ABA/DKSU/35/DKSU Copenahgen EC minutes 10.4.1990. 
1411
 Jensen (2014) I, 685-686. 
1412
 ABA/DKP/432/SAK SC minutes 10.14.1988; Assingments from committee meeting 6.3.1989. 
246 
 
off a loan to SAK, and he could not see how it would be possible to raise new means for the 
continued activities of the peace movement.
1413
  In1988 SAK had to move out of Fredscentret (‘The 
Peace Center).
1414
 In an internal evaluation DKP concluded that the peace cause had lost its ability 
to inspire poplar mobilization, primarily, according to DKP, because the social-democrats no longer 
seemed affected by popular peace activities.
1415
  
 
THE NEXT STOP MOVEMENT 
 
However, the Soviet-influenced peace movement had one final ace up its sleeve. In September 1989 
approximately 5000 young Scandinavians “invaded” the USSR to participate in cultural dialogue 
meetings with Soviet youth.  The youth movement was known as “Next Stop Soviet” (NSS). In the 
following we shall discuss who they were, how the idea came to be, and why it culminated in a rock 
concert at the Lenin Heights opposite MGU. 
 
Unge for Fred. As was the case with the “adult” movement the youth communists were also 
expected to contribute to the struggle for peace. Their activities sprang from DKU Copenhagen 
following a 1983 discussion on how to recreate the slumbering peace activities. In order to gain 
momentum DKU members, who ran Unge for Fred (‘Youth for Peace’), put aside emphasis on 
traditional peace slogans in line with Soviet communist ideology and instead focused on activism 
such as theater, concerts, street performances, painting and so on. A major event was a successful 
operation to stop the clock at Copenhagen City Hall at 5 minutes to 12. Although UfF seemed 
apolitical and able to co-opt movements with different views or negative opinions on the USSR and 
the Eastern Block they were not willing to accept a policy that placed equal blame on the USA and 
USSR for the arms race. DKU continued to be frame NATO and the USA as the villains of the 
international systemic conflict.
1416
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Next Stop Nevada. At some point the idea of sending a delegation of peace guards to protest at the 
American nuclear test site in Nevada came up.
1417
 On an organizational level this meant that DKU, 
Youth for Peace and Next Stop more or less mixed together and became a singular movement.
1418
 
Next Stop Nevada (NSN) presented the project at the October 1986 World Peace Congress in 
Copenhagen in October 1986. Next Stop representatives came primarily into contact with American 
church organizations participating in the congress. These contacts formed the logistic backbone of 
the Nevada odyssey.
1419
 In Denmark, NSN mobilized youth participation by having schools, various 
institutions, trade unions, and organizations select their own representative 
In April 1987 55 peace guards traveled to the US as representatives of Next Stop Nevada. 
Following conversations with advisers of several congressmen the peace guards were divided into 
two teams traveling in Greyhound buses on a Northern and Southern route to Las Vegas. Along the 
way participants engaged American youth at various public schools, high schools, universities, and 
even military schools. They met with grass root organizations, trade unionists, church 
representatives, local politicians, mayors, governors, and the would-be Democrat presidential 
candidate Jesse Jackson to discuss the nuclear test ban, disarmament, and world peace. In Nevada 
the tour culminated in an evening concert just outside the fence of the Nuclear Test Site where Søs 
Fenger and the band Moonjam played the Next Stop “theme song” Ticket to Peace and an inflatable 
globe was thrown across the fence surrounding the actual test site. From there the tour continued to 
San Francisco before returning to New York and departuring for Denmark.
1420
 
 
Next Stop Soviet. In many ways Next Stop Soviet (NSS) was a multifaceted, multi-activities and 
multi-directed movement reflecting the UfF years. However, it is possible to identify four major 
directions or tasks of NSS: establishing the structures of the organization and promoting NSS in 
Denmark, creating an international Next Stop Movement, engaging Soviet Youth, and planning the 
culmination.  
Having returned from Nevada, it was concluded that NSN had been a success, especially because it 
had resonated in the Danish press and had received attention in the non-communist press (that 
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usually ignored the peace movements),
1421
as well as among various sub-cultures through rock 
concerts and theater performances, and even among youth organizations and trade unions (who 
gave economic support) that usually did not support the peace movement.
1422
 It was decided the 
movement would continue with three purposes: to organize a lecture tour to popularize the 
experiences and results of NSN, to develop ideas for a new project, and to establish the 
organizational foundation for a new project.
1423
 The Coordination Committee concluded that a new 
project should not focus solely on the negative (US nuclear testing) but contain an element of 
adventure, appeal to individual actions and collective sense of responsibility. In other words it had 
to be able to mobilize both local and central activists one more time.
1424
 Several suggestions were 
put forward: the North as a Nuclear Free Zone, Next Stop the Baltic Sea, Next Stop Muroroa, or 
Next Stop Thule.
 1425
 
However, interest quickly gathered around Next Stop Soviet, which was seen as the logical follow 
up to NSN. The key argument of NSS was that youth on both sides of the Iron Curtain had to take 
responsibility and engage in dialogue and establish a new kind of logic that would remove the threat 
of future nuclear war.1426 In other words, DKU wanted to turn an anti-American protest movement 
into a dialogue forum. An internal DKU memorandum clearly stated that NSS should not be a 
protest movement, since the sole culprit of the arms race and nuclear testing (according to DKU) 
was the USA, and therefore any critical statements from the peace movement could only be directed 
towards that country. The USSR was still perceived as the leader of a coalition of reason that 
promoted ideals of common security, global responsibility, and a total abandonment of traditional 
power politics thinking in terms of strength and deterrence policies. For these reasons DKU had to 
place itself as the organizational center of the NSS movement.
1427
 
 
Organization. NSS initially inherited its organizational structure from NSN. 120 local groups 
mainly based on local UfF groups elected representatives for the national conference that in turn 
elected a national Coordination Committee that in turn elected an Executive Committee for 
managing the day-to-day running of the campaign. However, most of the work and decision making  
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Table 9.A.: Next stop chronology: 
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process took place within the Secretariat of NSS Copenhagen of approximately 20 people, the most 
active (or core) group of DKU and UfF activists.
1428
 This did not stem from an insistence on staying 
in overall control alone. The NS archives are full of minutes and letters complaining that the 
representatives of other organizations or local groups did not attend the meetings of the executive 
organs. 
The scope of the NSS project quickly expanded, and so did the organization. A number of activity 
groups planned concrete projects to take place in the USSR, while support groups provided the 
logistic support for the realization of the projects. The project groups covered the themes rock 
music, theater, sports, photo, art, youth clubs, public school, high school, seminars, universities and 
young scientists, apprentices, young workers, trade unions, environmental issues, sailors, the 
handicapped, city twinning, and media dialogue. The support groups included the Soviet group 
(negotiations in the USSR), economy, travels, Nordic coordination, and internal and external 
communication. All groups included members of the secretariat and, formally, also of the 
coordination committee.
1429
 A few groups were both planning and supporting groups. One example 
is the environmental group that at the same time produced thick booklets on environmental issues 
such as the negative impact of Freon on the greenhouse effect,
1430
 organized conferences on 
environmental questions in Denmark,
1431
 and protested against conventional private car use,
1432
 and 
organized projects to be realized in the USSR.  
One of the most important support groups was the partnership dissemination group tasked with 
finding partners for potential projects. Those interested in NSS filled out a project form describing 
the general idea behind the project, what kind of partner it wanted, and where in the USSR the 
dialogue meeting (as the partnership projects were called) would hopefully to take place.
1433
 
49 local NSS groups were established across Denmark
1434
 with local constitutions similar to those 
of the national organization.
1435
 Some of the local groups were in charge of coordination contacts 
with specific geographic areas, for example NS Elsinore with the Baltic republics
1436
 or NS Århus 
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with Leningrad
1437
 (Aarhus’ twin city). Various trade unions and political youth organizations 
joined NSS as well.
1438
 
To maintain the feeling of a coherent movement with local influence on activities and the overall 
development of NSS several national conferences took place. However, more often than not, as was 
the case with the Kolding conference in April 1988, no actual decisions were made at the 
conferences. Following this, local groups had a perception of national conferences as forums for 
too-late and too-little one way communication from the secretariat, and they considered it a “junta” 
that made all the decisions during conspiratorial meetings in far-away Copenhagen, whereas the 
secretariat felt that it had to lost any overview of the entire movement and that this endangered the 
entire campaign.
1439
 In the middle of threatening economic ruin, extremely difficult negotiations in 
the USSR, and huge problems with establishing a transnational movement the entire organization of 
NSS was restructured to try and save and renew the democratic basis of the organization and the 
dynamic flow of the campaign.
1440
  The new constitution made two important changes. It changed 
NSS membership from an activity based criteria to a membership fee paying based criteria and 
established that all decisions had to be based on the principle of full consensus. Other than that the 
Coordination Committee changed its name to Consultation Committee, but it still had to elect an 
Executive Committee.
1441
  The Consultation Committee, elected at each national conference, 
consisted of representatives of the working groups, local groups, and affiliated organizations.
1442
 
However, the Executive Committee elected after a conference in Århus still consisted of the same 
DKU members and fellow-travelers who formed the inner core in the still independently existing 
Secretariat in Copenhagen,
1443
 which became the headquarters of the international movement 
discussed below. 
Throughout its existence NSS struggled financially. It was estimated that the entire cost of NSS 
Soviet amounted to 20,000,000 kroner.
1444
 In May 1988 a debt of nearly 120,000 Kroners 
threatened to put an end to NSS. NSS took place before the Internet, so NSS developed a substantial 
debt to the telephone company (KTAS). In addition, there were many unpaid printing bills, and a 
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debt to DKSU for travels to meetings in the Soviet Union.
1445
 In the end, two people were appointed 
to clean up the financial matters
1446
  and a group was organized to find solutions to secure a 
monthly income of 250,000 kroner for the budget to balance.
1447
 NSS received substantial financial 
support in the form of subvention from various private foundations, the Ministry of culture, and 
trade unions accounted for almost 643.000 kroner.
1448
 A credit line was opened.
1449
 DKSU wrote 
off the debt for unpaid purchased travels.
1450
 The Copenhagen Municipality paid a monthly subsidy 
to cover the running expenses of rent, taxes and renovation of the sign factory (see below)
1451
 and a 
separate subsidy for the operation of the café.
1452
 Most travel funds were collected through a 
national fundraising effort titled "Go East".
1453
 Each participant received a ticket roll attached to a 
personal bank account opened specifically with the trip in mind. When the entire roll was sold the 
travel costs were covered.
1454
 
In the middle of its financial crisis NSS suddenly had to find a new lease. Following negotiations 
with the Copenhagen Municipality they rented an 850m
2
 former sign factory in Guldbergsgade 
consisting of two buildings with an inner courtyard.
1455
 The building contained offices and various 
workshops including a sound studio and a theater hall. A special part of the house was Кафе Rust 
(later Cafe Rust) named in honor of the West German pilot Mathias Rust who landed his plane just 
off the Red Square.
1456
 The café opened in October 1988
1457
 and continues to exist. 
 
Promotion. To make the general Danish public aware of the NSS campaign several activities took 
place in Denmark. Among them were a bonfire night on the anniversary day of Danish liberation 
from Nazi occupation at the end of World War II to mark the responsibility of Denmark in a 
moving world and the right to say no to nuclear arms.
1458
 It was considered an enormous success 
with more than 200 bonfires across Denmark.
1459
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Each year Fredsfonden (‘The Peace Foundation’) marked Hiroshima Day. But in 1988 it turned the 
event over to NSS to give the movement a possibility to present itself to the public.
1460
 The day was 
marked in Kongens Have (a large public garden in Copenhagen) with political speeches and Q&A 
sessions about NSS. Additionally, there was a “balloon sea”, readings in front of the H.C. Andersen 
statue, a music stage, a dance stage, and a theater stage, while the younger audience members could 
participate in creating a giant painting.
1461
 
Local groups also engaged in activities to gather support and participants for the dialogue meetings 
to take place in September 1989 in the USSR and to make the local public aware of the campaign. 
In Elsinore, for example, a festival called Baltitur took place with participation of bands from the 
Baltic Soviet republics.
1462
  
 
International movement. From the very beginning NSS was envisioned as a transnational 
movement. NSS representatives traveled to the capitals of the Nordic countries to promote the idea 
and find potential partners
1463
 and organized a special Nordic meeting 
1464
 with two additional 
meetings later on.
1465
 Archival sources suggest that a full NS movement was only successfully 
established in Sweden, whereas participation in the other countries was based on initiatives by 
individual organizations or individuals, and that the Finns in particular were very skeptical to the 
entire idea.
1466
  
 
Engaging the Soviet youth. NSS was keenly aware of the necessity to engage both public and 
actual grass roots (informal) organizations in the USSR if the project was to succeed. This meant 
that NSS had to both acquire permission from the top of the Soviet political hierarchy and develop 
contacts very broadly in the Soviet society to find partnerships for the intended projects
1467
  and 
hosts for the participants, as the idea was that NSS participants should stay in the private homes of 
Soviet citizens as a means of strengthening the dialogue aspect of the project.
1468
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Following a meeting at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen
1469
  a letter was sent to the Soviet Peace 
Committee to present the project and ask for negotiations in Moscow.
1470
 
The negotiators’ report suggests that both sides of the negotiation table experienced a cultural 
shock. The Soviet public organizations, The Peace Council and KMO (where the Peace Council 
referenced NSS), clearly did not intend to break with the principle of mono-organizational 
socialism. KMO tried to present itself as the sole possible partner and initiated a delaying tactics by 
pointing to difficulties of practical matters. The second purpose of the negotiations was to engage 
informal groups, and here the negotiators were met with all the warmth, sympathy, energy, ideas for 
cooperation, and enthusiasm the official meetings lacked – mixed with a skeptical view of the 
realistic chances of ever actually realizing the project.
1471
 NSS Denmark’s Coordination Committee 
insisted on keeping both tracks of negotiations open,
1472
 but would not accept that the public 
organization took control of the project in the USSR and continued to work for broader contacts on 
a grass roots level. To further this agenda and secure official sanctioning of direct grass roots level 
contacts, a second negotiation delegation traveled to Moscow in May.
 1473
 The second round of 
negotiations followed the same pattern. KMO continued to evoke delaying tactics to secure 
acceptance on their monopoly on organizing international meetings within a tried and tested 
formula, by continuously pointing to practical problems.
1474
 KMO demands were considered deeply 
problematic and a danger to the realization of NSS, as without direct contact with the Soviet 
informal groups the entire idea behind NSS would fail and the project would not be worth the effort. 
The NSS’s demand for the right to communicate with any organization, group, or movement – and 
that this had to be reflected in an eventual Soviet Coordination Committee – was not open for 
negotiation.
1475
 The Coordination Committee concluded that KMO attempted to pressure NSS by its 
insistence of being the sole host of a dialogue meeting in Moscow and sole right to decide on which 
Soviet organizations and groups were to participate, and that NSS therefore had to get access to 
higher powers: for example, CPSU.
1476
 To further the process the chairmen of the involved youth 
communist, various socialist and social-liberal youth parties traveled to the USSR to negotiate 
directly with Komsomol at the top level, resulting in a promise that KMO and Komsomol would 
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agree to take part in the Soviet movement on equal terms with the informal groups.
1477
 Based on 
this breakthrough, NSS Denmark organized a July 1988 Dialogue Meeting in Moscow with the 
participation of 18 Danes, 2 Swedes, 3 Norwegians, and 150 Soviet citizens invited based on 
formerly established contacts. Komsomol and KMO participated on equal terms with rock 
musicians, environmental activists, young scientists, actors, journalists, artists, construction 
workers, and other representatives of informal groups. The meeting agreed on the basic principles 
of the campaign, discussed partnership dissemination, including concrete projects, and prepared for 
a new meeting in November.
1478
 Informal NSS preparation groups were formed on an informal 
basis in several Soviet cities (see Table 9.B.). A permanent NSS representative office opened at the 
Moscow youth computer club center “Variant,”1479 staffed by a rotating group of Danish and 
Swedish NSS activists.
1480
 A preserved appointment book leaves the impression of a very busy 
schedule with numerous meetings with official authorities, informal contacts, and journalists, phone 
calls, material production, and internal strategy meetings.
1481
 
KMO, the CPSU International Department, the peace committee, and KGB still attempted to 
control the Soviet part of the movement.
1482
 In a final attempt to regain control of the NSS 
Movement inside the USSR, KMO sent a delegation to Denmark in September 1988.
1483
 Officially 
the delegation’s assignment was to find out more about NSS, whilst unofficially its assignment was 
to put pressure on the participating Danish organizations to make NSS withdraw from the 
campaign. Leading members of NSS Denmark concluded that KMO was in a weak negotiating 
position since KMO could not tolerate the loss of prestige by not being part of Next Stop Soviet in 
the USSR if NSS became a success.
1484
 The following days KMO met with NSS representatives 
and affiliated organizations. KMO did not receive the hoped for support for a role as the sole Soviet 
organizer and still refused to partake on an equal level with the informal organizations.
1485
  
Following the second meeting with KMO it was decided that the various projects and initiatives in 
Denmark should start sending their own negotiators to the USSR. For example, NSS Århus 
negotiated with KMO in Leningrad in November 1988. Typical of negotiations outside of Moscow, 
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they took place in a positive and constructive manner. This was also the case of meetings between 
NSS Denmark and Soviet representatives of informal groups.
1486
 
 
Table 9.B: List of Soviet NSS groups by city or area:
1487
 
 
 
 
The constructive role of KMO and Komsomol was also visible in role they played in the 
establishment of local NSS organizations, for example in Novosibirsk where KMO, Komsomol, and 
the Komsomol Regional Railway’s Committee partook  on equal terms with informal groups such 
                                                 
1486
 ABA/NS/20/Various reports undated. 
1487
 ABA/NS/21/List of Soviet NS groups undated. 
257 
 
as “Bachna” and “GTS NTTM” in establishing a regional NS Soviet branch. The present NSS 
Denmark representative played a central role in the founding meeting.
1488
 
A second Dialogue Meeting took place in Moscow in November 1988. As well as partnership 
meetings and dissemination activities to connect potential partner groups, the meeting decided on an 
international structure with national affiliations based on the same principle of equality of all 
partners and consensus in the decision making process.
1489
 Additionally the meeting established five 
international working committees on preparation of the following meetings, financial management, 
information dissemination, “Rock on the Red Square”, and other activities in September 1989.1490 
In the spring of 1989, Soviet authorities finally gave in. The CPSU CC voted in favor of a secret 
decision to support NSS, a special Soviet Support Committee was established, and the foreign 
ministry set up a set of special set of rules easing NSS traveling restrictions to the USSR.
1491
 The 
chairman of the Soviet Next Stop Support Committee was Svetlana Savitskaia (the second woman 
in space and high-ranking member of the peace committee) and included high-ranking participation 
from various ministries, state committees, public organizations and Mossoviet. The committee was 
tasked with solving all practical problems in relation to the realization of Next Stop Soviet.
1492
 
An official Soviet NSS Coordination Committee was founded in May at a conference with 120 
participants of both public and informal groups on equal terms, organized primarily by NSS 
Denmark representatives. A July national conference formally founded NSS Soviet.
1493
 
A third Dialogue Meeting took place in Denmark and a forth in Stockholm, both with participation 
of Soviet representatives of the informal groups. The meetings were spent in discussions on the 
culmination in September, the future of the NS movement, meetings between project partners, and 
dissemination of partnerships.
1494
 
 
First Step/Culmination. In the end the word “Culmination” was exchanged for “First Step” as a 
sign of goodwill towards the Soviet partners who felt more like objects of the campaign than 
participants and feared that Western NSS national affiliations would burn all bridges following the 
culmination events,
1495
 whereas the Soviet participants did not consider the September events a 
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culmination, but the beginning of long term relations.
1496
 Despite Glasnost it was not without 
danger to engage in contacts with foreigners and Soviet participants feared being abandoned to the 
mercy of Soviet authorities.  
 
Table 9.C: Dialogue meetings during Next Stop Soviet
1497
 
 
 
 
269 dialogue meetings were held with the participation of at least 4690 Nordic non-Soviet 
participants.
1498
 The USSR had been divided into 12 regions with both foreign and Soviet 
coordinators in each region.  
Some dialogue meetings were realized prior to September. In July, an “armada” of sailing ships 
sailed to Leningrad under the project title “The Wind Knows No Borders”1499  to visit a Leningrad 
yacht club. After receiving visas at the very last minute, the armada of 25 ships gathered in the 
Helsinki Harbor and sailed to Leningrad to spend a week in dialogue with ordinary Soviet 
citizens.
1500
 Another early dialogue meeting was an ethnological expedition to Yamal to assess the 
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negative impact on indigenous peoples caused by drilling for oil and gas.
1501
A third special project 
was the rock album Laika, made up of 12 Danish and 12 Soviet rock songs. The Soviet songs had 
been recorded in a Danish mobile sound studio in Leningrad. It was the first album to be released in 
the USSR on a different label than Melodya.
1502
 
Five projects were cross regional. That is to say that they were mobile dialogue meetings moving 
across the USSR through one or several of the established regions.  
The Theatre Caravan followed the route Copenhagen-Warsaw-Minsk-Rudinsk-Smolensk-Moscow 
with several longish stops en route to engage directly with ordinary people through the medium of 
street performances. The Caravan consisted of 20 individual groups including Danish street 
performers, circus artists, comedy acts, a puppet theater, variety singers, West German musicians, 
Dutch street performers and a transvestite, and the Danish punk and beatcore bands Stalin Staccato 
and Kluge Kinder.
1503
  
The Culture Train was a train with 50 Danes and 25 Soviets, who were jugglers, mimes, street 
artists, musicians, painters and a silversmith. They took part in a railroad journey along the route 
Leningrad-Vologda-Perm-Sverdlovsk-Tobolsk-Omsk-Novosibirsk-Cheliabinsk-Ufa-Kubichev-
Ulianovsk-Moscow with the purpose of opening a dialogue through the languages of culture 
between ordinary people in Scandinavia and the Soviet Union on common problems and how to 
build a society in ecological balance with nature and of freedom, security and opportunities for 
development for all. NSS had to cooperate with Komsomol, who still operated agitprop trains, on 
the project. The journey resulted in meetings with enthusiastic local audiences at both pre-arranged 
events and spontaneous festivities.
1504
  
On the upper floor of a Vilnius Technical School a Dungeons and Dragons Club from Albertslund 
played D&D with members of a local science-fiction club. The age different did not seem to play a 
role. Several Danish youth clubs were active in NSS. Elsewhere in the Baltic Soviet republics, in 
Pärnu, members of the youth club “Hullet” (“The Hole”) from Ballerup met with peers, lived with 
them in their homes, went on field trips, and discussed the pollution of the Baltic Sea. Another 
group ran a cafeteria. An ecological project planted trees at phosphate mines. A specific point of the 
demonstration was that the trees would inevitably die.
1505
  Members of a youth club from Roskilde 
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brought a circus tent to Tallinn where they performed together with the local youth both in the tent 
and at local youth clubs. The acts included dancing, fire juggling, singing, and clowns.
1506
 
Although protesting was not the central theme it had been during NSN, participation in protests at 
the Soviet test site in Semipalatinsk did take place.
1507
 In Ukrainian SSR NSS activists participated 
in a three day protest march against the Chernobyl atomic power plant, despite strong concerns 
about the possible health consequences. Following a visit to Pripiat the march ended with a party in 
front of the barracks of the workers of the still operating parts of the plant.
1508
 
In Leningrad youth groups also met with their peers. Danish rock bands performed together with 
Soviet bands, and dance acts met with and performed together with Soviet dancers.
1509
 Another 
participant in Leningrad was the social-creative project on the struggle against youth unemployment 
“Frontløberne,”1510 including the theater group Kronstadt 89 with a combination of stage plays and 
dancing.
1511
  Another participating organization Cirkus Tværs, primarily consisted of immigrants 
from the Gellerup social housing project performing various forms of acrobatics.
1512
 
In Siberia groups of Russian studies and social science students from Aarhus University 
participated in a seminar with Soviet students in Akademgorodok outside Novosibirsk.
1513
 In 
Krasnoobsk a group of social workers visited a local youth center and the local youth prison. When 
visiting the latter they became very inspired by its re-education program based on Makarenko’s 
principles.
1514
  
The largest center of activities was Moscow. This was due to the location of the NSS headquarters 
in Izmailovskaia, the majority of activities taking place there, and the idea that all Next Stoppers 
would gather in Moscow for the final concert. Among the participating projects in Moscow was the 
first hot air balloon to grace the Moscow skyline since the 1920 October celebrations. The first 
flight took place in Gorky Park. The second flight took them along the River Moscow and over the 
Kremlin only to be grounded by the commander of the Moscow air defense forces, who was not 
pleased that he did not have an answer when Mikhail Gorbachev phoned him to ask what it was that 
flew by his windows in his Kremlin office.
1515
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Arriving in Moscow, the various performers gathered for a festival in Gorky Park. However, this 
became the first of two anti-climaxes of NSS. The park had officially closed for the season, no 
advisements were made, and only very few, if any Soviet, spectators showed up for the shows.
1516
  
One of the last problems, and the largest, that NSS faced with Soviet authorities was the rock 
concert on the Red Square with Lars HUG as the main Danish act.
1517
 Danish State TV had agreed 
to broadcast it and a simultaneous concert in Copenhagen live.
1518
 Mossoviet gave permission for a 
concert at the Vassilii Heights just off Red Square in late August 1989
1519
 only to withdraw the 
permit, which led to hard negotiations between the Danish concerts organizers and the Supporting 
Committee, with the Danes threatening to sue for lost profits. In the end the Danes received a take-
it-or-leave-it offer for a concert at the Lenin Heights opposite The Moscow State University 
(MGU). On a cold and dark autumn evening, with almost no Soviet participation the concert took 
place within an iron ring of 8,000 Soviet riot police officers. In many ways the concert was 
considered the anti-climax to NS Soviet.
1520
  
However, as Jørgen Knudsen rightly highlights in his book on NSS, the actual culmination had been 
the many personal dialogue meetings, so the anti-climax of the concert should be of little relevance 
for the overall evaluation of Next Stop Soviet.
1521
  
 
NSS as a (rare) success story. Three conclusions should be drawn to indicate that NSS was one of 
the greater success stories of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. 
 Firstly, because DKU broke with decades long traditional forms and content of organizations 
involved in promoting images of the USSR to the Danish public, it succeed in establishing a peace 
movement that resonated outside of the usual communist and fellow-travelling circles. 
Secondly, Next Stop, despite the organizational and, especially, financial chaos in 1988, succeeded 
in establishing the possibility for direct people to people diplomacy to take place all across the 
USSR during September 1989 in a form that had previously been unheard of in the USSR. 
Thirdly, it could be argued that Next Stop, perhaps unintentionally, played a pivotal role in 
strengthening the democratic forces in the USSR that played a role in the mostly peaceful 
dissolutions of the Soviet Union, through the insistence on negotiating with both public and 
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informal Soviet organizations on equal terms, despite them being two distinct groups of Soviet 
actors.  
 
EVERYTHING COMES APART 
 
In 1991 the USSR dissolved peacefully and ceased to exist. The demise of the USSR strongly 
affected DKP and the front organizations in various manners, and the following section shall 
discuss the consequences and survival strategies for various parts of the movement. 
 
DKP collapse. More than any other change of politics of the USSR throughout the years, Glasnost 
had a negative impact on DKP and in the end fractured the party. Ole Sohn, as any other DKP party 
leader before him, loyally followed the CPSU general line. However, there was a strong sentiment 
in DKP against Glasnost, and in the end the majority of members voted with their feet. Many chose 
to join Kommunistisk Forum (‘Communist Forum’), an orthodox communist circle, instead. DKU 
dissolved. Without the Soviet financial support Land og Folk folded. The remains of DKP joined 
the current party Enhedslisten (‘The Unity List’), a cross-socialist cooperation.1522 
 
DDK collapse. Among the first casualties we also find DDK. Following the collapse of WIDF, 
DDK immediately dissolved as they could not perceive a continued existence without their 
affiliation to WIDF.
1523
 
 
SAK’s final years. Although most of the Soviet-influenced peace movements (discussed in Chapter 
7) collapsed, SAK continued to operate under more meager conditions for a number of years. 
Materials published in the 1990s indicate that SAK continued its anti-American and anti-NATO 
positions by protesting The Gulf War, attacking the concept of a missile shield, and arguing for 
Danish disarmament and withdrawal from NATO.
1524
 At some point after the turn of the 
millennium SAK dissolved. 
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Next Stop Nowhere. Following Next Stop Soviet the core group had burned out all energy.
1525
 All 
that was left was debt and inactivity.
1526
 Three former members of NSS bought Cafe Rust that still 
exists to this day as one of most popular concert venues in Copenhagen.
1527
 
However, whereas the overall project died out, it continued to exist on a personal level. One 
example is the 1990 return visit of Siberian social workers.
1528
 
 
From DKSU to DRF. If we take a look across the field of pro-Soviet organization a single survivor 
stands out, DKSU. 
By 1991 DKSU had to acknowledge the end of the former glory days both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The friendship work lost its ideological meaning, the traditional lines of 
communication broke down, and the traditional Soviet partnership organizations collapsed. 
Therefore, the DKSU leadership concluded that future activities had change from a clearly 
propagandistic angle to a more humanitarian perspective.
1529
 This new angle emerged for the first 
time at the 1990 congress when DKSU dared to criticize the USSR for the first time ever, even 
though it was carefully formulated, in casu, on the nuclear tests program at Novaia Zemlia. National 
secretary Asger Pedersen even publicly acknowledged in several newspaper interviews that up to 
that point DKSU had been to propagandistic in its work.
1530
 Meanwhile more than 600 members 
had left DKSU due to disillusion with the developments in the USSR.
1531
 Following an end to 
Soviet subvention the staff of the Friendship House had to be fired. The new Russian state took 
over running the building as an ordinary cultural institute. Only the book shop and the travel 
department (in the form of a new company, Eurasia Rejser) continued to exist until the mid-
1990s.
1532
 
Based on the developments described we should expect yet another story of a closure. However, 
this was not the case. Following a seminar on the possibilities to either continue as a new 
association for bilateral relations with Russia, or the CIS countries, or to dissolve entirely
 1533
 
DKSU decided at a 1992 extraordinary congress to change their name to Dansk-Russisk Forening 
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(‘Danish-Rusisan Associaton’).1534 Despite the organizational continuation, DRF was in spirit a 
different association from DKSU. This was also the case regarding the financial situation. Not only 
did the annual budget decrease, so did the annual deficit.
1535
 DRF more or less hibernated for 
several years,
1536
 however, by the late 1990s various local DRF branches became active once 
more
1537
 and DRF continues to exist as an association for bilateral relations with the Russian 
peoples. As such it stands out as the lone survivor of the Soviet-influenced Danish organizations of 
the Cold War. 
 
CONCLUIONS 
 
The Glasnost years of Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark bear three specific trademarks. 
Firstly, despite the optimism that the Glasnost years inspired in the general public they were 
difficult years for the Soviet-influenced movement as regards organizational relations and 
financing. 
Secondly, the movements lost momentum partly due to the Soviet acceptance of the terms of the 
double track decision, and partly due to the end to Soviet subvention of at least part of the Soviet- 
influenced movement. During these years the Next Stop movement is the exception to prove the 
rule as the only story of success during these years, but only because it broke completely with the 
form and contents of the way Soviet cultural diplomacy had traditionally operated up to that point. 
Thirdly, with one notable exception the Soviet-influenced movement was unable to survive the 
collapse of the USSR, and this fact tells us much about its nature and purpose. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
“Regimes based on extreme ideologies also have a habit of obscuring  
their true intentions through a smokescreen of propaganda, 
 twisting otherwise benign values to their own ends”. 
Robert Johnson.
1538
 
 
This dissertation presents an analysis and discussion of Soviet cultural diplomacy towards Denmark 
during the Cold War seen from three perspectives presented in the initial research questions: a 
sender perspective (organizational structures, financing, and decision-making), an activities 
perspective, and a reception level perspective (the possibility of measuring an impact). The 
conclusions follow these three perspectives. 
 
STRUCTURES 
 
Although this dissertation primarily considers the question of the Danish case study, we strived, to 
present a full picture of the many nooks of the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy on all three 
levels and argued, based on the model presented in Chapter 2, that there was very strong 
connections between the three levels (Soviet, international,  and national). It is very important to 
acknowledge these tight relations between the three levels when discussing the organizations and 
activities on a national, in our case in Danish, level. The discussion of the national level must not 
take the international context and relations out of considerations. 
We see a very strong hierarchical system within the USSR with the central CPSU structures as the 
center for making final decisions on the governing of the USSR, including on cultural diplomacy, 
based on established procedures of recommendations made by the various departments of the CPSU 
secretariat. Based on the study of documents from the Soviet archives, we argue that these decisions 
were made within a tightly defined ideological frame of Marxism-Leninism, as it was defined at any 
given time, and that in other parts of the apparatus it was necessary to accept this framework of an 
ideologically based world view to participate in the various involved organizations, either as 
communists or fellow-travelers.  The approved lines of cultural diplomacy filtered down through a 
system of public organizations, ministries, state committees, and state enterprises. 
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Outside the USSR the network of Soviet satellite organizations, the front organizations, should be 
divided into cause oriented and culture oriented organizations. Causes included peace, women, 
youth, students, trade unions, and various professional interest groups resulting in corresponding 
front organizations such as WPC, WIDF, WFDY, and so on. Two generations of front organizations 
are identified.  The first generation front organizations were established following World War II in 
the spirit of the grand alliance, but it quickly became clear that they were utilized by communist and 
fellow-travelers to promote Soviet foreign policy positions. For this reason we see a repeated 
pattern of establishment of a front organization, communist and fellow-traveling control, 
democratic membership organizations leaving, and the forming of counter-organizations. The 
second generation front organizations were established in connection with the second peace struggle 
against the NATO double track decision and deployment of Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. 
Through a line of indirect elections the front organizations came under the control of a small core 
group of communists and fellow-travelers active in a central executive organ with powers to 
formulate the policy positions of the entire organization.  
At the national level we also see the establishment of first and second generation front 
organizations. However, there are some differences. Regarding the first generation of organizations 
we see a difference between front organizations established with the purpose of functioning as 
Danish affiliates of international front organizations (Fredens Tilhængere, DDK, DFK, etc.) and 
already well-established organizations and institutions (the central trade union, Danish Broadcasting 
Union, DSF etc.) that initially joined or considered joining international front organizations, 
recognized their communist and non-democratic nature, and withdrew, more often than not to join 
the new international counter-organizations. In some cases second generation front organizations 
such as SAK took over the role of national affiliation of an international front organization (in this 
case WPC). Second generation front organizations were closely connected to peace activities, 
typically centered on a specific profession or geographic locality with the words “for Peace” or 
“against Nuclear Arms” attached and engaged in the struggle against the deployment of NATO 
missiles.  
Another aspect of the network focused on the promotion of Soviet culture. The primary medium for 
this promotion was The Society for Cooperation between Denmark and the Soviet Union. DKSU 
should be considered the primary and most important channel promoting Soviet culture and points 
of view in Denmark. Other private companies such as Dan-Ina Film/Folkefilmen centered on a 
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specific area (e.g. movies), and several communist controlled travel agencies worked on promoting 
the USSR through tourism. 
DKP was one of the most loyal communist parties during the Cold War. They received an endless 
stream of instructions, financial and other forms of material support from the USSR. The available 
sources strongly indicate that this support continued to the very end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the USSR. Based on this direct link DKP promoted a pro-Soviet position in the various 
Danish organizations and associations. On a Danish level, several communists repeatedly show up 
in one organization after the other. The most prominent were Ingmar Wagner and Anker Schjerning 
(and prior to them, to some degree Alfred Jensen), and communists often worked in capacities such 
as vice-chairman, secretary or treasurer. In the cases of Ingmar Wagner and Anker Schjerning this 
meant that DKP employed them to work as volunteers in various front organizations, enabling them 
to take on work-heavy positions that, at the same time, made it possible for them to control and 
direct the developments and policies of these organizations. In other cases, DKP members, for 
example Asger Pedersen (DKSU),Johny Baltzersen (SAK) or Hans-Henrik Kjølby (LSA) took on 
paid positions in the organizations enabling to work in a similar manner in their respective 
organizations. 
Archival evidence shows how throughout the Cold War DKP monitored and discussed 
developments in various peace movements and front organizations that had fallen under their 
influence. This does not mean that each and every member of these organizations was a 
sympathizer to communist or Soviet positions, but it does show a clear intent on the 
communist/Soviet side to control these organizations and utilize them in the promotion of Soviet 
positions.  
Regarding the question of financing, the available archival sources document that DKP was 
financed by the USSR both through direct subvention (whitewashed through the annual collections 
for the newspaper), paying overpriced bills for orders placed with the DKP owned printer, and 
various forms of non-currency support. The archival evidence also supports the claim that these 
forms of subvention continued until the collapse of the USSR. Similarly, the available sources 
document financial and material support of DKSU. Regarding the front organizations, it is possible 
to document financial support to the international front organizations, but on a national, Danish, 
level, the only documented case, is the financial support for the establishment of the SAK 
Fredscenter (‘Peace Center’) in Copenhagen. Sources indicate that Danish front organizations 
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received support in other ways such as free delegation trips or the translation and publication of 
materials in Danish free of charge. 
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
In order to establish a pragmatic definition of the term culture we identified eight forms of cultural 
activities to be discussed throughout the dissertation. They were: performing arts, musical arts, 
visual arts, tourism and exchanges, print media, mass media, sports, and the spoken word. 
Cultural diplomacy executed directly by the Soviet state in Denmark centered around mass media 
(Radio Moscow broadcasts), print media (FOS and the various ANP journals), and to some extent 
sports exchanges and exhibitions, although it is also possible to identify some lecture tours. 
The ideologically motivated commercial Danish travel agencies operating on the Soviet market 
seem to have shared the position of the Soviet view on this activity that it had both a financial-
commercial aspect and an ideological  aspect, that of generating sympathy for the Soviet project by 
showcasing the socio-economic progress made and the cultural level of the USSR. Similar cases are 
the delegations that included an extra layer of an expectation that the participants would disseminate 
a positive impression to a wider public audience upon returning home.  
The front and cultural organizations utilized a wide variety of the forms of cultural activities 
through public lectures, various publications, exhibitions, screenings, and concerts, or through a 
combination of these, for example, in the form of the DKSU organized Soviet cultural days. 
In addition, it is possible to identify a number of cases where activities were coordinated between 
the Soviet, the international, and the national level. Examples are the Stockholm peace appeal, the 
accusation of American bacteriological warfare in the Korean War, or in the campaigns against 
NATO deployment of new missiles in the 1980s by the Soviet-influenced parts of the peace 
movements.   
In Chapter 1 we discussed the three colors of Soviet cultural diplomacy (white, gray, and black). 
Having identified the various forms of activities it is possible to conclude that Soviet state executed 
cultural diplomacy was white. The various publications, Radio Moscow broadcasts, and exhibitions 
had a clear sender and most of the contents were either truthful or truthfully in line with Soviet 
opinions and views.  
The activities of the front organizations are of a more dark gray variation because front 
organizations were utilized as an attempt to camouflage the origin of the messages, but at the same 
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time a majority of the general public was able to figure out its actual origin and the contents mostly 
truthfully represented the position of the senders and should for these reasons not be placed in the 
same black category as the disinformation campaigns of KGB (they fall outside the themes of this 
dissertation).  
Similarly, it is possible to measure examples of individual propaganda activities on our color scale. 
Erik Vagn Jensen did not receive financial support for his book, but prior to travelling to the Baltic 
Soviet republics he already shared the Soviet version of the condition in the three Soviet republics. 
However, he did receive a substantial helping hand from APN and other Soviet organizations 
during the research process and in collecting picture materials. As such we can speak of a “light 
gray” case. On the other end of this scale we find a very dark gray case, the multimedia show 
American Pictures. The project’s reliance on assistance from the KGB and Jacob Holdt’s 
willingness to participate in a whataboutism campaign to discredit President Carter’s international 
human rights’ campaign place American Pictures in that darker end of the gray category.  Our Ole 
Friis case study (of a young man who came into contact with the Soviet cultural diplomacy 
apparatus, later becoming an active participant) exemplifies more than anything the substantial 
financial costs of winning over individuals to a pro-Soviet position. An important conclusion 
therefore has to be that in our Danish case study the most successful examples of cultural diplomacy 
were based on individual actions, but despite this the overwhelming amount of activities belonged 
to the category of mass activities because the Soviet cultural apparatus focused on executing 
activities through the channels of public, front, and friendship organizations. 
 
IMPACT 
 
As shown in Chapter 1 the Soviet cultural diplomacy apparatus aimed at influencing the general 
public in any given country so individuals could in turn influence the political decision makers from 
a pro-Soviet position. Therefore, the success or failure of Soviet cultural diplomacy should not be 
evaluated on whether or not it succeeded to directly influence the decision making level in a foreign 
country, but rather how it was received or perceived in the general public based on a combination of 
sources including Soviet planning and evaluation, evaluations of the national front and friendship 
organizations, and evaluations by the general public opinion as primarily seen through a lens of 
print media (as we have seen examples of in the various chapters). 
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Based on the available source materials we conclude that the Soviets were extremely frustrated over 
the lack of success, defined as a broad public support of the general public in Denmark of the Soviet 
initiatives and messages, measured by quantity of participants over quality of the activity. The 
support for Soviet agendas was generally limited to the various front organizations and the 
friendship society, and despite a growth in membership figures towards the mid-1980s they still had 
very little support compared to Danish overall population figures. 
There are several reasons for this: 
Firstly, the Soviet messages were framed in a manner alien to the general public in Denmark and 
therefore they were unable to latch onto the deep frames of the large majority of the Danish 
population.  
Secondly, the actual actions of the USSR in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and 1968, in Hungary in 1956 
and 1958, and in Afghanistan in 1979 caused substantial damage to the possible impact of Soviet 
cultural diplomacy because the difference between what was said and what was done became too 
great, thereby breaking one of the golden rules of successfully executing cultural diplomacy. 
Thirdly, Danish authorities, whether it was on a governmental level, in the civil service, or in the 
Social-democratic movement (that we include since it was in government for most years during the 
Cold War) did not respond to the attempts of pro-Soviet public pressure because they were strongly 
opposed to the Soviet position. Even when the leadership of the Social-democratic party and trade 
unions (for a number of reasons) changed its position on the central question of peace and security 
politics in the 1980s, Soviet cultural diplomacy did not create the hoped for success through public 
pressure because the government and the civil servants still did not alter their position. 
Fourthly, it is necessary to also factor in the question of economics in the equation. The various 
organizations were not able to sustain themselves through the commercial success of the activities. 
If anything, a history of Soviet cultural diplomacy is a history of unending deficits. In the end, the 
various organizations survived partly on Soviet subvention, and partly on the willingness of the 
same smallish group of communists and fellow-travelers to support various collections or purchase 
scarves, special stamps, lottery tickets and so on to time and again to salvage the financial situation 
of the various organizations. This lack of ability to survive on commercial terms is one of the 
strongest indicators of the lack of a broad impact of Soviet cultural diplomacy on the general 
Danish population.  
Naturally there were some examples of success on the general public level: Erik Vagn Jensen’s 
book, Jacob Holdt’s multimedia show, the 1980s peace movements (to a certain degree), and the 
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Next Stop movement are cases where various activities led to new participants joining in. However, 
each of these cases seems to have been very cost inefficient. The Soviet apparatus seems to have 
been very large, bureaucratic, inflexible, and cost-heavy. 
 
DENMARK WAS NOT A SPECIAL CASE 
 
As Olov Wennell has shown, in the strategic and tactical planning of VOKS operations it was 
constantly highlighted that the form of content of Soviet cultural diplomacy should be adapted to 
the country were the activities were to take place.
1539
 However, as he also concludes in his Swedish 
case study, in the annual evaluation reports this problem was repeated year after year as something 
that had to be improved the following year, indicating that it never was. 
For a similar reason it is possible to argue that our Danish case study is not a special case. This 
conclusion is strengthened when we look at Soviet cultural diplomacy from a center-periphery 
perspective.  
If we discuss cultural diplomacy from a perspective of the center it is possible to conclude that just 
as in the Swedish example above nothing was done in a serious attempt to frame messages in a way 
that could be considered to best correspond with the mind-set of “the average Dane” and the 
possible general Danish perceptions of Soviet statements and actions.  
If we turn the perspective on its head and discuss the question from a periphery perspective by 
comparing the works on the various friendship ship societies listed in the historiographical 
discussion in Chapter 1, or compare Danish and Italian reactions within communist and fellow-
travelling circles
1540
 to the 1956 Hungarian events, there are a considerable number of similarities in 
regard to origin, structures (in the names, forms and causes of the front organizations and friendship 
associations), activities, problems, and general reception and perception. When, for example, Simo 
Mikkonen argues that the Soviet-Finnish friendship association moved from an early, post-war very 
propagandistic position to a position of broadly promoting culture, exchanges, and tourism in a 
more somber tone, and that this transformation should be seen within a frame unique to a Finnish 
national case,
1541
 we simply have to note that it is possible to pinpoint exactly the same change in 
position and methods to the same point in time with the Danish-Soviet friendship association 
despite national differences and differences in the national position vis-à-vis the USSR. This places 
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1540
 Rossane Rossandra: The Comrade from Milan (London, 2010), 157-181. 
1541
 Mikkonen, 109-131. 
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a serious question mark over the validity of the comparative school’s insistence on focusing on 
national differences within communist studies.  
 
The overall conclusion of this dissertation are that the Soviet cultural diplomacy failed because the 
Soviets were not able to frame their messages in a way that resonated with the deep frames of the 
general Danish public, but only a minor group of communists and fellow-travelers that were in turn 
unable to apply any real popular pressure to the political decision-makers. 
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Appendix 1: 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
 
Abbreviation Danish translation English translation 
APN Agenturet for Pressenyheder Agency of Press News 
CC Centralkomite Central Committe 
CIMEA Den internationale komite for 
børn og unge foreninger 
International Committee for 
Children’s and Adolescents 
Movements 
Cominform Det kommunistiske 
informationsbureau 
The Communist Information 
Bureau 
Comintern Den kommunistiske 
internationale 
The Communist International 
CPSU Sovjetunionens 
Kommunistiske Parti 
Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union 
DFK Dansk Fredskonference Danish Peace Conference 
DDK Danmarks Demokratiske 
Kvindeforbund 
Denmark’s Democratic 
Women’s Union 
DKP Danmarks Kommunistiske 
Parti 
Communist Party of Denmark 
DKSU Landsforeningen til samvirke 
mellem Danmark og 
Sovjetunionen 
The Society for Cooperation 
between Denmark and the 
Soviet Union 
DKU Danmarks Kommunistiske 
Ungdom 
Denmark’s Communistic 
Youth  
DSF Danske Studerendes Fællesråd Danish Students’ Joint Council 
DUV Demokratisk Ungdoms 
Verdensforbund 
See: WFDY 
EBU EBU European Broadcast Union 
EC Hovedbestyrelse Executive Committee 
FBVA Foreningen til Beskyttelse af 
Videnskabeligt Arbejde 
The Association for the 
Protection of the Rights to 
Scientific Work. 
FIR Den Internationale Føderation 
af Modstandsfolk 
International Federation of 
Resistance Fighters 
FOS Fakta om Sovjetunionen Facts on the Soviet Union 
FT Fredens Tilhængere i Danmark Particans of Peace Denmark 
GKKS Den statslige komite for 
kulturelle forbindelser med 
udlandet 
The State Committee for 
Cultural Connections Abroad 
under the Council of Ministers 
Goskino Statens filmskomite The State Committee for 
Cinematography under the 
Council of Ministers 
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Gosteleradio Statens fjernsyns- og 
radiokomite 
The State Committee for radio 
and television broadcasting 
under the Council of Ministers 
GKKS Den statslige komite for 
kulturelle forbindelser med 
udlandet under Ministerrådet 
The State Committee for 
Cultural Connections Abroad 
under the Council of Ministers 
IAN Det internationale 
nyhedsagentur 
The International News 
Agency 
ICFTU Den Frie Fagforenings 
Internationale 
International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions 
ID Den Internationale Afdeling The International Department  
of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union 
IFDL Demokratiske Juristers 
Internationale Forbund 
International Association of 
Democratic Lawyers 
IOJ Det Internationale 
Journalistforbund 
International Organization of 
Journalists 
IPPNW IPPNW International Association of 
Physicians for the Prevention 
of Nuclear War 
ISC Den International 
Studenterkonference 
International Student 
Conference 
IUS Den internationale 
Studenterføderation 
International Union of Students 
KGB Komiteen for Statens 
Sikkerhed 
The Committee for State 
Security 
LLO Lærlingenes Landsorganisation Apprentices National 
Organization 
MID Sovjetunionens 
udenrigsministerium 
The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Soviet Union 
NATO Atlanterhavspagten The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization 
NSN Next Stop Nevada Next Stop Nevada 
NSS Next Stop Sovjet Next Stop Soviet 
OIRT Det Internationale Radio of 
Fjernsynsforbund 
The International Organization 
of Radio and Television 
Politburo Politbureauet The Political Bureau 
ROSTA Det russiske telegrambureau Russian Telegram Agency 
SAK Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred 
og Sikkerhed 
The Cooperation Committee 
for Peace and Security 
Sovinformburo Det Sovjetiske 
Informationsbureau 
The Soviet Information 
Agency 
Sovmin Ministerrådet Council of ministers 
Sovnarkom Rådet af folkekommisærer Council of People Commissars 
SPC Den sovjetiske fredskomite The Soviet Peace Committee 
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SSOD Forbundet af Sovjetiske 
Foreninger for Venskab og 
Kulturelle Forbindelser med 
Udlandet 
Union of Soviet Societies for 
Friendship and Cultural 
Connections Abroad 
SUDK Foreningen Sovjetunion-
Danmark 
Soviet-Danish Friendship 
Society 
TASS Sovjetunionens 
Telegrambureau 
Telegram Agency of the Soviet 
Union. 
USA Amerikas Forenede Stater The United States of America 
USSR Unionen af Socialistiske 
Sovjetrepublikker 
The Union of Socialist Soviet 
Republics 
VOKS Det Alunioniske Selskab for 
Kulturelle Forbindelser med 
Udlandet. 
The All-Union Organization 
for Cultural Connections 
Abroad 
WFDY Demokratisk Ungdoms 
Verdensforbund 
World Federation of 
Democratic Youth 
WFTU Den Faglige Internationale World Federation of Trade 
Unions 
WIDF Kvindernes Internationale 
Demokratiske Verdensforbund 
Women’s International 
Democratic Federation 
WPC Verdensfredsrådet World Peace Council 
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Appendix 2: 
 
List of archvial abbreviations 
 
 
Abbreviation Danish translation English Translation 
ABA Arbejderbevægelsens bibliotek og 
arkiv 
Library and Archives of the 
Worker’ Movement 
DIIS Dansk Institut for Internationale 
Studier 
Danish Institute for International 
Studies 
KB Det kongelige Bibliotek Royal Library 
KF Kim Frederichsens privatarkiv Kim Frederichsen’s private papers 
LPA Litauens Særlige Arkiv Lithuanian Particular Archives 
LVA Letlands Rigsarkiv Latvian National Archives 
OF Ole Friis’ privatarkiv Ole Friis private papers 
RA Rigsarkivet National Archives 
VP Vladimir Pimonovs privatarkiv Vladimir Pimonov’s private papers 
ГАРФ Det russiske rigsarkiv Russian State Archives 
РГАНИ Det Russuske statsarkiv for nyere 
historie 
Russian State Archives for Current 
History 
РГАСПИ Det Russiske Statsarktiv for Socio-
Politisk Historie 
Russian State Archives for Social 
and Political History 
AJ Alfred Jensen Alfred Jensen 
AJRA Alfred Jensen og Ragnhild Andersen Alfred Jensen and Ragnhild 
Andersen 
CC Centralkomite Central Committee 
BH Børge Houmann Børge Houmann 
CM Carl Madsen Carl Madsen 
Danica Samling af arkivalier om danske 
forhold fra udenlandske arkiver 
Collection of archival documents 
concerning Denmark originating 
from foreign archives. 
Dannato Dansmarks repræsentation ved NATO Denmark’s NATO mission 
DBS Dansk-Bulgarsk Selskab The Danish-Bulgarian Friendship 
Society 
DDK Danmarks Demokratiske 
Kvindeforbund 
Denmark’s Democratic Women’s 
Union 
DFK Dansk Fredskonference Danish Peace Conference 
DKP Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti Communist Party of Denmark 
DKP-Gladsaxe Danmarks Kommunistpe Parti 
Gladsaxe afdeling 
Communist Party of Denmark, 
Gladsaxe Branch 
DKSU Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem 
Danmark of Sovjetunionen 
The Society for Cooperaiton 
between Denmark and the Soviet 
Union 
DKU Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom Danish Communist Youth 
Ejendomsselskabet Ejendomsselskabet af 25. september 
1945 
The Property Company of 
September 25th 1945 
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EC Hovedbestyrelse Executive committee 
EK Einar Kruse Einar Kruse 
FF Foreningen Folkepressen The Peoples’ Press Association 
Fridericia Allan Fridericia Allan Friderecia 
FT Fredens Tilhængere i Danmark Particans of Peace Denmark 
HH Hans Hedtoft Hans Hedtoft 
IW Ingmar Wagner Ingmar Wagner 
Jensen Jørgen Jensen Jørgen Jensen 
JJ Jørgen Jørgensen Jørgen Jørgensen 
Komintern Danske personsager fra Komintern 
arkivet 
Personal files from the Comintern 
archive 
LO Landsorganisation i Danmark Danish Central Trade Union 
LSA Landsforeningen “Stop 
Atomraketterne” 
The National Committee “Stop the 
Nuclear Rockets” 
NS Next Stop Next Stop 
NC Landslelse National Committee 
OS Ole Sohn Ole Sohn 
SAK Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og 
Sikkerhed 
The Liason Committee for Peace 
and Security 
SC Arbejdsudvalg/Forretningsudvalg Steering Committee 
SiD Sovjetunionen i Dag The Soviet Union Today 
UM Udenrigsministeriet Danish Foreign Ministry 
ÅJ Aage Jørgensen Aage Jørgensen 
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A note on sources 
 
This dissertation is primarily based on Danish archival sources supplemented with Soviet archival 
materials. They are stored in various Danish and foreign archives. As this dissertation deals with 
events and activities in Denmark, the archival sources of the involved Danish organizations and 
persons are considered the most important. 
Concerning the Danish archival materials, there are two different types of archival materials. In 
some cases Danish organizations (for example in the case of The Society for Cooperation between 
Denmark and the Soviet Union) involved in the network for Soviet cultural diplomacy left behind 
more or less complete archives. In other cases only a scattered material (for example in the case of 
the Danish national affiliation of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers) spread 
across various personal papers is available. This material is supplemented by the archives of the 
Danish Foreign Ministry, which contains materials from the period up until 1972. The following 
Danish archives store materials of interest for this dissertation: Rigsarkivet (The National 
Archives), Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv (The Library and Archives of the Workers’ 
Movement), and Det Kongelige Bibliotek (The Royal Library).  In a few cases I have been allowed 
to access to personal collections and these materials have filled central gaps in the materials stored 
in Danish archives. 
 
Due to the restraints on time and financing for a PhD dissertation in Denmark I chose to make use 
of available plentiful copies of Soviet archival material located outside of Russia. This material 
mostly stems from the central party organs in the party apparatus of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and the key party departments involved in carrying out Soviet cultural diplomacy. 
These sources originate from the Russian State Archives for Current History (RGANI), and they 
have been supplemented with copies of source materials stored in other Russian archives; the 
Russian State Archives (GARF), The Russian State Archives for Socio-Political History (RGASPI), 
and The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), as well as source materials 
from The Lithuanian Particular Archives (LPA) and the Latvian National Archives (LVA). 
Copies of documents related to Denmark originating from foreign archives are in Danish called 
“Danica”. Inside Denmark such Danica collections exist in the collections of The National Archives 
and the library of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). However, when using the 
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collection at DIIS it was noted that a number of folders containing the physical paper copies of 
Soviet documents roughly corresponding to the contents of an average moving box were missing. 
Neither I nor the library staffs were able to identify the whereabouts of the missing folders, and, 
therefore, it has to be noted that for an unknown reason the collections of DIIS are incomplete. 
 
The largest and most important collection of copies of original Soviet documents stored outside of 
Russia are, in my opinion, the collections of micro films stored at Lamont Library, one of the 
university libraries at Harvard. Due to the availability, accessibility, and opportunity to make PDF 
copies of the contents of the micro film reels stored at Lamont I decided to use the EliteResearch 
PhD research grant (EliteForsk Ph.d. rejsestipendie) that I was awarded in 2015 on a research trip to 
Lamont. Within the aforementioned restraints on a Danish PhD dissertation it would simply have 
been impossible to utilize he same amount of materials in Russia, even if I was granted access. 
 
I have utilized two kinds of published sources for this dissertation. Since the end of the Cold War 
Russian historian have published numerous volumes of original, previously unpublished 
documents. I treat these publications as similar to the unpublished archival documents. Throughout 
the Cold War the participants in Soviet cultural diplomacy produced endless pages of printed 
materials. I consider these printed materials to be published sources and have primarily used them 
in cases where either no archival sources were available at the time of research or when discussing 
and analyzing these printed materials as an activity of cultural diplomacy. Likewise, in a few cases I 
have made use of oral interviews by conducted by myself. 
 
Finally, a few words on the filling systems of Danish and foreign archives, as they are reflected in 
the manner that references are made in the footnotes of the dissertation. For Danish archives I have 
made use of the conventionally accepted abbreviations of the various archival institutions followed 
by an abbreviation of the organizational archive or personal papers in question followed by the box 
(in Danish “kapsel”, “kasse” or “pakke” depending on the archival institution in question). As each 
box contains any given number of sheets I adhere to the tradition of giving a short headline to the 
document in question and recording its date of origin. However, the archival files of the Danish 
Foreign Ministry do not follow this system, but are labeled by a combination of numerals and 
letters. I observe the tradition of referring to these combinations. Russian archives use a different 
system that I also respect in my footnotes. An abbreviation of the archival institution in question is 
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followed by the number of the collection (“fond”), finding aid (opis’), case number (“delo”), and 
sheet number (lista). Other archives of the former Soviet Union also utilize this combination to 
identify the exacts document in question. However, AVPRF also includes a number of the folder 
(“papka”) between the number of the opis and the delo. I follow this principle as well. In principle, 
this numeral code would be sufficient to identify a given document in the footnotes. However, as 
with the Danish references I include a short headline and date. The references to the Russian 
archives (and also monographs and articles) are in Russian when the original document is in 
Russian. In some cases documents are written in another language and in these cases the references 
are written in English. I have decided not to transliterate references in Russian to the Latin alphabet 
as this would make no difference to a non-Russian speaker. I am unable to provide a translation of 
the headline due to the space restrictions. 
  
Unpublished sources: 
 
Danish archives: 
 
Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv (The Library and Archives of the Workers’ 
Movement): 
 
Alfred Jensen 
Allan Fridericia 
Børge Houmann 
Danmarks Demokratiske Kvindeforbund 
Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti 
Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti, Gladsaxe afdelingen 
Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom 
Dansk-Bulgarsk Selskab 
Dansk Fredskonference 
Einar Kruse 
Ejendomsdelskabet af 25. september 1945 
Foreningen Folkepressen 
Fredens Tilhængere 
Hans Hedtoft 
Ingmar Wagner 
Jørgen Jensen 
Komintern, personal files of Danish cadres 
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Landsforeningen ”Stop Atomraketterne” 
Landsforeningen til Samvirke mellem Danmark og Sovjetunionen 
LO 
Next Stop 
Ole Sohn 
Samarbejdskomiteen for Fred og Sikkerhed 
Socialdemokratiet 
Aage Jørgensen 
 
Dansk Institut for International Studier (Danish Institute for International Studies): 
 
Copies of files of Landsforeningen til samvirke mellem Danmark of Sovjetunionen 
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Vladimir Pimonov 
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Latvian archives: 
 
LVA (Latvian state archives): 
 
Fond 338 
 
Lithuanian archives: 
 
LPA (Lithuanian Particular Archives): 
 
Fond K 1 
 
Russian archives: 
 
GARF (The State Archive of the Russian Federation): 
 
R-9492 USSR Ministry of Justice. 
R-9518 The State Committee on Cultural Relations abroad under the USSR Council of Ministers 
 
RGANI (The Russian State Archive of Current History): 
 
1 Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
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Resume på dansk 
 
I denne afhandling foretages en analyse af de sovjetiske kulturdiplomatiske aktiviteter rettet mod 
Danmark under Den Kolde Krig, defineret som perioden 1945-1991. Afhandlingens overordnede 
sigte er at besvare tre spørgsmål 
1: Hvordan blev virksomheden organiseret og finansieret? 
2: Hvilke typer af aktiviteter fandt sted? 
3: Hvordan blev de modtaget, og hvad kan der siges om deres gennemslagskraft? 
Afhandlingen er opdelt i en indledning, ni kapitler og en konklusion. 
I kapitel 1 diskuteres en række teoretiske og metodiske spørgsmål vedrørende udøvelsen af 
kulturdiplomati samt af forskellige skoler indenfor forskningen i internationale relationer, 
kulturdiplomati, sovjetologi, Den Kolde Krig, fredsbevægelser og kommunismen, hvilket 
afslutningsvis fører til formuleringen af et teoretisk grundlag for den empiriske del af afhandlingen, 
der vægter at undersøge; hvordan budskaber blev formet, og hvilke kanaler de blev fremsat 
igennem, hvilke former de antog, og hvordan de blev modtaget, opfattet og vurderet fra såvel 
sovjetisk som dansk side. Samtidig understreges vigtighed i at inddrage overvejelser af de 
sovjetiske intentioner og ideologisk betingede verdenssyn for vurderingen. 
I kapitlerne 2-9 diskuteres det sovjetiske apparat for kulturdiplomati og dets aktiviteter Med 
udgangspunkt i teorien om monoorganisatorisk socialisme opstilles en model for det sovjetiske 
apparat med tre niveauer; det sovjetiske, det internationale og det nationale, der søger at indeholde 
et fyldestgørende billede. Det sovjetiske niveau indeholder forskellige dele af kommunistpartiet, 
ministerier, statskomiteer, statsvirksomheder og de såkaldte offentlige organisationer, det 
internationale forskellige internationale frontorganisationer (såsom Verdensfredsrådet eller 
Kominform) og det nationale bestående af de nationale afdelinger af internationale 
fredsorganisationer (f.eks. Fredens Tilhængere), den dansk-sovjetiske venskabsforening samt 
forskellige virksomheder. En vigtig pointe er at fremhæve den rolle, forskellige kommunister 
spillede som initiativtagere og drivkræfter. 
I løbet af afhandlingen undersøges og diskuteres en række forskellige initiativer og aktiviteter 
såsom offentlige foredrag i større eller mindre kredse, konferencer, deltagelsen i internationale 
manifestationer, meningsmålinger, udgivelser, filmforevisninger, delegations- og turistrejser, 
radioudsendelser, udstillinger, udvekslinger, åbne breve og demonstrationer. Desuden identificeres 
en række koordinerede kampagner så som underskriftsindsamlinger på f.eks. Stockholm-appellen, 
anklager om amerikansk bakteriologisk krigsførelse i Korea eller kampagnen mod genoprustningen 
af (Vest)Tyskland. 
Med hensyn til modtagelsen og gennemslagskraften konkluderes det, at den sovjetiske direkte og 
støttede virksomhed havde til formål at påvirke den offentlige mening og derigennem skabe et 
indtryk af et offentlig pres, der kunne påvirke de politiske beslutningstagere, men at det var meget 
vanskeligt for de deltagende parter at formulere et budskab, der havde klangbund i en bredere 
offentlighed eller ikke blev undermineret af faktiske sovjetiske handlinger som i Ungarn i 1956 og 
1958. 
Afhandlingens overordnede konklusion er derfor, at trods enkelte succeshistorier og en lidt større 
succes med at sprede budskabet fra midten af 1970’erne havde Sovjetunionen meget vanskeligt ved 
at opnå bred offentlig sympati for sine budskaber, da de var for fremmede for størstedelen af den 
danske offentlighed og derfor lykkedes det heller ikke at øve indflydelse på beslutningstagerne. 
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Summary in English 
 
This dissertation presents an analysis of the Soviet cultural diplomatic activities towards Denmark 
during the Cold War, defined as the period 1945-1991. The overall aim of the dissertation is to 
answer three questions 
1: How were the activities organized and financed? 
2: What forms of activities took place? 
3: How were they received and what can be said about their impact? 
The dissertation is divided into an introduction, nine chapters and a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 discusses a number of theoretical and methodological questions regarding the practice of 
cultural diplomacy and various schools within the fields of research on international relations, 
cultural diplomacy, Soviet studies, the Cold War, peace movements, and communism. Based on 
this, a theoretical approach for the empirical based discussion is formulated. The dissertation 
investigates how messages were framed and through which channels they were disseminated, which 
forms they assumed and how they were received, perceived, and assessed by both the Soviet and the 
Danish sides. At the same time, it emphasizes the importance of incorporating considerations on the 
Soviet intentions and ideological worldview in the overall assessment. 
Based on this approach, chapters 2-9 discuss the Soviet apparatus for cultural diplomacy. Based on 
the theory of mono-organizational socialism, a model establishes a Soviet apparatus of three levels: 
Soviet, International and National, seeking to incorporate all the participating organizations. The 
Soviet level contains various parts of the Communist Party, ministries, state committees, state 
enterprises, and the so-called public organizations, the International level contains various 
international front organizations (e.g. the World Peace Council or Cominform), and the national 
level contains the national affiliates of international peace organizations (e.g, “Fredens 
Tilhængere”), the Danish-Soviet friendship association, and various businesses. An important point 
is to emphasize the role played by various communists as initiators and driving forces. 
In the dissertation a variety of initiatives and activities are discussed. They include public lectures, 
conferences, participation in international manifestations, opinion polls, publications, film 
screenings, delegation visits and tourism, radio broadcasts, exhibitions, exchanges, open letters, and 
demonstrations. In addition, a number of coordinated campaigns are identified, for example, 
signature collections (e.g. on the Stockholm Appeal), accusations of American bacteriological 
warfare in Korea, or the campaign against (West) German rearmament. 
Regarding reception and impact, it is concluded that the Soviet direct and supported activities were 
aimed at influencing public opinion and thereby give the impression of a public pressure that would 
in turn affect policy makers, but that it was very difficult for participants to achieve this aim It 
proved very difficult to frame messages in such a manner that they resonated with the broader 
public or were not undermined by actual Soviet foreign policy actions such as the events in 
Hungary in 1956 and 1958. 
The overall conclusion of the dissertation is that despite some success stories, including a wider 
audience form the mid-1970s on, it proved very difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve broad 
public sympathy for its messages as they more often than not seemed alien to the majority of the 
Danish public and therefore failed to influence the decision-makers. 
 
